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Introduction 
Anton Bebler 
The structure of international community has over centuries experienced 
countless changes resulting from state amalgamation and integration and, on 
the other hand, disintegration and dissolution of large states leading to ap-
pearance of smaller state formations. In earlier times the non-recognition of 
new entities by other states had often had little or no consequence but later 
became important due to growing interdependence of states. Global politics 
in the first half of the XXth century had been strongly marked by the break-
down and/or disappearance of several multinational and colonial empires, 
although their partial contraction in Northern and Southern America started 
already in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries.  
As their result a number of new states were created in Europe and Asia, on 
the territories of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman and 
Chinese empires. Some of them proved to be short-lived (Slovak Soviet Re-
public, Independent state of Fiume, independent republics of Ukraine, Geor-
gia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, et al.) and were absorbed by stronger neighboring 
states. But some nevertheless survived and obtained international recognition, 
also from the successor of the former imperial overlord. Such were the cases 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (later renamed into Yugo-
slavia), Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who 
subsequently entered the League of Nations. Two former Chinese dependen-
cies formally proclaimed their independence but in fact became protectorates 
of Soviet Russia and later of the Soviet Union. Mongolia eventually, more 
than two decades later obtained limited international recognition and almost 
five decades later was admitted to the United Nations. The former Chinese 
dependency Tuwa has been however never internationally recognized and in 
1944 was simply annexed by the Soviet Union and included into the Russian 
Federation. One year later the Soviet government made a similar attempt in 
Northern Iran which was since 1941 occupied by Soviet troops. A secession-
ist Gilan Republic was proclaimed but did not survive the evacuation of the 
Soviet Army under British-American political pressure.  
The next wave of new state creation started in the 1940s under the influ-
ence of the Second World War and followed the defeat of Fascist Italy and 
the destruction of the Third Reich. During the Second World War Iceland 
separated itself from Denmark. Occupied Germany (1945-1949) and Austria 
(1945-1955) lost their international status as independent states and under 
foreign occupation constituted parastates of a special kind. Similarly as in 
Eastern Asia (China, Korea, Vietnam) the political-ideological polarization 
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during the “Cold War” caused the division of amputated Germany (and Aus-
tria) into occupation zones followed by the much-longer division of Germany 
into two separate states (FRG, DDR). The “Free Territory of Trieste” (FTT), 
a parastate officially under UN jurisdiction, formally existed between 1947 
and 1954 on the former Austrian territory occupied and annexed by Italy after 
the First World War. Under the terms of an interstate protocol this parastate 
was abolished and its territory divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The 
Yugoslav zone of earlier military occupation was then subdivided into two 
parts which today belong to Slovenia and Croatia.  
The process of decolonization in Africa, Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean and 
Mediterranean attained its acme in the second half of the XXth century. Two 
former British colonies in Mediterranean Europe-Cyprus and Malta became 
independent. The wave of decolonization brought to well over a hundred the 
number of new independent states and members of the United Nations. Fur-
thermore in the 1960s to 1980s secessionist and other movements fighting 
central governments in post-colonial African states (Nigeria, the Congo, An-
gola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia) and in Asian multinational states (My-
anmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka) had created new parastates. Many of the inter-
nationally unrecognized parastate entities in Asia and Africa were later sub-
dued by the respective central governments at the end of civil wars e.g. in 
Nigeria, the Congo, Angola, Indonesia et al. Some had however existed for 
decades with their state symbols, governments, military and police forces. 
The most recently crushed secessionist parastate had been since 1976 main-
tained by the movement of “Tamil Tigers” on the territory of Sri Lanka. Only 
a very few parastates have succeeded in defending their independence and 
were subsequently internationally recognized and admitted to the UN (Eritrea 
and East Timor). The last former parastate to achieve its independence and 
international recognition was Southern Sudan in 2011.  
Internal tensions and conflicts closely related to ethnic, national, linguistic, 
cultural and religious divides have been experienced by many other contem-
porary states. In the Euro-Atlantic area alone the geography of trouble spots 
has spanned from Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Belgium 
and France to Slovakia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedo-
nia, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, extending further to the Caucasus, 
the Near East and further from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq all the way 
to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines and China. 
Thus the potential for state transformation and fragmentation into new enti-
ties is still present today on, at least, four continents. 
The wave of liberal democratization in the 1990s brought down most East 
European authoritarian communist regimes. In this process several European 
states vanished altogether from the political map (GDR, SFRY, USSR and 
SSR) and over two dozen new entities appeared on the territories of the 
latter three. Among the newly-born states in Europe all former Soviet, Yugo-
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slav and Czechoslovak full-fledged republics have retained or achieved, some 
very soon, wide international recognition, membership in the UN and subse-
quently in other international organizations. However the disintegration of 
two “socialist federations” SFR Yugoslavia and USSR created also several 
parastates within the territories of three Yugoslav republics and of four Sovi-
et republics. Of the four “Yugoslav” parastates two were crushed or formally 
disbanded (“Republic of Serbian Kraina” in Croatia and “Herzegbosna” in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina), one survived and achieved considerable but not uni-
versal international recognition (Kosovo). One secessionist parastate (Repub-
lika Srpska) survived in name but as an “entity” (unit) within federal Bosnia 
& Herzegovina and not as an independent state. In the post-Soviet space 
there have been five cases of secession within full-fledged republics – one 
unsuccessful (Chechnya in the Russian Federation, brutally suppressed by the 
Russian military and security forces) and four, so far, successful ones (Trans-
nistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorny 
Karabakh in Azerbaijan and most recently Crimea in Ukraine).  
There is a number of academic books dealing with each of the secessions 
enumerated above, which are being used mainly by researchers and area ex-
perts. This volume is devoted to informing the general public about several 
flashpoints of tensions and occasional violence which resulted in the last four 
decades from conflicts within and disintegration of states in or close to Eu-
rope. They are all located in South Eastern Europe, in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean and in the Transcaucasia. In the mass media parlance and also in the 
academic literature of international relations the earlier ones were branded 
the “frozen conflicts”. The chief reason for this designation was the fact that 
the violent stage in each of these conflicts ended in a stalemate and without a 
peace treaty.  
The adjective “frozen” as applied to these cases has been substantively of 
questionable validity for, at least, two reasons. Firstly, several of them have 
been, also recently, quite hot being accompanied by armed violence, includ-
ing mini wars which caused a considerable loss of human life and destruc-
tion. Secondly, their duration has been, historically short when compared to 
some other conflicts in Europe, in Europe’s vicimity or to those created by 
European powers on three other continents and in the Atlantic.  
The much longer lasting and still unresolved interstate conflict on the edge 
of European continent has been between two members of the European Un-
ion and the NATO. Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory with a territory of 
6.8 square kilometres and a population of about 30.000 inhabitants, has re-
mained a bone of contention since its occupation by the British in 1704. Nine 
years later, in 1713 under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht it was ceded by 
Spain to Great Britain “in perpetuity”. Nevertheless many successive Spanish 
governments, including the present one, have tried various kinds of diplomat-
ic and non-diplomatic pressures – land blockades, prevention or disruptions 
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of vehicular and other road traffic, harassment of tourists and the Gibraltari-
ans, intimidation by low jet overflights etc.). The objective has been to 
achieve the termination of British sovereignty and of the Gibraltarians’ self-
rule. The key Spanish argument has been that the British enclave has “dis-
rupted the unity and territorial integrity of Spain”. The same argument could 
be however used by Spain also against neighbouring Portugal who seceded 
and declared its independence from Spain in the XVIIth century. On the other 
hand, a similar argument could be advanced also by Morocco against Spain 
itself concerning the Spanish colonial possessions in the form of two en-
claves on the Moroccan coast – Ceuta and Melilla. In the 1969 Constitution 
of Gibraltar Great Britain pledged to “never enter into arrangements under 
which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another 
state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes” and the Gi-
braltarians in a referendum of 1967 and again in 2012 overwhelmingly re-
jected proposals for restoring Spanish sovereignty. So, the three hundred 
years-old Spanish-British dispute certainly much more deserves the distinc-
tion of a champion among the protracted conflicts in Europe than the so-
called frozen conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and in the Trancaucasia. Also 
elsewhere on the European continent and in adjacent waters there remains a 
number of old dormant conflicts or half-concealed territorial claims which 
might in the future escalate into more serious conflicts between European 
states. 
The label “frozen conflict” has become fashionable since 1991 and mostly 
applied to several developments in the post-Soviet space. Two cases outside 
this area (Cyprus and Kosovo) have been also treated as part of the same 
group because of their considerable structural similarity with the ex-Soviet 
ones. In all six cases sharp intrastate conflicts within multinational states had 
occurred and culminated in armed violence along the lines separating ethnic, 
national, cultural and linguistic communities. The immediate causes of esca-
lation which led to armed violence had ranged widely between actual or 
feared subordinated status, discrimination and domination by the majority 
national group, to political disenfranchising of the minority group, grave vio-
lations of human rights and harsh police repression. The relevant European 
experience since 1970s has indicated that the fragmentation of a larger state 
and the secession of its part has been more likely to occur where the minority 
population is relatively numerous, spatially concentrated, culturally and reli-
giously substantially different from the majority nation and hence cannot be 
easily culturally and politically absorbed and assimilated. If actively opposed 
by the central government an attempt of separation could not be successful 
without an overt or covert external military support and/or intervention by a 
militarily stronger state(s) or by an international organization.  
There have been, of course, considerable differences among the above-
mentioned “frozen conflicts”. In two cases (Cyprus and Moldova) armed 
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violence started in a unitary state while in the remaining cases it happened in 
states with elements of federalism in the form of autonomies. Of these four 
cases two autonomies were named after the titular nation (Abkhazia, South-
ern Ossetia). The other two autonomous provinces bore old geographic 
names (Nagorny Karabakh, Kosovo, Crimea). In the five autonomous prov-
inces a national minority of the larger state constituted a strong provincial 
majority. The admittedly limited sample of seven clearly ethnically marked 
internal conflicts does not support the thesis that ethnofederal systems as 
such “dig their own grave”. It seems that ethnofederalism decreases neither 
the probability of sharp intercommunal conflicts nor the level of accompany-
ing violence. The existence or non-existence of ethnofederalism prior to a 
secession apparently has no impact on arriving subsequently at a peaceful 
resolution of each conflict.1 The record shows that secessions in some Euro-
pean states, with or without the evocation of the right to external self-
determination, have removed some earlier sources of conflicts between the 
ethnic communities involved and their elites. On the other hand, secessions 
as a rule create new problems, tensions and conflicts. Among the seven con-
flictual pairs Serbia and Kosovo have progressed the most in peacefully man-
aging these problems thus removing, very recently their dispute half-way 
from the category of “frozen conflicts”. 
In all seven cases the outcome of a secession was decively influenced by 
outside interference or by outright military intervention. The subsequent ex-
ternal military protection still largely determines the present situation. In all 
cases the separation was followed by conflictual relations between the seces-
sionist entity and its protector, on one hand, and the truncated larger state, on 
the other. As a rule the latter refuses to recognize the secessionist entity and 
endeavours to prevent its recognition by the international community. The 
secessionist entities have been in various degrees, fully or partly internation-
ally isolated and politically deprived. Together with the two entities outside 
the post-Soviet space four ex-Soviet cases constitute a small group of six de 
facto existing and formally independent states which lack universal interna-
tional recognition. None of them is really fully independent. Five of these 
states have gained recognition from none to only five UN member states. 
These are Northern Cyprus, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Na-
gorny Karabakh. Kosovo has been much more successful in obtaining over 
100 recognitions by the UN members but still cannot enter key international 
organizations, such as the Organization of United Nations. The Autonomous 
                                                          
1 See discussions on problems of ethnofederalism in: Rothchild, Donald, and Roeder Philip 
(eds.). Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (2005). Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY; Cornell, Svante. Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in 
theoretical perspective (2002). In: World Politics 54, 2, pp. 254-76; Zürcher, Christopher. 
The Post-Soviet Ears: Rebellion, Ethnic conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (2007). 
New York University Press, New York. 
12 Anton Bebler  
Republic of Crimea within Ukraine was, unlike the six other cases, renamed 
into the Republic of Crimea and together with the city of Sevastopol formally 
admitted as two new federal units into the Russian Federation. As such the 
Republic of Crimea does not need international recognition as an independent 
state. However numerous UN members, including three permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, condemned Crimea’s annexation by the Russian 
Federation and refused to recognize its legitimacy. 
All seven conflicts reviewed in this volume involve the application or vio-
lation of either of the two fundamental principles of international law explic-
itly acknowledged in the UN Charter. These are the principle of self-
determination of peoples and the principle of territorial integrity of states. 
The principle of external self-determination was first applied in the process 
of decolonisation of Latin America and Africa i.a. in order to prevent and 
resolve potential border disputes. By virtue of this principle the administra-
tive borders previously drawn by the former colonial powers between the 
colonies were elevated to the status of international borders at the moment 
when a respective administrative area declared its independence. Applied to 
the Soviet Union and the SFR of Yugoslavia the internal demarkation be-
tween the full-fledged republics became external frontiers of new states in the 
sense of international law, but not those between the full-fledged and auton-
omous republics or autonomous regions.  
The “internal” aspect of the right to self-determination, if realized within 
the framework of a given state does not infringe on the territorial integrity of 
a state concerned. Outside the colonial context, the right to self-determination 
has been deemed by most international lawyers to be limited to internal self-
determination only, while the right to external self-determination in the form 
of a secession is still not generally recognized as legitimate. The legitimation 
of a secession could be however facilitated by preceding gross violations of 
basic human rights, especially by attempted genocide, by the outbreak of 
armed conflicts, by policies of despotic governments oppressing minorities, 
by the exclusion of a minority from the political process etc. In order to be 
recognized internationally a secession resulting from external self-
determination needs to follow appropriate democratic procedures, notably a 
free and fair referendum on independence, ideally under international super-
vision. A conditional extraordinary allowance to secede as a last resort in 
extreme cases is a debatable proposition in international legal scholarship. 
Most authors opine that such a remedial right or allowance does not form part 
of the doctrine of international law. Secession thus remains a matter unregu-
lated by international law.  
In all cases treated in this volume the problem of international recognition 
has been politically very relevant, accompanied by considerable humanitari-
an, economic and many other implications. The Montevideo convention stip-
ulated four minimal preconditions for recognizing statehood of a given new 
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entity: (1) a defined territory, (2) a permanent population, (3) an effective 
government and (4) the ability to conduct relations with other states. These 
objective criteria for determining independent statehood are however very 
general and their application to concrete cases usually depends on subjective, 
mostly political appreciation. Especially the “effectiveness” of government is 
a question of degree. The assessment of statehood in international law and in 
international politics overlaps, but differs. The political practice of recogni-
tion of states, as a rule, starts out from the criteria of international law, but is 
usually guided by additional considerations. It is very possible that for partic-
ular political reasons and motives an entity short of the quality of viable 
statehood is recognized as an independent state by another state or by a group 
of states. Territorial entities can thus fall into one of three categories: (1) enti-
ties fulfilling the relevant criteria for statehood and universally recognized; 
(2) state-like entities fulfilling all relevant criteria but which are not univer-
sally recognized; and (3) entities lacking viable statehood but nevertheless 
recognized by one or by more other states. The Guidelines on the Recogni-
tion of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, decided on 16 
December 1991 by the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the European 
Community, defined the recognition criteria for the entities which emerged 
from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The recognition policy of the EU 
concerned only the constituent states or the highest ranking component units 
of the dissolving federations. This restrictive position was based on the legal 
opinion issued by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on former 
Yugoslavia established in November 1993 by the European Communities. 
Chaired by Robert Badinter this commission based its opinion on the legal 
principle of uti possidetis and mechanically applied it also to cases where the 
legal possession of a contested territory had been maintained by undemocrat-
ic means and harsh repression.  
This volume grew out of an international conference on “frozen conflicts” 
in Europe which was held at Lake Bled in Slovenia in August 2012. The con-
ference was organized by the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia and finan-
cially supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Germany. Due to financial 
and organizational constraints the paper-givers and other discussants could 
not analyze all conflicts presented in this volume. In order to provide a more 
complete picture additional chapters were commissioned. For each of the 
then six conflicts I searched a reputable expert who would be neither from a 
seceded entity nor from a larger state which lost its part as a result of the se-
cession. The purpose of this selectivity was to obtain as much as possible the 
invited authors’ political impartiality. For each chapter on originally six con-
flicts I endeavored to attract also academic commentators from both sides of 
the conflict. In most cases it proved to be very difficult. My repeated invita-
tions were either flatly rejected, went unanswered or I simply could not find 
an academic expert capable of writing a solid commentary in English. In two 
14 Anton Bebler  
cases the comments I received were so badly biased that I had to drop them. 
In other cases I negotiated with their authors and used my editorial preroga-
tives to tone down the belligerence. Even though not entirely successful I 
included several commentaries in order to show to the reader reflections of 
the still persisting sharp animosity in political and national conflicts reviewed 
in the volume. The desired design of the chapters devoted to six conflicts was 
eventually only partly implemented.  
In order to compensate for the underachieved and to enrich the informative 
value of the volume I added to this basic architecture recommendations by 
the reputable think tank International Crisis Group and a paper on the en-
deavors of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in medi-
ating the conflict in Moldova. To the section on the Serbia-Kosovo conflict I 
added three papers written by an Albanian Kosovar researcher (who was later 
elected to the Parliamentarian Assembly of Kosovo), a Kosovo Serb City 
Councilman in Kosovska Mitrovica (who was in jail waiting for a trial on a 
charge of alleged association with killings in spring 1999) and a prominent 
human rights activist from Serbia proper. Their papers illuminate the com-
plexity of the Kosovo problem and the efforts actively supported by the in-
ternational community to achieve the normalization of relations between the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo/Kosova. The last to be added 
was my own chapter on the newest Ukrainian-Russian conflict over Crimea 
which worsened the prospects of resolving other conflicts in the ex-Soviet 
space. 
Participants of the Bled conference proposed a number of recommenda-
tions which are still relevant: 
 in order to allow the win-win logic prevail, political will of all par-
ties involved is indispensable. All sides should employ exclusively 
political and diplomatic means and refrain from using violence and 
coercion. 
 the long-term objective of all parties must be reaching a sustainable 
and mutually acceptable settlement, which will take into account the 
legitimate interests of the populations involved and promote recon-
ciliation, good neighborly relations, regional security and coopera-
tion. 
 there are no instant solutions to “frozen conflicts”. The policy of 
small steps and confidence-building measures should be patiently 
applied in order to make irreversible progress towards a long-term 
solution. No deadlines should be enforced, unless agreed upon by 
the parties in the conflict. 
 at the start of negotiations an agreement on basic ground rules must 
be reached and respected at all times, including an appropriate and 
unobtrusive language, the validity of documents and agreements 
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adopted in the past and a clear agenda for future negotiations. All 
parties must act in an honest and transparent manner. 
 areas of common interest need to be defined and pragmatic coopera-
tion between the sides in the conflict promoted in order to establish 
and maintain a climate of trust. International organizations could fa-
cilitate achieving binding legal solutions between opposing sides 
and should support only those projects which jointly involve the 
sides in the conflict in order to facilitate cross-community commu-
nication exchange and cooperation at the local level. 
 the status quo on the ground could be improved by joint border 
management, by respecting demarcation lines and borders until ac-
ceptable long-term solutions are found, by avoiding and preventing 
incidents and violence, by respectinog ceasefires and by demilitariz-
ing the areas of contact in order to (re)build mutual trust. 
 sustainable settlements must be based on the principles of interna-
tional law and should include provisions for a democratic (instead of 
ethnocratic) electoral system which will protect the legitimate inter-
ests of national and religious minorities. 
 although all “frozen conflicts” are sui generis, some lessons can be 
learned from success stories, for example, the Polish-German recon-
ciliation and the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland; 
 a single set of unambiguous standards for protecting minorities 
ought to be agreed upon and respected; 
 the less than universally recognized states are well-advised to con-
sider and promote informal cooperation with various regional and 
other international organizations, joining, when possible non-
political, professional, technical, environmental etc. international 
organizations, which in addition to practical advantages to their 
population, could facilitate the progress towards eventual normaliza-
tion of their status; 
 convincing one’s own community is more important and often more 
difficult than convincing one’s opponent. Practical people-to-people 
contacts on the ground and involving civil societies are crucial. This 
could be facilitated by free travel, cross-border traffic and by partic-
ipation in various international/regional sports and cultural events; 
 reaching an agreement is just the beginning. A lot of strenuous ef-
forts need to be invested in order to buttress and implement an 
agreed solution, to strengthen the rule of law, provide for sustainable 
economic development, improve wellbeing, services and equal 
rights for all citizens. The constructive role of third parties and re-
gion-wide support are essential for achieving durable improvements; 
 every lasting peace process needs to include reconciliation between 
the sides in conflict. In order to promote common understanding of 
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disputed and painful historical events it is advisable to establish 
truth and reconciliation commissions. 
The unresolved conflicts in South-Eastern Europe and in Europe’s immediate 
vicinity have been very relevant to many European and some non-European 
states. The “frozen conflicts” presented and analyzed in this volume are also 
of concern to the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and other inter-
national organizations. The latest conflict over Crimea has magnified their 
wider political and security implications. These conflicts not only, in various 
degrees, poison regional security and impede the attainment of the strategic 
goal shared by key European and Euroatlantic international organizations – a 
united, free, peaceful, secure and prosperous Europe. The “frozen conflicts” 
thus well deserve the attention of the international community. I hope that 
this volume will contribute to better understanding of these trouble spots and 
stimulate the search for their peaceful resolution. 
 
June 2015 
 
Republic of Cyprus vs. Northern Cyprus 
 

The Cyprus Problem 
James Ker-Lindsay 
Introduction 
For over fifty years, the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the 
small island of Cyprus has been a source of concern in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. Not only has it repeatedly threatened to bring Greece and Turkey into 
conflict, and remains an ongoing point of contention between Athens and 
Ankara, it has also become a major point of discord between the European 
Union and Turkey. While the roots of the conflict can be traced back hun-
dreds of years, in contemporary terms the problem dates back to when the 
island became independent in 1960, following 82 years of British colonial 
rule. The complex constitutional arrangement designed to balance relations 
between the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypriots last-
ed a mere three years. In 1963, fighting broke out and led to the collapse of 
the bicommunal Cypriot state. Since then, the UN has been at the forefront of 
efforts to try to forge a settlement between the two communities; a task made 
all the more difficult after the island was divided following a Turkish military 
invasion in 1974. However, despite the considerable time and effort spent on 
trying to find a political solution to the dispute, the Cyprus Problem remains 
unresolved. This chapter will explore the history of the Cyprus problem be-
fore examining the key areas of contention between the two sides. It will 
show how debates over the structure of a new state, as well as over issues 
such a property, security and the economy, all serve to complicate efforts to 
reunite the island. Finally, the chapter will examine the possible opportunities 
for resolution. 
History of the Cyprus Problem 
On 16 August 1960, the Republic of Cyprus became an independent state 
after 82 years of British colonial rule. It had not been an easy process. In 
1955, the majority Greek Cypriot population, representing 78 per cent of the 
island’s 550,000 inhabitants at the time, had initiated an armed guerrilla up-
rising to unite the island with Greece (enosis) (see Holland, 1998). Mean-
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while, the Turkish Cypriots, who represented 18 per cent of the population,1 
fearing that enosis would leave them as a vulnerable minority in a Greek 
state, had in turn fought to divide the island between Greece and Turkey 
(taksim). Greece and Turkey, fearful that a serious escalation of fighting in 
Cyprus could lead to a full scale war between them, decided that the most 
suitable compromise solution would be to create a wholly new and independ-
ent country. 
The constitution of the new state gave equal decision-making powers to 
the two main communities on a range of key issues. For instance, the Greek 
Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice-president (elected exclusively 
by their own communities) held extensive veto rights. At the same time, the 
Turkish Cypriots were given 30 per cent of all government posts. This in-
cluded three of the ten ministerial posts, 30 per cent of parliamentary seats, 
30 per cent of civil service appointments and 40 per cent of its proposed ar-
my. Underpinning this constitutional structure was the Treaty of Guarantee, 
an international agreement that gave Greece, Turkey and the United King-
dom the duty to protect the ‘sovereignty, independence and territorial integri-
ty’ of the new Cyprus state (see Macris, 2003). Cyprus was expressly prohib-
ited from joining any other state, either in whole or in part. Despite this pro-
hibition on enosis and taksim, the two communities were nevertheless permit-
ted to retain close ties with Greece and Turkey. For example, the flags of 
Greece and Turkey were permitted to fly alongside the flag of the Republic 
of Cyprus on government buildings during holidays. Greek and Turkish were 
the two official languages of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, under the 
Treaty of Alliance, both Greece and Turkey were permitted to retain a small 
military force, 950 and 650 troops respectively, on the island.  
Following independence, the widespread hope was that the tensions of the 
previous years would soon subside. However, disputes soon emerged be-
tween the two communities on a range of issues. Key points of contention 
included the establishment of Greek and Turkish municipalities in the main 
cities, questions of taxation and the structure of the armed forces. In late 
1963, Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot president proposed a number 
of constitutional amendments. These were seen by the Turkish Cypriots as an 
attempt to reduce their powers. They were therefore rejected by the Govern-
ment of Turkey, acting in its above stated capacity as a guarantor of the Cy-
prus constitution. This led to tensions between the two communities and, in 
late-December 1963, fighting broke out in the capital city, Nicosia. In March 
1964, the United Nations Security Council authorised the creation of a 
peacekeeping force for the island (UNFICYP). It also instructed the UN Sec-
retary-General to appoint a mediator to assist the two sides reach a political 
settlement. (For more on this period see Droussiotis, 2008; James, 2001; and 
                                                          
1 The remaining 4 per cent of the population was made up of three small ethno-religious 
communities – Maronites, Armenians and Latins (descendants of Catholic Italians). 
 The Cyprus Problem 21 
 
Ker-Lindsay, 2004). Crucially, the UN Resolution also recognised the Greek 
Cypriots as representing the legitimate institutions of the Republic of Cyprus; 
a position that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey contest to this day. 
The formal role of mediator fell into abeyance in 1966. In its place, the 
UN Mission of Good Offices was established. However, by the early 1970s 
efforts to reach a settlement between the two communities were increasingly 
been overshadowed by tensions within in the Greek Cypriot community be-
tween those who were willing to accept an independent Cypriot states and a 
small, hard line minority who still wanted enosis. In July 1974, the military 
government in Greece, which supported union, organised a coup d’état 
against the Greek Cypriot-controlled government of Cyprus (see Asmussen, 
2008; Birand, 1985; and Constandinos, 2009). Fearing that this could lead to 
Greek annexation of the island, the Turkish Government exercised its rights 
under the Treaty of Guarantee and invaded Cyprus. A peace conference con-
vened in Geneva failed to secure an agreement and Turkey resumed its offen-
sive in August. By the time another, permanent ceasefire was reached, the 
Turkish army had managed to capture 36 per cent of the island’s territory. 
The effects of the invasion were catastrophic for the Greek Cypriots. 160,000 
people – approximately one third of the Greek Cypriot population – had fled 
their homes and many of the island’s most economically productive areas 
were now under Turkish occupation. Henceforth, Greek Cypriots were de-
nied access to the areas now under Turkish occupation. Meanwhile, in the 
months that followed, the Turkish Cypriot communities living in those areas 
still under the control of the (Greek Cypriot) Government of Cyprus moved 
to those areas under Turkish Cypriot control. Cyprus was now divided and 
the two communities lived apart. There was just one single crossing point 
between the two sides, in the capital. 
In the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, the Turkish Cypriots established 
the ‘Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus’. This was presented as a 
prelude for reunification talks based on an eventual federal settlement. In 
1977, the leaders of the two sides concluded what would come to be known 
as the First High Level Agreement. This confirmed that the eventual reunifi-
cation of the island would be based on a geographic federation made up of 
two communities and two territories; a model that is known as a bizonal bi-
communal federation. This formula was reconfirmed two years later, in 1979, 
in what is known as the Second High Level Agreement. To this day, the two 
High Level Agreements, and the creation of a bizonal bicommunal federa-
tion, remain at the core of all discussions concerning the settlement of the 
Cyprus Problem. 
Despite these agreements, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, seizing on polit-
ical instability in Turkey at the time, unilaterally declared independence in 
1983. Although Turkey recognised the Turkish Cypriot state, the move was 
immediately and strongly condemned by the international community. The 
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UN Security Council passed Resolution 541 (1983), which condemned the 
declaration of independence and called on all states not to recognise the so-
called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). Although the UN 
continued its efforts to broker a comprehensive solution, the Turkish Gov-
ernment and the Turkish Cypriot leadership showed little desire to reach a 
federal settlement. Instead, they increasingly talked of a confederation. This 
was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots, who believed that such a state would 
soon break apart. This stalemate began to change in 1990, when the Republic 
of Cyprus applied for EU membership. (For more on the accession process, 
see Christou, 2004 and Sepos, 2008). In response, Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots were adamant that this could not be allowed to happen as it would 
give the Greek Cypriots a veto over Turkey’s European Union accession 
path. Therefore, Ankara warned the EU and the Cyprus Government that any 
steps to integrate Cyprus into the European Union would be matched by Tur-
key and the TRNC. 
However, despite these threats, the EU refused to change its position. It 
repeatedly insisted that it would not allow Turkey to have a veto over who 
could and could not become a member. Although there was a clear preference 
for a united Cyprus in the EU, the member states were adamant that they 
would accept Cyprus as a member without a solution if necessary. Realising 
that the EU was committed to Cypriot membership, in late 2001 Rauf 
Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, proposed new talks.2 At first these 
were clearly designed as a stalling tactic. By engaging in talks, he hoped that 
the European Union would delay Cypriot accession. However, in November 
2002, a new government came to power in Turkey that was determined to 
join the EU. Realising that if Cyprus joined the EU without a solution the 
Greek Cypriots would be in a position to block their membership and demand 
more favourable settlement terms, Ankara therefore put pressure on the Turk-
ish Cypriot leadership to engage more actively in the process. At the same 
time, the Turkish Cypriot people began to demand political change. Recog-
nising the economic and social benefits EU membership would bring them, 
tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots (out of a population of 150,000) took 
to the streets to demand reunification.3 
In April 2003, the EU signed the Treaty of Accession with Cyprus and 
nine other European states. This was the final confirmation that Cyprus 
would join the EU the following year. Just days later, the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership announced that it would ease the heavy restrictions on crossing the 
line. Henceforth, people from both communities, as well as foreigners, could 
cross over simply by presenting their ID card or passport. It was also decided 
that further crossing points should be opened along the dividing line. In Janu-
ary 2004, at the request of the Turkish Government, a last attempt was made 
                                                          
2 ‘Denktash seeks to bypass UN with direct talks call’, Cyprus Mail, 10 November 2001. 
3 ‘Turkish Cypriots rally for UN plan’, The Guardian, 15 January 2003. 
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to reunify the island before it joined the European Union, on 1 May. After an 
intensive series of talks in Cyprus and Switzerland, the UN presented the two 
sides with a comprehensive reunification proposal (the Annan Plan). (For 
more on the UN reunification process, see Hannay, 2004; Faustmann and 
Varnava, 2011). In conformity with long standing agreements, it proposed a 
bizonal, bicommunal federation. In a referendum held on 24 April 2004, the 
plan was accepted by 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot community. Howev-
er, it was rejected by 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots. Despite this, Cyprus 
joined the EU the following week. While it still remained divided in real 
terms, under the terms of accession, and in accordance with international law, 
the whole island is technically a member of the European Union. At the re-
quest of the Cyprus Government, the application of EU law is suspended in 
those areas that are not under its ‘effective control’. 
In 2008, the UN restarted talks between the two sides. At first there was 
considerable optimism that this new process could yield positive results as 
there was now a new, more moderate political leader on the Greek Cypriot 
side. However, despite the best efforts of the United Nations, the talks failed 
to make a breakthrough.4 The election of Nicos Anastasiades, the leader of 
the centre-right Democratic Rally (DISY), and a prominent supporter of the 
Annan Plan in 2004, to the presidency, in February 2013, once again raised 
hopes that another initiative could be launched. But this was soon overshad-
owed by the emergence of a severe economic crisis. This delayed the start of 
new negotiations until February 2014, when, with the active involvement of 
the United States, a new process got underway after the two sides agreed a 
joint statement on the future path of discussions.5 Once again, this reiterated 
that the basis of a solution would be a bizonal bicommunal federation in line 
with the High Level Agreements.6 
Current Issues of Contention 
In broad terms, one can identify six main areas of contention between the two 
communities. Three of these – constitutional arrangements, territory and 
property, security – may be considered to be the main obstructions to an 
agreement. However, three further areas will have to be addressed: the econo-
                                                          
4 For accounts of the UN reunification talks since 2008, see the regular reports produced by 
the United Nations: ‘Assessment report of the Secretary-General on the status of the negotia-
tions in Cyprus’. United Nations Security Council Documents S/2009/610, 30 November 
2009; S/2010/238, 11 May 2010; S/2010/603, 24 November 2010; S/2011/112, 4 March 
2011; S/2011/4908, 8 August 2011; S/2012/149, 12 March 2012;  
5 ‘Greek and Turkish Cypriots to renew peace talks’, Associated Press, 8 February 2014. 
6 ‘Joint Declaration’, 11 February 2014. 
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my, settlers and representation in the European Union (for more on these see 
Ker-Lindsay, 2011). 
Constitutional issues 
In terms of the constitutional issues, there are in fact a number of specific 
points of difference. These range from the more conceptual to the overtly 
practical. At the more conceptual level, disagreement centres on the relation-
ship between bizonality and bicomunality. This has always been a particular-
ly troublesome area for the two communities. For the Greek Cypriots, a bi-
zonal bicommunal federation would be structured around two federal states. 
One would be predominantly Greek Cypriot. However, it would not be ex-
clusively so. Likewise, the other would probably be predominantly, but not 
wholly, Turkish Cypriot. Therefore, while the two states may appear to be 
more or less Greek and Turkish Cypriot, they would not be specifically given 
a fixed and unchanging ethnic orientation. The Turkish Cypriots take a very 
different approach. In their view, bizonality and bicommunality are directly 
linked. As they see it, they cannot have security without having a defined 
Turkish Cypriot state. Thus, one state will be Greek Cypriot and the other 
will be Turkish Cypriot. 
Additionally, disagreements exist over the way in which the federal states 
and the central government will interact and work with one another. The 
Greek Cypriots have traditionally argued the case for a strong central admin-
istration that will have authority over as many areas of policy as possible. 
The only issues that would come under the power of the federal states would 
be those areas where there is a clear communal interest, such as education. 
Yet again, the Turkish Cypriot perspective is rather different. They want to 
ensure that as many competences as possible are handed over to the federated 
states. Indeed, they would even like to see certain elements of foreign affairs 
and defence come under the control of the separate federal units, such as the 
right to establish representative offices abroad and the management of rela-
tions with Greek and Turkish troops on the island (an issue that will be dis-
cussed a little later on). As already noted, the Greek Cypriots have long op-
posed any sort of loose federation, let alone confederation. In part this has 
been because of their fear that this could ultimately lead to the legal disinte-
gration of the state along the lines of the break up of Czechoslovakia. At the 
same time, many Greek Cypriots have a continuing wish to exert control over 
a strong central state. But this may now be changing. Prior to his election, 
Nicos Anastasiades strongly hinted that he was sympathetic to a looser feder-
al model, albeit defined in terms of subsidiarity; devolving power to the most 
appropriate level. 
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Finally, there are also a number of questions relating to the institutions of 
any new state. For example, what would be the structure of the key legisla-
tive and executive bodies? Would the parliament have one chamber or two? 
Would there be a rotating presidency or a presidential council? Also, the 
structure of the federal judicial system needs to be addressed, including the 
representation of the two communities in a supreme court.  
Property and territory 
The second major area of contention centres on the interrelated issues of ter-
ritory and property. Both sides readily accept that any solution will mean that 
the area currently under Turkish Cypriot control will have to be reduced from 
the current 36 per cent of the island. According to most estimates, the amount 
of land that would be returned is likely to amount to 8-11 per cent of the is-
land’s total territory. In other words, the size of the Turkish Cypriot federal 
state will most probably amount to 26-29 per cent of the island. However, it 
is understood that it may be even smaller if the Greek Cypriots are willing to 
cede more political powers to the Turkish Cypriots as a trade off for more 
land. At the same time, there is the question of which areas will be relin-
quished by the Turkish Cypriots. Traditionally, the Greek Cypriots have 
sought the return of the city of Famagusta, on the eastern coast of the island, 
and the large town of Morphou, in the north east. Regaining control of these 
areas would allow large numbers of refugees (more accurately, internally 
displaced persons IDPs) to return to their properties. Indeed, a central aim for 
the Greek Cypriot leadership will be to ensure that as many refugees as pos-
sible will be able to return to their homes, if they so want, and that as many 
of them as possible will be in Greek Cypriot controlled areas. 
Although a territorial readjustment would allow many Greek Cypriots to 
return to their properties, questions would remain concerning Greek Cypriot 
properties in areas that would remain under Turkish Cypriot control. This is 
an extremely contentious issue (Loizides and Antoniades, 2009; and Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2010). Whereas the Greek Cypriots have traditionally 
argued that all displaced persons should have their entire property returned to 
them, the Turkish Cypriots have tended to call for some form of property 
exchange. This would allow Turkish Cypriot properties in the south to be 
swapped for Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Or, at least, swap those 
properties where the original Turkish Cypriot owner had no desire to return 
and live in the south. Some form of compensation could then make up the 
difference. Needless to say, both ideas have their flaws and are considered to 
be unacceptable by the other side. For instance, the Turkish Cypriots argue 
that if they returned all Greek Cypriot property to its original owners it would 
be impossible to create a viable Turkish Cypriot federal unit. If all the Greek 
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Cypriots who had property in the north were to return, they could well out-
number the Turkish Cypriots. For their part, the Greek Cypriots argue that 
any measure that limits the right of people to return to their land is a funda-
mental infringement of their human rights. The Greek Cypriot position is that 
the vast majority, if not all, Greek Cypriots must be given the explicit right to 
return to their homes if they so wish. In reality, it should be noted that the 
property issue is increasingly being resolved by other means. Most notably, 
there is now a mechanism for dealing with the property claims of displaced 
Greek Cypriots. Importantly, this rarely results in restitution. More often than 
not, the Turkish Cypriot body responsible for handling such claims, which 
has been recognised as legitimate by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR),7 has offered compensation instead. With the financial crisis, it ap-
pears that increasing numbers of Greek Cypriots are now taking this route.8  
Security 
The third key area is security. This is a crucial issue for both communities 
(see Ker-Lindsay, 2008). The Greek Cypriots are adamantly opposed to the 
continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, which gives Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom a right to intervene in the internal affairs of the island. As 
they see it, it is wholly unacceptable that the constitutional structure of the 
Cypriot state should be subject to the guarantee of any third countries, let 
alone that these states also have a right to intervene militarily. Such an idea is 
contrary to the very principles of state sovereignty and has no place in the 
twenty-first century, especially as they relate to a state that is a member of 
the European Union. Indeed, in February 2010, the House of Representatives 
passed a Resolution stressing that the Treaty of Guarantee had no place in a 
settlement.9 At the same time, they would like to scrap the Treaty of Alliance, 
which permits Greece and Turkey to station a certain number of troops on the 
island. A permanent garrison of Turkish troops on the island, especially when 
linked with a right of intervention, represents a fundamental threat to the se-
curity and stability of the Cypriot state. All Turkish troops must therefore be 
removed. As one would expect, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey take a very 
different view. As far as they are concerned there can be no changes to the 
Treaty of Guarantee. Indeed, just days after the Greek Cypriot resolution, 
Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians passed a resolution noting that the Treaty is 
an integral part of any solution.10 The Turkish Cypriots argue that past expe-
                                                          
7 ‘ECHR recognises north’s Immovable Property Commission’, Cyprus Mail, 6 March 2010. 
8 ‘Bill seeks to bypass IPC for those in need’, Cyprus Mail, 18 June 2013. 
9 ‘House: No Guarantee’, Cyprus News Agency, 19 February 2010. 
10 ‘TRNC Parliament Approves Resolution on Treaty of Guarantee’, Asia Pulse, 24 February 
2010. 
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rience has shown that the Greek Cypriots cannot be trusted. Unless Turkey 
has a guaranteed right of intervention, there is little to ensure that the Greek 
Cypriots will stick to the terms of any settlement. Moreover, the stationing of 
Turkish troops in Cyprus offers the best safeguards that the Turkish Cypriots 
will be protected from attack. Therefore, while the number of troops present 
after a settlement is open to negotiation, they cannot be removed altogether.  
Another major Greek Cypriot concern over security that will need to be 
addressed in any future settlement effort is the question of implementation. 
This was a major issue in 2004 (Faustmann, 2004). Many Greek Cypriots 
remain deeply distrustful of Turkey and do not believe that it will be willing 
to uphold its side of any agreement. They want to know how the international 
community, including the European Union and the UN Security Council, will 
ensure that any deal reached will be upheld fully by both sides according to 
the timetables laid down. This is especially important to the Greek Cypriots 
as it is likely that the provisions of an agreement that will be phased in will 
apply to the Turkish Cypriots, whereas their concessions will be made imme-
diately. To illustrate this point, the new constitutional structure of a state will 
be put in place from the start. At the moment a settlement comes into force, 
the Greek Cypriots will be expected to share power fully with the Turkish 
Cypriots. However, the Turkish Cypriots will not be expected to hand back 
all land and properties to Greek Cypriots immediately as new homes will 
have to be built first for the displaced Turkish Cypriots. Likewise, Turkish 
troops cannot be expected to leave at the moment a new arrangement comes 
into force. It will take time to redeploy them. All this creates the real poten-
tial for delays and postponements, and it is this that the Greek Cypriots are 
determined to avoid. They want to be sure that any agreement put in place 
will be honoured and that, should this not happen, the international communi-
ty will take appropriate steps to ensure full and prompt compliance with the 
terms of a settlement. 
Other important questions 
While constitutional issues, property and territory, and security represent the 
most significant points of disagreement, there is a range of other issues that 
serve to divide the two communities. For instance, the question of Turkish 
settlers is highly charged. Over the years, Greek Cypriots have insisted that 
the fundamental tenets of a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus Problem 
would be based on the repatriation of all Turkish troops and all Turkish set-
tlers. The trouble is that not all Turkish ‘settlers’ are immigrants. It has now 
been over 35 years since the invasion. Many of the children of the original 
settlers brought to the island in the immediate aftermath of the invasion are 
now approaching middle age and have children of their own who were born 
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and raised on the island. Cyprus is their home, not Turkey (see Hatay, 2007). 
A strict adherence to a demand that they all be deported would mean that tens 
of thousands of people would be forced to live in a country they do not know 
simply for the actions taken by the Turkish government many decades earlier. 
The question of the settlers is therefore no longer strictly a legal question. It 
is also a humanitarian issue. Then there are questions concerning economic 
management, or the representation of Cyprus in European institutions. How 
would taxation and expenditure be regulated? And how would the two com-
munities decide on single representation in the EU on issues that they might 
have separate control over on the island. All these seemingly peripheral ques-
tions serve to heighten tensions between the two communities and thus com-
plicate the search for an overall settlement. 
Settlement Prospects 
While both sides will eagerly blame each other for the current deadlock, the 
truth is that it is rather hard to blame the failure of the talks exclusively on 
one side or the other. In reality, neither has appeared to be particularly inter-
ested in reaching an agreement to reunify the divided island. Although they 
both claim that they are willing to accept a bizonal and bicommunal federal 
settlement, as agreed by the UN Security Council, neither is especially keen 
on this idea. Opinion polls have shown that the Turkish Cypriots would ideal-
ly prefer to have a two state solution (Sozen, 2012). Failing this, they are 
aiming for a very loose confederal arrangement. Meanwhile, the ideal out-
come for the Greek Cypriots would be a unitary state in which the Turkish 
Cypriots have strong minority rights. This will not happen. They have there-
fore reconciled themselves to a tight federation, in which they would be able 
to control as much as possible. The task for mediators has been to try to find 
a balance between the two second best options. It has been a frustrating and 
thankless task. Over the years, the two communities have become masters at 
retaining the status quo. They are more than capable at ensuring that they are 
not saddled with a solution they do not want. 
However, this repeated obstructionism has come at a price for both sides. 
For the Greek Cypriots, the continued division of the island means that few 
of the 160,000 people who were displaced when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 
1974 will ever get their property back. While the historic Loizidou ruling of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) recognised the continuing 
ownership by Greek Cypriots of properties in northern Cyprus,11 later rulings 
have also recognised that the new inhabitants also have a legitimate claim to 
them. To this extent, compensation, rather than restitution, is the norm. 
                                                          
11 European Court of Human Rights, 40/1993/435/514. 
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Moreover, as a result of the steady influx of mainland Turkish citizens into 
the north of the island, the demographic structure of the Turkish Cypriot 
community has now changed. There is now a very substantial mainland Turk-
ish population living in the North; quite possibility event a majority. Given 
that it is highly unlikely that many of these settlers will be required to leave, 
it is no longer the case that following a solution Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
will be sitting alongside one another in the parliament, cabinet and civil ser-
vice. There are likely to be many mainland Turks in state institutions as well. 
For many Greek Cypriots, the thought of reunifying Cyprus under these con-
ditions is unacceptable. In private, but also increasingly in public, many are 
now questioning whether reunification is really that desirable. For some, the 
prospect of a formal negotiated division is the logical answer. For most, a 
perpetuation of the current status quo is more palatable. Having spent almost 
three decades trying to prevent the international recognition of the self-
proclaimed ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (see Ker-Lindsay, 2012), 
few Greek Cypriots are now willing to just give up and reward Turkey and 
the Turkish Cypriots with their own state on the island. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots are also facing the consequences of their 
earlier intransigence. Their unilateral declaration of independence, in 1983, 
has left them economically, politically and culturally isolated on the world 
stage. After thirty years, many are now asking just how much longer the situ-
ation can last. Once again, talk has turned towards a Plan B.12 The problem is 
that the Turkish Cypriots have few alternatives to reunification. For instance, 
efforts to try to persuade more countries to recognise the TRNC are unlikely 
to produce results. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) expressly 
calls on states not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot state. Moreover, when 
Cyprus acceded to the European Union, in May 2004, it did so as a single 
entity. The acquis communautiare, the EU’s body of laws, may be suspended 
in the north of the island. However, the north is still legally regarded as a part 
of the EU. As a result, any country recognising the unilaterally declared in-
dependence of the TRNC would automatically be raising the real prospect of 
punitive action by the EU. A few countries may be willing to take the risk – 
but not many. Although it is certainly possible that some states will increas-
ingly normalise their relations with the TRNC, and the Organisation of Islam-
ic Co-operation has called for member states to enhance their co-operation 
with the Turkish Cypriots (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2013: 12), 
wider international recognition therefore seems unlikely. 
Another option that has been suggested is the possibility that Turkey may 
annexe the north of the island.13 In fact, this is not a new threat. It was used 
                                                          
12 ‘Cyprus remains bitterly divided as Turkish north buries former leader’, The Guardian, 
20 January 2012. 
13 ‘Turkey May Annex North Cyprus If No Reunification, Kibris Says’, Bloomberg, 5 March 
2012. 
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many times by Turkish politicians in the 1990s and early 2000s in order to try 
to dissuade the EU from opening accession talks with the Republic of Cy-
prus.14 At that time it was widely seen as a bluff. It still is. It would be ex-
tremely unlikely that Ankara would take such a drastic step. Any attempt to 
annexe northern Cyprus would immediately bring to an end whatever hopes 
there might still be that Turkey could join the European Union someday. 
Quite apart from the fact that Nicosia would undoubtedly veto any further 
accession negotiations with Turkey, it is almost certain that many other EU 
members would happily seize such an opportunity to close the door to Turk-
ish membership once and for all. All things considered, any move by Turkey 
to lay formal legal claim to the north of Cyprus would have devastating con-
sequences for Turkish-EU relations and would be highly likely to be met with 
the strongest international condemnation, including within the UN Security 
Council. Ankara is aware of this. While it might be less than concerned about 
the effects of such an action on its EU membership prospects, it is unlikely 
that it would want to jeopardise its recent efforts to build its standing on the 
world stage. 
In truth, the problem facing the Turkish Government is that there are no 
feasible alternative options if negotiations collapse again. For as long as it 
harbours any hopes of wanting to join the European Union, Ankara knows 
full, well that the only real choice it has is a continuation of the current status 
quo or a formal agreement with the Greek Cypriots. The problem is, as al-
ready noted, that the Greek Cypriots have shown little inclination in recent 
years to reach any solution. Moreover, there is little that can be done to force 
them to engage more constructively. Now that Cyprus is in the EU, and has 
joined the Euro, they have achieved their key foreign policy goals. Of course, 
one could argue that the financial situations Cyprus faces could be used to 
exert leverage.15 However, it is unlikely that this will happen. After all, what 
would happen if the Greek Cypriots refused to play ball. Would the EU really 
cut Cyprus loose, and risk damaging the euro. This is extremely unlikely; and 
Nicosia knows it. Ultimately, there is no leverage over Cyprus. At the same 
time, many feel that Germany is probably quite happy to maintain the status 
quo, thereby providing a convenient pretext for keeping Turkey’s EU acces-
sion path on hold indefinitely. 
Not surprisingly, one can detect a sense of frustration in Turkey about this 
situation. For example, the Turkish government refused to have any contacts 
with Cyprus during its six-month period as the rotating presidency of the 
European Union, in the second half of 2012.16 In time past, this would have 
been a source of concern in EU circles. This time, few seem to have cared 
that much. With the EU facing far more serious problems, enlargement has 
                                                          
14 See, for instance, ‘Turkey holds key Cyprus debate’, BBC News, 23 November 2001. 
15 ‘European Union’s Leverage Over Cyprus Is Ephemeral’, Reuters, 4 February 2013. 
16 ‘Turkey sticks to boycott of Cyprus EU presidency’, Reuters, 7 June 2012. 
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dropped down the list of priorities. More to the point, many of the states that 
are most hostile to the thought of Turkish membership would be absolutely 
delighted to see Turkey isolate itself in this way. Even Turkey’s friends are 
growing increasingly frustrated at the way that Ankara makes matters diffi-
cult for itself. For example, the European Union has frequently called on 
Turkey to normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. A vital first 
step in this process, which the Turkish government originally agreed to do as 
a condition for starting accession negotiations,17 would be to open Turkish 
ports and airports to Cyprus flagged vessels and planes. Ankara has steadfast-
ly refused to do so, arguing that this would amount to its recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus as a Greek-led entity; rather than as the bicommunal state 
founded in 1960. This has had a knock on effect in terms of its EU accession 
negotiations with many EU states believing that Turkey cannot be trusted to 
keep its word. At this stage, there is very little sympathy for Turkey in EU 
circles. As a result, it seems almost certain that Turkish-EU relations will 
deteriorate even further. 
However, the tensions between Turkey and the European Union over Cy-
prus may yet be overshadowed by far more serious issues. Over the course of 
the last few years speculation grew that there may well be significant quanti-
ties of natural gas off the south coast of Cyprus (see Gürel, Mullen and 
Tzimitras, 2013 and Faustmann, Gürel and Reichberg, 2012). In December 
2011 these suspicions were confirmed. Exploratory drilling in one of the thir-
teen offshore blocks established by the Cypriot government indicated that 
there was anywhere up to 8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas.18 Although 
this has subsequently been revised downwards (to 3.6-6 TCf), the discovery 
is nevertheless widely seen to offer Cyprus an important chance to develop 
an important new revenue stream. The problem is that the Greek Cypriot de-
cision to try to exploit the energy resources has not gone down well in Anka-
ra, or amongst the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Government has insisted 
that the Greek Cypriot administration has no right to exploit these resources 
without the Turkish Cypriots.19 Such views have received little sympathy 
elsewhere. Both the United States and the European Union have repeatedly 
stressed that the Republic of Cyprus is perfectly within its sovereign rights to 
exploit any resources it finds within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).20 
                                                          
17 ‘Turkey rebuffs Cyprus over ports’, BBC News, 16 June 2006 
18 ‘Noble Announces Natural-Gas Discovery Off Coast of Cyprus’, Bloomberg, 29 December 
2011. 
19 ‘Statement Regarding the Claims of the GCASC on Hydrocarbon Resources in the Eastern 
Mediterranean’, Press Release No: 83, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, 
23 March 2013. 
20 ‘Turkey rattles sabres over Cypriot natural gas drilling’, The National, 19 September 2011. 
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Unhappy with this, Turkey has continued to voice its objections. As well 
as warning foreign companies not to become involved in gas exploration,21 
Ankara has said that it will take all necessary legal and political steps to pre-
vent Nicosia from pressing ahead with its attempts to exploit its new found 
energy deposits. There have even been hints that Ankara may be willing to 
resort to military force if necessary.22 For the meanwhile, such threats seem 
unlikely to be carried out. Again, any attempt to use force against Cyprus will 
automatically lead to a strong diplomatic response from the European Union. 
At the very least, it will again reconfirm the view held by many in Europe 
that Turkey is wholly unsuited to membership of a union that is founded on 
the very principle that no matter how serious the dispute, force, or the threat 
of force, will not be used to resolve the issue. Still, there is always the danger 
that posturing could lead to a conflict. While Turkey may have no intention 
of starting a conflict, accidents can happen when armed forces come into 
close proximity with one another at times of political tension. Even the act of 
sending warships to harass drilling platforms could have unforeseen, and 
unfortunate, consequences. For these reasons, there are real fears about the 
direction that events are taking. 
In addition to the possibility that the Greek Cypriots decision to exploit 
natural gas may lead to further tension, if not conflict, in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, it could well have a profoundly negative effect on efforts to resolve 
the Cyprus problem. As already noted, many Greek Cypriots are sceptical 
about, if not wholly opposed to, some form of reunification based on a loose 
federation. As the numerical majority, they have long believed that a solution 
should give them the greater share of power on the island. The discovery of 
natural gas is likely to lead to a hardening of such attitudes. It was difficult 
enough for many Greek Cypriots to accept reunification when it meant shar-
ing political power with the Turkish Cypriots. It could well be even more 
difficult to accept this when it also means sharing what could be very signifi-
cant energy revenues. Such concerns will no doubt be exacerbated by the dire 
economic situation Cyprus is now in as a result of the March 2013 financial 
crisis. Many Greek Cypriots will undoubtedly be keen to ensure that as much 
wealth as possible is used to reconstruct their economy before trying to fund 
reunification.23 
But could the discovery of energy resources also lead to a new opportunity 
for a settlement? Some certainly believe so. It is hardly a secret that many 
Turkish Cypriots are becoming alarmed at the direction the north is taking.24 
Quite apart from the influx of Turkish settlers, tensions have been growing 
                                                          
21 ‘Turkey warns 15 countries to stay away from Cyprus’ gas’, Cyprus Mail, 2 August 2012.  
22 ‘Cyprus, Turkey at Odds Over Natural Gas Drilling’, NPR, 23 November 2012. 
23 ‘Cyprus Turks Share Pain as Banking Crisis Revives Talk of Unity’, Bloomberg, 3 April 
2013. 
24 Comments to the author by several Turkish Cypriot political figures, December 2012. 
 The Cyprus Problem 33 
 
with Turkey. Isolated from the rest of the world, the TRNC is reliant on hand 
outs from the Turkish state. In an age of austerity, Ankara has called on the 
Turkish Cypriots to cut back their expenditure, which prompted major 
demonstration in 2011. This is the source of resentment amongst many Turk-
ish Cypriots and has led to several high profile disagreements between the 
Turkish Cypriot administration and their pay masters in Ankara (Bryant and 
Yakinthou, 2012). Against this backdrop, the possibility that the Greek Cyp-
riots may eventually be earning significant revenues from natural gas makes 
the prospect of reuniting the island more enticing than it has ever been. Ra-
ther than be a subsidised province of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots have an 
opportunity to be a major part of a new energy-rich Cypriot state. The prob-
lem is that the Greek Cypriots may try to overplay their hand. Many will no 
doubt believe that they now have a degree of strength in the medium-long 
term that they have rarely enjoyed in the negotiations in the past. As they see 
it, if the Turkish Cypriots want a share of those revenues they are going to 
have to make more concessions that they have been willing to accept in the 
past. While it may be the case that the Turkish Cypriots will be willing to do 
so, the evidence so far suggests that this is unlikely (Gürel et al, 2013; Gürel, 
2014). If energy is to be a catalyst for peace, it will still require both sides to 
show a fundamental willingness to compromise. 
Conclusion 
For over fifty years, Cyprus has stubbornly resisted all efforts external efforts 
to reach a solution. Despite the fact that the two sides have nominally accept-
ed to reunify within a bizonal, bicommunal federation, the truth is that neither 
side has any real attachment to the idea. For the Greek Cypriots, the ideal 
solution would be a unitary state in which the Turkish Cypriots had enhanced 
minority rights. For the Turkish Cypriots, two separate and internationally 
recognised states on the island would be the preferred outcome. For both, 
however, a federal settlement represents a less than perfect outcome. Mean-
while, leaving aside the fact that neither community particularly wants a fed-
eral settlement, it is also important to note that there is a wide range of specif-
ic issues that need to be addressed. These include the question of the constitu-
tional structure of the new state, security, the proportion of territory to be 
distributed between the two federal states, property, the question of Turkish 
settlers and the economy. This serves to complicate still further the efforts to 
reach a conclusive settlement. And yet, on balance, the sense is that none of 
these issues presents an insurmountable challenge that could not be overcome 
with the right political will. Meanwhile, the discovery of natural gas is widely 
seen to have the potential to change the nature of the debate – for better or for 
worse. 
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Comments 
Muhittin Tolga Ozsaglam 
James Ker-Lindsay wrote an academic article on the Cyprus problem, in 
which he summarized its historical path while touching also in some current 
issues. I shall try to point out some features and add some missing points in 
his text. 
Ker-Lindsay analyzes the Cyprus problem since the foundation of the Re-
public of Cyprus in 1960. He does not, even briefly treat the previous periods 
of Lusignan, Venetian, Ottoman and British rule in Cyprus. He omits men-
tioning the oppression of the Orthodox Church and of the Greek population 
by the Lusignans and Venetians. He also does not mention that the Ottoman 
rule brought a kind of emancipation to the Orthodox Church combined with 
the Greeks’ privileged status obtained under the Ottomans. The tensions be-
tween the Turks (Muslims) and the Greeks on the island followed the revolts 
by Greek clergymen against the Ottoman authorities. Ker-Lindsay mentions 
briefly that during the British rule tensions were raised by the independence 
movement among the Greek Cypriots who wished to be united with Greece 
and by the founding of EOKA-A. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots 
were massively employed in the British police. These developments are at the 
root of the conflict which have developed on the island since XIXth century. 
Greek Cypriots did not care the existence of Turkish Cypriots during their 
independency struggle while Turkish Cypriots had no nationalist aspirations 
widely. However, afterwards Turkish Cypriots have begun to agree on sepa-
ratist-partition idea and therefore mistrust increased among the communities. 
Eventually, the nationalists of the both communities injected the impossibil-
ity of co-existence to the public. 
While explaining the origin of inter-communal clashes between the Turk-
ish and Greek Cypriots in 1963 Ker-Lindsay fails to mention the Akritas 
plan. This document was prepared in 1963 by Polikarpos Yorgacis, Interior 
Minister of the Republic of Cyprus (Akritas was his nick name). The Turkish 
Cypriot leadership considered the 13 amendments to the constitution pro-
posed by the Greek Cypriot leadership as part of the Akritas plan. The 
Akritas plan was not expressed to the public until 1966, which was published 
by Greek Cypriot Newspaper (Patris). The Turkish Cypriot leadership per-
ceived the 13 points (amendments) as the part of the plan, and that plan was 
as the path for union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece.1 Therefore, Turkish 
Cypriot leadership has focused on partition obviously as a kind of alternative 
                                                          
1 For more details, see, Haralambos Athanasopulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea 
(2001). McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, USA, p. 45. 
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to Akritas Plan. Describing the political atmosphere on Cyprus during the 
1963-1974 period, Ker-Lindsay does not mention the withdrawal of Turkish 
Cypriot deputies and representatives from the institutions of the Republic of 
Cyprus. It was a development of crucial importance since the Hellenisation of 
the Republic of Cyprus was legally unleashed in the absence of Turkish Cyp-
riot representatives.  
Ker-Lindsay underlines the importance of the Denktas-Makarios (1977) 
and Denktas-Kyprianou (1979) agreements, which laid down the framework 
for a comprehensive solution of the conflict on the basis of federalism and bi-
communalism and bizonality. The author unfortunately does not mention the 
re-opening of Varosha on the basis of the 1979 High Level Agreement. The 
latter was concluded without waiting for a comprehensive solution of the 
Cyprus conflict (N.B. Varosha is part of Famagusta, still called the “Ghost 
City” by the Greek Cypriots who fled following the advancing Turkish army 
in 1974). After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implement-
ed without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the 
Cyprus problem. Nowadays, Varosha is called as the “GhostCity” by Greek 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriot leadership wants the opening of Varosha as the 
part of confidence building measures, however Turkish Cypriot leadership 
see opening of Varosha as the part of comprehensive solution of Cyprus 
Problem. Although, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cyipriot civil initiatives’ de-
mands (such as, bi-communal Famagusta Initiative) Varosha is still closed.  
Ker-Lindsay also omits mentioning the political climate in the Northern 
part of Cyprus and in Turkey in 1983 when the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed. That was the time of military rule in Turkey 
and of a highly authoritarian atmosphere in Turkey and also on the island 
which silenced opposition among the Turkish Cypriots to separatist declara-
tion by Rauf Denktas and his party. Some figures provided by Ker-Lindsay 
are questionable. He gives, for example, the figure of 150 thousand for the 
total population in the Northern part of the island, while the 2006 census gave 
the figure of 265 thousand.2 He also cites an unrealistic number of demon-
strators against the Annan Plan (70 thousand) which marked a crucial mile-
stone in the endeavors for re-unification of Cyprus. While touching contents 
of the Annan Plan the author should have analyzed more thoroughly the roles 
of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), of the coalition government in the 
North in 2003-04, Papadopoulos in the South, and the foundation of the Im-
movable Property Commission (IPC) by Turkish Cypriot authorities. The 
Commission latter gave the Greek Cypriots the right to apply for compensa-
tion, exchange of properties or using-return to their properties. The estab-
lishment of IPC was notably welcomed by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
                                                          
2 TRNC, State Planning Organization, http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Nufus-nitelikleri-index.
html (2-9-14). 
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Ker-Lindsay correctly underlines that the secession of TRNC has in-
creased the relative isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. He did not however 
mention the current status of many as EU citizens who use the Republic’s of 
Cyprus identity cards and passports and benefit from the EU funds and green 
line regulations. The EU North Cyprus Support Office has provided scholar-
ships to Turkish Cypriot students, teachers and academics, funds to farmers, 
small enterprises, municipalities etc. 
Ker-Lindsay has drawn well a wide picture of the Cyprus problem. How-
ever while presenting the general characteristics of the conflict, he over-
looked some important particulars. 
 

Recommendations1 
International Crisis Group 
Crisis Group has detailed in its reports how the interests of the Cypriots and 
outside parties would be best met with a comprehensive political settlement. 
This remains the ideal, but the sides should move ahead with unilateral steps 
such as the following, each of which could build confidence and help estab-
lish and environment more conducive to an overall agreement: 
 Turkey should open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot sea and 
air traffic, meeting its signed 2005 obligation to implement the Ad-
ditional Protocol to its EU Customs Union, and also permit Greek 
Cypriot aircraft to transit its airspace.  
 Greek Cypriots should allow the port of Famagusta to handle Cypri-
ot (including Turkish Cypriot) trade with the EU, under Turkish 
Cypriot management and EU supervision; end their practice of 
blocking Turkey’s EU negotiating chapters; and, in the event of 
trade beginning with Turkey after it implements the Additional Pro-
tocol, open up the Green Line to the passage of Turkish goods so 
that Turkish Cypriots can also benefit.  
 Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots should hand back property in the 
Turkish-military controlled ghost resort of Varosha to its Greek 
Cypriot owners, subject to a UN interim regime that oversees recon-
struction.  
 Greek Cypriots should allow charter flights to Ercan Airport in the 
Turkish Cypriot zone, monitored by the EU.  
 Turkey, Greece, the UK and the two Cypriot communities should 
put in place a mechanism to verify troop numbers on the island. 
Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot leadership should organise with 
Greek Cypriots a census to determine the exact population of the is-
land and the legal status of its inhabitants.  
 Greek Cypriots should cooperate with Turkish Cypriot administra-
tive entities, pending a political settlement. Turkish officials should 
meet with Greek Cypriot officials, and Turkish Cypriots should be 
supportive. The European Commission, supported by the EU Presi-
dency, should continue to serve as an honest broker to secure 
agreement on interim steps. Leaders of EU member states should 
                                                          
1 “Cyprus: Six Steps toward a Settlement”, International Crisis Group, Europe briefing no. 61, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus/B61-cyprus-six-steps-
toward-a-settlement.aspx (25-7-12). 
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avoid partisan statements at a time when UN talks continue and no 
one party is being clearly obstructive.  
Even in the absence of an overall Cyprus settlement, the parties should re-
examine the benefits of independent confidence-building moves, seek mutual 
advantage and avert a deepening of the crisis by taking these steps specific to 
the energy issue: 
 The Greek Cypriot leadership should commit to share 20 per cent of 
any net revenue or gas from any offshore hydrocarbon resources 
with Turkish Cypriots, possibly distributed through a UN-supervised 
arrangement, as long as both parties remain formally committed to 
reunification. Turkish Cypriots should commit to share with the 
Greek Cypriots an inverse proportion of their hydrocarbon revenues 
from their ongoing onshore drilling activities.  
 Greek Cypriots should agree with Turkish Cypriots to form a bi-
communal, advisory ad hoc committee to discuss energy issues, and 
to plan potential domestic and industrial use of the gas throughout 
the island.  
 Turkey and Turkish Cypriots should stop using threatening rhetoric 
and naval maneuvers inside the island’s EEZ, even if they dispute its 
limits; and formally commit not to interfere with, or to drill in, off-
shore hydrocarbon blocks that are in these waters, including the new 
Aphrodite field and areas west of Cyprus, pending an arrangement.  
 If the basic environment for dialogue is established: 
 Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus should agree, possibly with 
third-party mediation, to discuss eastern Mediterranean energy is-
sues, without prejudice to the UN-facilitated talks, or to any official 
recognition that will follow a settlement. They should study the fea-
sibility of and consider possible cooperation on a gas export pipeline 
to Turkey, and onwards to Europe, with strong third-party arbitra-
tion clauses.  
 Turkey, Cyprus and Greece should agree to take their claims for 
EEZs in the Eastern Mediterranean to the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) or an arbitral tribunal.  
These steps are in the interest of all and should be taken unilaterally by the 
party with the power to do so, not reserved for or made dependent upon ne-
gotiated agreements and reciprocity. Some are familiar but have failed be-
cause they were bundled into top-heavy negotiated packages, with each side 
conditioning its one step on two by its counterpart. Package deals in the Cy-
prus context have little chance. It is unilateral gestures that have worked in 
the past, like the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision in 2003 to open part 
of the front lines so Cypriots could cross freely, and the Greek Cypriot deci-
sions since 2004 to offer individual Turkish Cypriots living in the north some 
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citizenship rights, including free health care in 2003 and EU passports since 
2004. 
The steps proposed would address known needs of the two communities 
and, far from undermining any party’s goals, clear the way for successful 
negotiations. They would not prejudice the ultimate outcome of talks, or the 
vexed issue of status, but would help build trust whose absence is a principal 
reason for three and a half decades of stalemate. In some cases they would 
fulfil pledges, like Turkey’s obligation to open sea and airports to Greek 
Cypriot traffic and the EU’s promise of direct trade for Turkish Cypriots. 
Cooperation in the exploitation of significant gas finds, which Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders agree are a common heritage, can help build confi-
dence without prejudicing the eventual outcome of comprehensive talks. If 
the sides continue engaging in unilateral actions, tensions will rise, accidents 
will become more likely, and Turks and Greek Cypriots will be on course for 
a head-on collision in the eastern Mediterranean.  
If the status quo continues, Greek Cypriots will find that their rejection of 
the EU-backed UN peace plan in 2004 has led to deepening partition. The EU 
will find its soft power diminished and Cyprus will remain an awkward sym-
bol of inability to solve the political and military division even of a member 
state. 
 

Moldova vs. Transnistria 
 

The Transnistrian conflict 
Natalya Belitser 
 
The Transnistrian conflict is characterized by quite a few features which 
make it distinct from other post-soviet conflicts. The Nistru river provides a 
natural divide between the Repulic of Moldova (RM) on the right bank and 
its eastern Transnistrian region – the self proclaimed “Transnistrian Moldo-
van Republic (TMR)”, on the left bank. The population on both banks con-
sists of people belonging, in different proportions, to the same ethnic groups 
and religious denominations. Underlying causes of violent conflicts based on 
ethnic or religions animosities, mistrust, or historical grievances, are largely 
absent in this case. In contrast to other conflicts in the Caucasus and Balkans 
no violent clashes or military actions of any type have occurred after the 
case-fire agreement of July 1992. However, a “civilisation gap” in social 
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psychology, perceptions, and geopolitical preferences, conditioned by a re-
cent historical experience of belonging to different state structures and enti-
ties, shaped quite a different social climate, mentality, sets of values and 
mindset of people on the two banks of the Nistru River. 
The de-facto Transnistrian statehood has existed for over 20 years and 
possessed many attributes of a genuine state: institutions of executive and 
legislative powers, a judicial system, a Constitutional Court, currency, cus-
toms, border guards, security service, education system, etc., not to mention 
the armed forces that are considered more numerous and better equipped than 
those of the Republic of Moldova (RM). Leaving aside the issue of their 
quality and disputable compliance with democratic standards, it should be 
noted that the very existence of these institutions has had a notable impact on 
the ordinary people, on prospects and possible scenarios of conflict settle-
ment, on the attitudes towards the Transnistrian problem among internal and 
external actors, mass media, academia and the expert community.  
Proposed solutions and bilateral developments 
Initially the efforts to put an end to armed conflict were undertaken within 
the format of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and by the 
heads of the most interested neighbouring states, namely, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Romania. At the Kyiv meeting in March 1992 the heads of the CIS coun-
tries adopted a declaration stating that the territorial integrity of the Republic 
of Moldova is the key element for the entire stability in the region. Initially, 
conflict management efforts had included experts from not only Moldova, 
Russia, and Ukraine but also from Romania and Hungary. The Conference 
for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was then preoccupied with 
the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the CSCE Mission to Moldova was 
established only in April 1993. Already in November of the same year the 
CSCE Mission prepared a report outlining proposals to serve as a basis for 
further negotiations between the two sides. The report stated that Transnistria 
could exercise the right of ‘external self-determination’ in the case of Moldo-
va’s merging with Romania and recommended Moldova’s decentralisation 
based on the principle of subsidiarity. The special region of Transnistria as 
integral part of Moldova would enjoy extensive self-rule, with its own execu-
tive, elected legislature, courts and shared competences. Negotiations based 
on the OSCE proposal started in 1994. On 19 January 1996 Russia, Ukraine 
and Moldova signed a Joint Declaration Recognising the Sovereignty and 
Territorial Integrity of the Republic of Moldova. 
Among remarkable initiatives in the 1990s was the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding on the Principles of Normalisation of Relations between the Re-
public of Moldova and the Transnistrian Republic signed in Moscow on 8 
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May 1997. It proposed the formation of a ‘common state’, although a few 
concrete details were provided. The Transnistrian statehood was thus implic-
itly recognised. The Memorandum included TMR’s right to conduct its own 
foreign relations and the presence of a peacekeeping force was reaffirmed. 
The document was seen as a compromise between two incompatible posi-
tions: Moldova’s demands for restoring its territorial integrity and TMR’s 
demand for ‘external’ self-determination. However, further negotiations were 
blocked and never reached the point of discussing the division of competenc-
es between Moldova and TMR, or any other substantive issues.1 The Agree-
ment on Confidence-building Measures and Development of Contacts be-
tween the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed in Odessa on 20 
March 1998. It called for a reduction in the contingent of peacekeepers, invit-
ed military observers from Ukraine and addressed a number of concrete is-
sues. A Joint Statement on Issues of Normalisation of Relations between the 
Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed in Kyiv by the two parties 
and three mediators on 16 July 1999. That document contained an important 
provision for five ‘common spaces’ – common borders, common economic, 
legal, defence, and social domains. Regrettably none of these have been ever 
implemented. 
The most important event of the late 1990s was the OSCE summit in Is-
tanbul in November 1999 where the Russian Federation committed itself to 
the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from Moldova – weapons 
by the end of 2001, whereas the personnel and stockpiled equipment by late 
2002. In fact by 2003, the peacekeeping force still consisted of estimated 
1,000 troops, deployed in thirteen posts, at some manned by the Russians 
only, while the others were trilateral.2 Throughout the 1990s the peacekeep-
ing operation and control mechanisms proved to be rather effective to secure 
the cease-fire agreement. However, they maintained the status quo in divided 
Moldova rather than contributed to finding a viable solution for reintegrating 
the self-proclaimed TMR into the Moldovan state.  
During the next decade a few normalization plans were proposed. The 
most hotly discussed were those based on the idea of federalisation. At a 
meeting in Kyiv in July 2002 the mediators proposed, on the initiative of 
OSCE, a draft agreement on distribution of competencies between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol. The document defined the Republic of Moldova as a ‘federal 
state’. The implementation of the agreement would be monitored and ulti-
                                                          
1 Basic Documents in Pridnestrovyan Conflict Resolution. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Kiev, 
2000. 
2 Lynch, Dov. Moldova and Transnistria (2004). In: Security-Sector Reform and Transparen-
cy Building: Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, Harmonie Papers 17. The Centre 
for European Security Studies. pp. 111-122.  
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mately guaranteed by the Russian Federation, Ukraine and OSCE.3 This plan 
has had both critics and supporters on both sides and among international 
experts. In general it was considered worth of serious attention and further 
elaboration.4  
Regrettably, instead of a wide discussion on the ‘Kyiv Document’, another 
federalisation plan, elaborated unilaterally by the Russian Federation and 
usually referred to as the ‘Kozak plan’, appeared on the scene (Lynch, 
2004).5 The content and style of the proposal, taken without any intention to 
discuss it with other interested parties, including official mediators, alienated 
OSCE, the Council of Europe and, seemingly, the European Union as well. In 
Moldova the Russian federalisation plan produced a sharp negative reaction 
and public protests. As a result, just at the eve of President Putin’s visit to 
Chisinau in order to participate in an official signing of the document, Presi-
dent Voronin ‘suddenly’ changed his mind and reversed his promise to sign 
the ‘Kozak plan’. This last-minute refusal provoked an angry reaction from 
the Russian side. Further negotiations were frozen, the Moldovan President 
compromised his position domestically and complicated relations with Rus-
sia. Moscow was insulted by Moldova’s last minute rejection of what was 
planned as a surprise coup. The only clear winners were seemingly the lead-
ers of the Transnistria.6 
The situation stagnated until the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of 2004 
which brought to power pro-Western President Victor Yushchenko and his 
team. A new proposal, known as the ‘Yushchenko plan’ was presented in 
May 2005. Although far from being unanimously hailed by the Moldovan 
political class and civil society,7 it was used as a basis for preparing the “Or-
ganic Law on the principles of resolving the conflict in Transnistria”. This 
                                                          
3 Socor, Vladimir. Federalization Experiment in Moldova (2002). In: Russia and Eurasia 
Review 1, 4. http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.html?type=html&serial=1035991567713, 
(16-7-02).  
4 Belitser, Natalia. Protracted Moldova/Transdniestria Conflict: Recent Developments and 
Prospects of Settlement via Federalisation of the Republic of Moldova (2004). Research Pa-
per presented to the Second International Conference on Regional Autonomy and Ethnic 
Minorities, June 10-13, 2004, Uppsala, Sweden. 
5 Lynch, Dov. Moldova and Transnistria (2004). In: Security-Sector Reform and Transparen-
cy Building: Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, Harmonie Papers 17. See also 
Shafir, Michael. Russia’s Self-Serving Plan for Moldova’s Federalization (2003). RFE/RL 
Newsline 7,221, 24/11/2003, End Note.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Nantoi, Oazu. The Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement Proposed by Ukraine - 
pros and cons (2005). Institute for Public Policy. http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=
en&id=377&idc=154, (8-6-05). For a detailed analysis of thus plan and other important 
events of 2005, see: Belitser, Natalya. Why ‘Yuschenko plan’ has failed” (in Ukrainian) 
(2010). In: EuroAtlantica, 2010 1, pp. 32-43.  
 The Transnistrian conflict 49 
 
law was adopted by Moldova’s parliament on July 22, 2005.8 Strong re-
sistance from the Russian and Transnistrian sides prevented, however, any 
further attempts of implementing of either the Yushchenko plan or the Mol-
dovan law mentioned above. 
New hopes for conflict resolution have appeared in 2009 after the parlia-
mentary election in the Republic of Moldova. A pro-Western team – the Alli-
ance for European Integration (AEI) – terminated then the Communist Par-
ty’s rule since 2001. The new government proved to be much more pragmatic 
and willing to deal with its breakaway region than their predecessors. Im-
portant changes have later also taken place in Transnistria, due mainly to the 
surprising results of the presidential elections in December 2011. The long-
serving president Igor Smirnov failed to be re-elected, having lost Moscow’s 
support. The same occurred also to Moscow’s favourite Anatoliy Kaminsky. 
An impressive majority of voters gave preference to a young leader of the 
‘Revival’ movement Yevgeny Shevchuk. His victory revived the hopes for 
positive developments. To some extent these expectations came true.  
The most remarkable positive change in the first half of 2012 were close 
relations established between the new Transnistrian leader and Moldova’s 
Prime Minister. The two leaders met, both officially and unofficially, many 
times and in different places. By the end of 2011 official negotiations were 
resumed in Lithuania. They were followed by a meeting in February 2012 in 
Ireland. On July 12-13, 2012 a document on the principles, procedures and 
agenda for negotiations was signed in Vienna. It included such topical issues 
as the freedom of movement of persons and goods, circulation of trains, edu-
cation issues, etc. The main attention became focused on Confidence Build-
ing Measures (CBMs), while political aspects, including security issues and 
developing a mutually accepted status of Transnistria, were not addressed. A 
priority was given to solving a number of practical issues. Since then a num-
ber of steps have been taken which included establishing joint Working 
Groups on confidence – building measures, conducting high level meetings 
and elaborating social and economic development projects. Currently, there 
are twelve working groups existing, eleven of which are functional, namely, 
those on economy, agriculture, environment, transport, railways, civil status 
acts, social and humanitarian aid, health, education, combating organised 
crime. Modest progress has been achieved in economic activities across the 
line of separation between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria.  
                                                          
8 Socor, Vladimir. Moldova Law Completely Changes the Logic of Settlement on Transnistria 
(2005). Eurasia Daily Monitor 2, 114. http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/publications/3134/lang/en/
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The European Union’s role9 
The European Union enjoys a positive reputation on both sides of the river. It 
has also accumulated significant experience in conflict resolution. In 2005 
the negotiation format on Transnistria was expanded by adding EU and US 
observers (the ‘5 + 2’ format). By the end of the same year, the EU Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established10 at the Ukraine-Moldova 
border, including its Transnistrian segment. At the request of the Moldovan 
and Ukrainian sides its mandate was twice extended to 2015.  
After the entry of two new members – Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the 
Republic of Moldova became the European Union’s immediate neighbour 
making it impossible any more to ignore the Transnistrian issue. Since then 
the European Union has undertaken several steps of engagement in conflict 
resolution. A number of these steps have promoted a kind of “economic inte-
gration” of the Transnistrian region into Moldova’s common space. However 
at the political level there has been no progress. The only kind of cooperation 
with the European Union that Transnistria’s leadership had then accepted was 
humanitarian aid, social security, medical services, environmental matters 
etc. In its turn EU was cautious and avoided all political matters in order not 
to antagonise the Tiraspol authorities. The EU position however remained 
unwavering regarding the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic as a part of Mol-
dova. An important contribution by the European EU to conflict resolution 
has been providing financial support to various projects and initiatives. The 
European Union has actively encouraged a gradual rapproachment of the two 
sides in the conflict by supporting and funding the projects on Confidence 
Building Measures (CBM), through humanitarian and social projects, busi-
ness development and community and civil society capacity-building. 
After Ukraine has lost its role as the “regional leader” in the Eastern Part-
nership (EaP), Moldova started receiving progressively more attention and 
support from EU. In 2010 negotiations were launched on an Association 
Agreement with the EU, a core element of which is a Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The agreement was finally signed in 
                                                          
9 Cristescu, Roxana, Matveev, Denis. Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Moldova: the 
role of the EU (2011). http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/CSDN/Member%
20State%20Meetings/Romania/CSDN_Romania_CaseStudy_Moldova.pdf (28-6-11). Be-
litser, Natalya. Rossiyskiy factor na postsovetskom prostranstve: yevrazziyskiy proekt Mos-
kvy, pridnestrovskiy conflict i yevropeyskaya integraytsia Moldovy (2013). In: Forum 
noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul'tury/Forum for Contemporary East European 
History and Culture 10, 1 (in press).  
10 Belitser, Natalya. 8. Role and Significance of the European Union Border Assistance Mis-
sion to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) (2009). In: Transnistrian Problem: A View from 
Ukraine. Gerasymvhuk, Serhiy (ed.). Strategic and Security Studies Group. Kyiv, pp. 96-
120. http://www.gsbs.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/December_2009.pdf. 
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June 2014. It has brought benefits and also major challenges. Some of the 
latter relate to Transnistria. The inclusion of the Transnistrian economy into 
its framework would be beneficial to all parties and to the eventual resolution 
of the conflict.11 Another promising step on the part of the EU was conclud-
ing in February 2014 an agreement on a visa-free regime. This change, effec-
tive from April 2014 is expected to entice more residents of Transnistria to 
acquire also Moldova’s passports, thus giving Chisinau a stronger leverage in 
negotiations with Tiraspol. Until now the European Union has not undertaken 
any move to upgrade its status in the negotiation process, now limited to be-
ing merely an ‘observer’. Changing its current status to that of a full-fledged 
participant in negotiations would be a logical step, beneficial for the process.  
The Russian Federation’s and Ukraine’s roles 
Throughout the entire period of the Transnistrian conflict Russia has been 
recognised as the main supporter of the separatists on the left bank. Some 
argue that Russia itself is a party in the conflict and therefore can not play the 
role of an impartial mediator and “guarantor”. Such views are not fully un-
substantiated. In its decision of 8 July 2004 in the case of “Iliascu and Others 
v. Moldova and Russia” (no. 48787/99), the European Court of Human 
Rights stated:  
“The Russian authorities had therefore contributed both militarily and politically to the 
creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria, part of the territory of the 
Republic of Moldova. Even after the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992 Russia had 
continued to provide military, political and economic support to the separatist regime, 
thus enabling it to survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of 
autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova. In the Court’s opinion, all of the acts committed by Rus-
sian soldiers with regard to the applicants, including their transfer into the charge of the 
separatist regime, in the context of the Russian authorities’ collaboration with that ille-
gal regime, were capable of engaging responsibility for the consequences of the acts of 
that regime.  
The Russian army was still stationed in Moldovan territory in breach of the under-
takings to withdraw them completely given by Russia at the OSCE summits in 1999 
and 2001. Both before and after 5 May 1998, when the Convention came into force 
with regard to Russia, in the security zone controlled by the Russian peacekeeping forc-
es the “MRT” regime continued to deploy its troops illegally and to manufacture and 
sell weapons in breach of the agreement of 21 July 1992. All of the above proved that 
the “MRT” remained under the effective authority, or at the very least under the deci-
                                                          
11 Beyer, John. Routes across the Nistru (2011). SAFEWORLD, May 2011, p.6. http://www.
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sive influence, of Russia, and in any event that it survived by virtue of the military, eco-
nomic, financial and political support that Russia gave it”.12 
The Russian Federation heavily subsidizes Transnistria by providing gas and 
oil at below-the-market prices. It was calculated that in addition only in 
2007–2010, Russia provided financial support to the amount of $55.5 million 
as humanitarian aid. In summer 2010 these transactions were stopped and 
then resumed in summer 2011. The next interruption occurred after the presi-
dential elections in Transnitria of December 2011, expressing, evidently, 
Russia’s dissatisfaction with the victory of Yevgeny Shevchuk (instead of 
Moscow’s favourite A. Kaminsky). This drop put the new government, fac-
ing a budget deficit of 72 percent, into an extremely difficult position. The 
payment of salaries and pensions was significantly delayed, threatening to 
undermine the Shevchuk-led government position, in its struggle with par-
liament controlled by the political rival ‘Renewal’ (Obnovleniye) Party. After 
numerous appeals by Yevgeniy Shevchuk Russia resumed its financial assis-
tance in July 2012.13 
The endeavours aimed at bringing closer the positions of the European 
Union and of Russia on the Transnistrian problem have brought, so far, only 
very modest results. The main obstacle has been Russia’s unyielding position 
with regard to transforming the military peacekeeping mission into an inter-
national civilian one and to the demilitarisation of the region in general. Ac-
cording to Russian authorities, all this could become possible only after a 
political solution of Transnistria’s status within reunited Moldova, is agreed 
upon by all participants in the negotiation process. Russia has refused to dis-
cuss the issue of its military peacekeeping operation in Transnistria with the 
EU and US representatives stating that the peacekeeping format may only be 
addressed by the official participants in the conflict resolution process – 
OSCE, Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, and Ukraine.14  
At the forum “Seliger-2012” President Vladimir Putin stated that “only the 
people inhabiting Transnistria can define its destiny whereas the international 
community, including Russia, shall respect its choice”.15 This statement in 
fact renounces Russia’s support to territorial integrity of the Republic of 
                                                          
12 Grand Chamber Judgement in the Case of Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia. 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61886#{%22itemid%22:[%220
01-61886%22]} (8-4-04).  
13 For more details, see: Yevgeniyu Shevchuku vydali avans. Kommersant.md. 
http://kommersant.md/node/9208 (18-7-12). 
14 Minzarari, Dumitru. The Kremlin Politically Fortifies Its Military Presence in Transnistria 
(2012). Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, 114. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/
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Moldova. It could mean that if Transnistria decides to hold a referendum on 
its independence, similar to that of September 2006, the Russian Federation 
might accept its results with the consequences akin to those in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. 
Since Russia has always played a special role at all stages of the conflict 
and continues to be seen by the left bank population as their main supporter 
and protector, persuading Russia to embark, together with EU and US, on a 
common pathway of conflict resolution is crucial. 
Ukraine is the only country bordering Transnistria. Therefore it has a 
strong incentive for resolving this conflict. Especially so because Ukraine 
experienced its direct negative impact during the bloody clashes in spring 
1992, when tens of thousands Moldovans fled the conflict-ridden are a to 
Ukraine. They were given then the status of asylum-seekers. There is also a 
sizable Ukrainian minority, constituting almost 30 percent of the Transnis-
tria’s population. Their situation is obviously a matter of concern for 
Ukraine. In 1995 Ukraine was officially included into the negotiation process 
as a mediator and “guarantor” and in 1998 ten Ukrainian military observers 
joined those from Moldova and Russia. However for a long period following 
this step Ukraine’s role had been insignificant and its position hardly differ-
ent from that of Russia. Taking into account Ukraine’s deep knowledge of 
the situation in Transnistria, and its high interest in reaching a peaceful and 
sustainable resolution, new initiatives were expected in 2013 – the year of 
Ukraine’s OSCE chairmanship. These hopes, regrettably, did not materialise. 
The sharpened obstructionist position of both Transnistria and Russia pre-
vented any further progress.16  
Poor prospects of a setlement 
By 2015 all attempts failed to achieve some progress in conflict management. 
The reasons for such an unfortunate outcome are numerous and diverse. 
Among them, the economic and financial crisis, especially in the Euro zone, 
distracted the European Union’s attention from this particular problem. The 
political turmoil in Ukraine as well as the political crisis in the Republic of 
Moldova in February – May 2013 also diminished the chances for a coordi-
nated activity backed up by EU and US. At the same time, Russia has re-
sumed its strong political support for Transnistria and intensified financial 
and humanitarian assistance to its impoverished population and sinking 
economy. Russia’s aid turned out indispensable for Transnistria’s survival 
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and promoted the cause of Eurasian integration also on the right bank of the 
Nistru River. Joining the Russia-led Customs Union and, in perspective, the 
Eurasian Economic Union has become more popular, whereas the support for 
integration with the European Union, pursued by the Moldovan government 
and political elites, has decreased. 
Transnistria has been perceived by many as a burden, hampering and/or 
preventing Moldova’s “Europeanisation” and eventual entering the European 
Union. Regrettably, such views are present not only in Moldova and 
neigbouring Romania. They surface sometimes in citing the example of di-
vided Cyprus, one part of which joined the European Union, whereas the 
other continues to exist as an internationally unrecognised entity. Especially 
detrimental for the reintegration prospects are various “unionist” movements 
and initiatives for the reunification of Moldova with Romania. These initia-
tives provoke strong resistance in Transnistria and are used as a decisive ar-
gument against reintegration. The temptation to reach a quick solution for the 
Transnistrian conflict by forcing premature reunification of the coutry has 
proved unrealistic. It is important to promote “people-to-people” horizontal 
contacts among NGOs, professionals, economic, cultural agents and other 
actors from both RM and TMR, with a wider engagement of actors from oth-
er European countries. For younger generations of Transnistrians, in particu-
lar, this could help to perceive reintegration not as something imposed, 
and/or dangerous, but as a natural way out of permanent uncertainty, suspi-
cions, and imagined threats, thus gradually overcoming the syndrome of a 
“besieged fortress”. 
The turbulent events in Ukraine in 2013-2015 renewed the concerns over 
Transnistria. After Crimea’s annexation by Russia there were expectations 
that it would be followed by the recognition of “independent” Transnistria. 
However, no steps in this direction were undertaken. The concerns over 
Transnistria were related mainly to the feared presumed intention of Moscow 
to create a wide belt of Russian-controlled territories in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine bordering on the Transnistrian segment of the Ukraine-Moldova 
border. If implemented this belt would make Transnistria an integral part of a 
larger geopolitical project called “Novorossia”.17 However Transnistrian pol-
icies related to the Ukrainian crisis turned out much more cautious and prag-
matic than it has been anticipated. Tiraspol has not recognised the two self-
proclaimed republics in Donetsk and Lugansk, although both officially asked 
Tiraspol to do so, and did not approve some former Transnistrian officials’ 
joining the Ukrainian separatists. Tiraspol also hotly protested against 
Ukrainian mass media’s portraying Transnistria “as an enemy” of Ukraine.18 
                                                          
17 Belitser, Natalya. Moldavskiy separatism kremlivskoji zakvaski (in Ukrainian) (2014). 
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The developments in negboring Ukraine and in Moldova’s relations with the 
European Union made Transnistria’s position even more delicate than before 
and brought to a standstill the international efforts to resolve the Transnistri-
an conflict.19 
 
                                                          
19 Oleksy, Piotr. Transnistria’s Difficult Choice (2014). New Eastern Europe. http://www.new
easterneurope.eu/interviews/1286-transnistria-s-difficult-choice (5-8-14). 

OSCE’s efforts to resolve the conflict 
Erwan Fouere 
“There is no such thing as a conflict that can’t be ended. They 
are created and sustained by human beings. They can be ended 
by human beings.”  
Senator George Mitchell, at the “shared future” conference on 
the Northern Ireland peace process, Dublin, 27th April, 2012  
Over two years has passed since the relaunch of the negotiations in the 
Transnistrian settlement process. More progress was made in the negotiations 
over this period than in the previous twenty years combined. It is thus an ap-
propriate moment to take stock of developments and to assess the chances of 
further progress in the period ahead.  
While there exists since the beginning of 2012, a high level of dialogue 
between both sides of the Nistru river, this was not always the case. As the 
paper of Dr Belitser eloquently illustrates, there were repeated attempts, ever 
since the conflict started in 1992, at promoting dialogue aimed at a compre-
hensive settlement but always ending in failure; official talks were even sus-
pended in 2005.  
It was only in September 2011, almost six years later, that agreement was 
reached to relaunch the negotiation in the ‘permanent conference for political 
questions in the framework of the negotiating process for the Transnistrian 
settlement’. This is the official title of the process more commonly referred to 
as the “5+2 process” because of its composition – Russia, Ukraine and the 
OSCE as mediators, plus the two sides Moldova and Transnistria, and finally 
the EU and us as observers.  
Accordingly, the 5+2 met in Vilnius on 30 November 2011, under the then 
OSCE chairmanship of Lithuania, to relaunch the negotiations.  
The efforts of the Irish chairmanship 
When Ireland took over the chairmanship in January 2012, it coincided with 
a change of leadership in Transnistria. The new leader Yevgeny Shevchuk 
replaced Igor Smirnov who had been in power for twenty years. The new 
leader adopted from the outset a less ideological and more pragmatic ap-
proach than his predecessor. This change of leadership brought significant 
momentum in the process with intensified dialogue between the two sides.  
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Our approach and the strategy we pursued as chair was guided by many of 
the principles which drove other post conflict peace processes, in particular 
the Northern Ireland case.  
The first priority was to create a positive environment for the negotiations 
conducive for an open dialogue and for developing a relationship of trust 
between the chief negotiators from both sides Our second priority was to 
gradually build on the trust established through a policy of small steps Our 
third priority was to highlight the critical role that can be played by civil 
society organizations and the media in the ongoing Transnistrian settlement 
process.  
Having experienced conflict and a difficult but ultimately successful peace 
process, the Irish chairmanship felt it was important to share this experience. 
This led to a number of interactive events organized by the Irish chairman-
ship during the course of 2012 to make people more aware of the Northern 
Ireland experience.  
With this in mind we invited the chief negotiators from both the Moldovan 
and Transnistrian side to visit Ireland and explore together the Northern Ire-
land peace process. During the four day trip to both Dublin and Belfast, they 
were able to hear at first hand of the patience and perseverance that the peace 
process required; and that work must be based on a relationship of trust and 
partnership, on an ability to step into the shoes of the other and to view things 
from the other’s perspective. The advice that first minister of the Northern 
Ireland executive Peter Robinson gave to the chief negotiators when he re-
ceived them was a powerful message in itself: that to achieve a peaceful set-
tlement, both sides must want to reach an agreement and that their most diffi-
cult challenge will be to convince not their opponents, but their own constitu-
ency of the agreed settlement.  
While in the Northern Ireland conflict the biggest pressure for an agree-
ment was a desire to end the violence, in the case of Moldova and Transnis-
tria, it could be argued that the only pressure comes from the economic di-
mension. Indeed it would be an important element in the debate if some effort 
were made to estimate the cost of reintegrating Transnistria into Moldova 
with a special status, and to compare that with the cost of maintaining the 
status quo. This could be an important contribution to the process from the 
academic community and civil society, with the basic premise being to de-
termine whether enough people believe that their self-Interest would be better 
served by change rather than by maintaining the status quo.  
During the course of the year, Ireland chaired five rounds of negotiations, 
Our first formal round of negotiations held at the end of February 2012 took 
place in Farmleigh house – a grand domain in the middle of the appropriately 
named phoenix park, originally belonging to the Guinness family and now 
owned by the state. Although a short distance from the heart of Dublin city, 
its secluded location in bucolic surroundings with cows and donkeys grazing 
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in the nearby fields provided the ideal setting for intensive talks. The follow-
ing three rounds were held in Vienna in the marmolsaal – a ceremonial but 
intimate hall graciously put at our disposal by the Austrian foreign ministry 
and during which several important steps were agreed. The magnificent fres-
coes decorating the ceiling which depict milestones in Europe's history such 
as the Congress of Vienna, provided suitable inspiration for the negotiators 
sitting around the horse-shoe table below, hoping to emulate similar success-
es. 
The most significant steps were taken at the April round with the agree-
ment on the principles and procedures for the conduct of the negotiations. 
These are the basic ground rules for the negotiating process such as the 
recognition of equality of the sides in the negotiations, as well as the princi-
ple that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. A number of these 
rules are similar to those agreed in the Northern Ireland peace process that 
led in 1998 to the Good Friday agreement. The agreement reached at the 
April round on the ‘principles and procedures’ was an important break-
through in this respect and enabled us to move forward with greater confi-
dence in subsequent rounds. Patience however remained of the essence. And 
as we advanced, the pace got noticeably slower, partly due to conflicting sig-
nals coming from Moscow and uncertainty as to Russian intentions on the 
degree of autonomy it would allow to Transnistria in the negotiations.  
Another important agreement reached at the same session was the agenda 
for the formal negotiating process. The agenda was broad and non-
exhaustive; it provided for the taking into account both of the previous 
agreements between the sides (over 150 agreements, but for the most part 
unimplemented) as well as the ongoing work of the eleven expert working 
groups. The agenda divided the topics for negotiation into three baskets:  
 socio economic issues;  
 general legal and humanitarian issue s and human rights;  
 comprehensive settlement, including institutional, political and secu-
rity issues. 
As these negotiations in the 5+2 framework were continuing, there were in 
parallel significant developments taking place on the ground, with frequent 
meetings between both Prime Minister Filat and Mr Shevchuk. One of the 
first agreements reached between both leaders was for the resumption of rail 
freight services between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Further agreements were also 
discussed, such as in the telecommunications and transport areas – all aimed 
at removing obstacles which continue to impede free movement between 
both sides while building confidence. Both leaders understood that progress 
in these areas would demonstrate to the communities on both sides of the 
river the advantages of working together, thus creating a sense of ownership 
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in the process and highlighting the economic benefits which could accrue to 
each side.  
Perhaps these early successes in the process led us to unduly raise our ex-
pectations on what could be achieved. But for whatever reason, there is no 
doubt that the momentum slowed down during the second half of the year. 
There was a noticeable hardening of positions, particularly on the Transnis-
trian side, with Russia no doubt worried that events were moving too rapidly 
and that it was losing control. This resulted in some frustration on the Mol-
dovan side and a lack of flexibility on a number of practical issues just when 
it was most needed.  
There is no doubt that broader security and geo-strategic considerations al-
so impact on the overall atmosphere. These are very much linked to the geo-
graphical location of Moldova, on the crossroads between eastern and west-
ern influences. On the one hand, the pro-European agenda of the current 
Moldovan government is bringing some tangible results, with an association 
agreement with the European Union expected to be signed during this year, 
while negotiations for a deep and Comprehensive free trade agreement (simi-
lar to that negotiated with Ukraine), to which Transnistria has been invited to 
take part, are well advanced. On the other hand, Russia is attempting to woo 
the region towards the yet to be established Eurasian union, while using Mol-
dova’s dependence on Russian energy supplies to exert pressure.  
By the September round, we had managed to open not only the first bas-
ket, but also the second one, where agreement was reached on practical steps 
such as the establishment of a group focusing on human rights issues as well 
as the creation of a platform for civil society and media dialogue. As we 
reached the end of the year our approach remained that of pursuing the policy 
of small steps in all three baskets. Alas, the third basket remained by the end 
of our chairmanship unopened (see below).  
The final round in November, which lasted for three days, in contrast to 
the traditional day and a half, also took place in Farmleigh house. As before, 
both chief negotiators were lodged in the residence itself, allowing once 
again for ample interaction both during and after the formal sessions. All the 
other participants were lodged in a nearby hotel.  
Location can be very helpful in creating the right environment for a posi-
tive mood and a more productive dialogue. It also facilitates the task of the 
chair who can more easily guide the process and pre-empt any possible diffi-
culties. In this respect, it is an imperative in negotiations for the chair to en-
sure, in particular during the early rounds, that each side is given ample time 
to outline its position on different issues, even if it means listening to long 
and at times repetitive speeches. Patience is an essential ingredient for a suc-
cessful chairmanship, through which he or she establishes an atmosphere of 
trust and can more easily steer the negotiations towards points of agreement, 
however small the steps may be.  
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Despite the outward signs of dialogue, we were aware of the deep rooted 
prejudices that had festered over the years. It was thus important to tread cau-
tiously, particularly in the early stages. As the Tanaiste (deputy prime minis-
ter) and chair-in-office, Eamom Gilmore, said when he formally opened the 
negotiations on 28 February, “what we aim for are small incremental steps, 
rather than a giant leap forward. It is these incremental steps that will build 
trust in the overall process and enable both sides to advance with greater con-
fidence on the road towards a settlement”.  
To help in achieving that goal, we decided to highlight the critical role that 
can be played by civil society organizations and the media. This aspect is, in 
my view, a necessary ingredient for any post-conflict peace process. The ear-
lier the involvement of the media and of civil society, particularly at grass 
roots level, the greater the level of trust created and the broader the ac-
ceptance by the public of the final settlement.  
This view is gaining ground internationally, as reflected in the Euro-
Atlantic security initiative presented at the February 2012 annual security 
conference in Munich. The initiative included a call for the ‘expansion of 
traditional diplomacy’, by promoting a culture of dialogue to include civil 
society.  
In the case of the Northern Ireland peace process, while at the grass roots 
level there was already in place a degree of cooperation between civil society 
organizations from the different traditions, at the political party level, the 
efforts to foster public consultation and include civil society during the nego-
tiating process varied from one party to another. Many have suggested that in 
this respect the republican side was more advanced that the loyalist or union-
ist side. The regular consultations with local communities also played a criti-
cal role in obtaining acceptance by the public of the Good Friday agreement 
in the sebsequent referendum, where the agreement received overwhelming 
support.  
During my visits during the year to both Chisinau and Tiraspol in my ca-
pacity as special representative of the chair-in-office, we encouraged the au-
thorities to engage with civil society organizations and the media in discus-
sions. We emphasized that building a space of open dialogue at local level 
would help to overcome the prejudices that have developed on both sides of 
the river over the past twenty years. It was with this objective that we includ-
ed it as a point for discussion at the September round of negotiations. The 
agreement to establish a joint platform for civil society and media from both 
sides was a welcome vindication for our efforts, subsequently recognized at 
the OSCE ministerial (see below).  
And it was in response to a joint request made to us by both Prime Minis-
ter Filat and Transnistrian leader Shevchuk that we hosted a group of twenty 
civil society and media representatives in Reland in the autumn. These were 
representatives who came from both sides of the river, many of whom have 
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little opportunity to interact in their own environment. Despite this, they all 
participated in the visit with great enthusiasm, sharing their different points 
of view as well as many pints of Guinness.  
During their five-day visit to Dublin and Belfast they heard first-hand 
from political party representatives as well as civil servants who were direct-
ly involved in the Northern Ireland peace negotiations and who continue to 
serve in various capacities in the implementation of the Good Friday agree-
ment. The messages conveyed to the group at every stage of their visit under-
lined the key role of civil society and media in creating a bridge between po-
litical leaders and the people at local level to enable proper and regular com-
munication. As the democratic unionist party member of parliament Jeffrey 
Donaldson, who received the group in Belfast, highlighted, if negotiations 
take place in secret without civil society supporting the process and media 
not able to report, this reduces the sense of ownership in the process and al-
ienates the public.  
During the visit the role of women in post-conflict peace negotiations, of-
ten sadly underestimated, was also underlined. The Northern Ireland wom-
en’s coalition was the only political party of its kind to gain representation in 
the peace negotiations as well as being elected to the first legislative assem-
bly. These courageous women who were part of this struggle for recognition 
were following in the footsteps of others before them involved in other post-
conflict peace processes, such as in South Africa.  
Finally, what was particularly revealing to the group in both Dublin and 
Belfast was listening to personal testimonials of former prisoners from both 
the loyalist and republican traditions now working together at local level in 
joint projects to bridge the continuing divide between neighboring communi-
ties. They also play an important role in reducing tensions at critical periods 
such as during the summer parade season. The trust they build up at local 
level can be often greater than the efforts of more distant politicians.  
The acceptance by all 5+2 participants of the important role to be played 
by civil society and media in the Transnistrian settlement process is particu-
larly relevant, bearing in mind the very low level of public interest in the re-
gion with the Transnistrian conflict. This is particularly the case on the right 
bank of the river, with most opinion polls in Chisinau showing the issue rated 
last on a list of priority topics of interest for the Moldovan public. Twenty 
years with nothing much happening has created its own ‘comfort zone’. De-
veloping and fostering a space for civil society and media dialogue will cer-
tainly help to fill that void.  
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OSCE efforts 
Successive attempts have been made at the annual OSCE ministerial meet-
ings to have a statement on the Transnistrian conflict adopted. The last minis-
terial statement, which dealt with Moldova goes back to the 2002 ministerial 
meeting in Portugal. Linkages with other issues which some participating 
states insisted upon invariably killed any proposed statements. On the one 
hand, Russia would contend that a statement on the Transnistrian settlement 
process would have to be accompanied by a statement on the conflicts in the 
Caucasus, knowing that there was no hope of consensus in that respect, while 
on the other, Moldova would insist on a reference to the commitments on 
Russian troop withdrawals from the region adopted at the 1999 OSCE Istan-
bul summit (apart from the troops, there is an estimated 20,000 tones of am-
munition stored in a Soviet era warehouses in Transnistria still awaiting re-
moval).  
Thus, at the Vilnius ministerial in December 2011, despite the relaunch of 
the negotiations in the 5+2 framework, the attempt at reaching a consensus 
on a ministerial statement on Transnistria failed, for the above reasons.  
A similar fate was highly likely at the Dublin ministerial meeting a year 
later. However, thanks to some deft diplomacy and the fact that no one could 
deny the considerable progress achieved during the course of the year, the 
ministerial meeting adopted a statement ‘on the Transnistrian settlement pro-
cess in the 5+2 format’. The fact that it was the first such statement in ten 
years was a significant achievement for the Irish chairmanship.  
The statement reaffirmed strong support for ‘a negotiated, comprehensive, 
just and viable resolution of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the republic of Moldova with a special status 
for Transnistria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and so-
cial rights of its population’. It encouraged the’ advancement of the negotia-
tions on all three baskets of the agreed agenda’. This is a critical element in 
view of the reluctance of both Transnistria and Russia to allow negotiations 
to focus on the comprehensive settlement issues contained in basket three. 
The statement also welcomed the ‘recognized complementary role of civil 
society and media from the sides in the settlement process’. This ministerial 
statement was without doubt an important encouragement to the process.  
The biggest challenge has been to convince the Transnistrian side, sup-
ported by Russia, to allow the negotiations to move into basket three issues. 
Up to now it has refused any such discussion, arguing that the priority must 
remain on finding solutions to the obstacles in the socio-economic area. In 
addition, Russia continues to insist that until such time as Moldova gives up 
on its 2005 law which sets out principles of resolving the conflict, there is no 
point in opening a discussion on comprehensive settlement issues.  
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To help in overcoming this dilemma, the Irish chairmanship decided to of-
fer a ‘food for thought’ paper, drawing on its own experience in the Northern 
Ireland peace process. In that example, a ‘framework document’ agreed be-
tween the UK and Irish governments was introduced into the process at an 
early stage. Those involved in the negotiations from both the republican and 
loyalist parties are unanimous in their view that this document, which set out 
a proposed road map towards a comprehensive final settlement as well as the 
possible content of that settlement, played a crucial role in helping them 
reach the good Friday agreement. 
With this in mind, we presented our ‘food for thought’ paper to all the par-
ticipants at the final round in November. We presented it without prejudice to 
the positions of the participants, as a possible guide for a way forward in the 
process. It will now be up to the Ukraine chairmanship and to the participants 
in the 5+2 process to determine whether to use it. We hope they will.  
At the final round under the Irish chairmanship in November, we recalled 
that, based on our own experience in the Northern Ireland peace process, it 
was often easier to resolve issues in one particular area if they are viewed as 
part of a broader context. We suggested that the longer the delay in opening a 
discussion on basket three issues, the bigger the obstacle becomes. These 
arguments did not convince neither the Transnistrian nor the Russian delega-
tions. So it was up to the Ukraine chairmanship to resolve this ‘Gordian 
knot’.  
Ukraine assumed the OSCE Chairmanship on 1st January 2013. The 
Ukraine Chairmanship got off to a slow start with the appointment of a new 
relatively inexperienced Foreign Minister just a few weeks before the Chair-
manship started. It also chose not to follow the Irish Chairmanship model of 
having two Special Representatives for the protracted conflicts – one for the 
Transnistrian settlement process and one for the Caucasus. Instead it nomi-
nated just one Special Representative to cover all protracted conflicts. 
However valid the reasons for this decision may be, it puts a heavy burden 
on one individual and underlines a weakness in the OSCE conflict resolution 
system. To achieve any substantial progress in an ongoing negotiation pro-
cess, such as in the case of the 5+2 process for Transnistria requires the atten-
tion of a full time Special Representative who can undertake extensive work 
on the ground in between the formal rounds of negotiations. 
Up to August 2013, there have been three formal rounds of the 5+2 pro-
cess, one in Ljov, one in Odessa and the most recent one in Vienna. The next 
round is scheduled for October in Brussels. If last year's rhythm of meetings 
is to be followed, a fifth round under the current Chairmanship should take 
place before the end of the year. 
Judging from the reports and official statements so far, there has been little 
if any progress in the talks. Even allowing for the political developments in 
Moldova itself, which resulted in a change of leadership of the Government 
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with the appointment of the former Foreign Minister Leanca as the new 
Prime Minister, there is no doubt that much of the momentum achieved dur-
ing the course of last year has been lost. The number of bilateral meetings at 
leadership level has decreased dramatically while the tone of the exchanges 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol have become sharper. 
This negative atmosphere has also been reflected in the 5+2 talks them-
selves, with difficulties over agreement of the agenda for each round. While 
all three baskets remain on the formal agenda, both Russia and Transnistria 
refuse to embark on the political settlement discussions under Basket three. 
Even on the freedom of movement issues, practical proposals aimed at ena-
bling a freer flow of vehicles, goods and people between both sides remain 
unresolved. 
Meanwhile as Moldova is moving ahead with some success in its Europe-
an integration strategy, Transnietria is reinforcing its determination to move 
even closer to Russia. In July, the Transnistrian leadership announced plans 
for a phased inclusion in the Russian inspired Eurasian integration process. 
Russia is naturally enough actively encouraging this Transnistrian approach. 
The ensuing dilemma regarding the longer term perspectives for both sides 
in the conflict will be brought into sharper focus in November at the Summit 
in Vilnius which will bring together the six countries, including Moldova and 
Ukraine, that are part of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood Programme (the 
other four being Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus). The Summit is 
expected to confirm the Association Agreement including its Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Area with Moldova, for which negotiations have been 
successfully completed. Together with visa liberalization, where Moldova is 
well advanced in the reforms required, the Summit will mark a significant 
achievement for Moldova. The EU has promoted efforts aimed at encourag-
ing Transnistria to be part of this process, but with little success so far. 
Sadly the civil society dimension of the Transnistrian settlement process 
has also suffered. The Transnistrian authorities have made clear their inten-
tion to introduce controls over civil society similar to those decreed by the 
Putin administration in Russia. This will seriously curtail interaction between 
civil society organizations from both sides of the river, at a time when it is 
most needed. 
With prospects for some breakthrough increasingly unlikely, the contribu-
tion from civil society in coming forward with proposals for a final settle-
ment could make an important difference in re building momentum. 
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Suggested a way forward 
The challenges facing the negotiating process underline the absence of sever-
al crucial elements before the process can be anywhere close to a successful 
conclusion.  
An analysis of other post- conflict peace processes, such as in South Afri-
ca or Northern Ireland, shows that there are several basic principles essential 
for success. Even allowing for each conflict requiring a unique approach, 
such an analysis helps to understand the critical importance of these basic 
principles, and how the absence of any of them can influence the outcome.  
Some of these principles may appear obvious, but they are not necessarily 
a given and cannot be taken for granted:  
 The importance of dialogue between the parties in conflict;  
 The desire of both parties to reach a final settlement;  
 The role of personalities in driving the process forward (the duo of 
Nelson Mandela and F. W de Klerk, or John Hume in Northern Ire-
land come to mind);  
 The need to build a relationship of trust between the main parties 
negotiating, a relationship where each may not share the views of 
the other but will nevertheless respect those views;  
 Ensuring transparent and regular communication to the respective 
constituencies, in particular to grass roots civil society organizations 
and to the media, thus building confidence in the process by provid-
ing for their involvement at an early stage;  
 The importance of a road map towards achieving a final settlement 
(such as the framework document in the Northern Ireland peace pro-
cess);  
 The importance of emphasizing the economic benefits of achieving 
political stability and a successful post-conflict peace process; this 
would be particularly relevant in the Transnistrian settlement pro-
cess;  
 That a post-conflict peace process does not end with the agreement 
reached, but requires continuing and painstaking work in ensuring 
implementation at both leadership and local level;  
 That a process of reconciliation, often viewed as the “unfinished 
business” of a peace process, must be seen as an integral part of 
post-conflict peace building;  
 Above all, the need for patience and perseverance.  
These principles taken together emphasize the necessity of a comprehensive 
approach towards conflict resolution in any post-conflict peace process to 
ensure a successful outcome.  
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If one applies the above list to the Transnistrian negotiations, the one as-
pect which stands out the most is the absence of a ‘road map’. This has no 
doubt contributed to the current blockage in moving the negotiations into 
basket three.  
It is all the more ironic considering that all the international actors in-
volved in the process are united at least officially as to the ultimate goal of 
the comprehensive settlement, a point confirmed by the above mentioned 
OSCE ministerial statement. Yet because they invariably differ on the tactics 
and the journey required to achieve that goal, the absence of a ‘road map’ is 
even more keenly felt.  
The annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 and the unfolding cri-
sis in Ukraine has had an direct impact on the Transnistrian settlement pro-
cess, as well as on the security environment of the broader region. Subse-
quent attempts by Russian-backed rebel fighters in the Eastern Ukraine to 
seize control of the port of Mariupol raised fears that Russia's strategy was to 
create a direct territorial link to Crimea and beyond to Odessa and even to 
Transnistria. The flare up of deadly violence in Odessa in early May, the 
worst the former imperial city had witnessed since the First World War, add-
ed to the fears of contagion. 
It is worth recalling that Russia's more assertive foreign policy in the re-
gion was evident even before the annexation of Crimea with its embargo on 
Moldovan products during 2013. This was a crude attempt to prevent the 
country signing up to the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement with the EU at the November 2013 Vilnius 
Summit. These actions by the Russian authorities, and the fact that Moldova 
remains heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supplies, were clearly 
part of the psychological warfare being waged against those countries Russia 
regards as part of its sphere of influence. 
Transnistria meanwhile continues to enjoy autonomous trade preferences 
granted by the EU, even though it has so far refused to be part of the DCFTA. 
These trade preferences will lapse on 1st January 2016, which leaves one year 
for Moldova to try and convince the Transnistrian authorities on the benefits 
it will enjoy were it to be part of the DCFTA with the EU. The stakes are 
very high; failure to find a solution will mean a much deeper trench between 
Moldova and Transnistria and will make a final settlement for the conflict 
between both sides even more difficult. 
In the Transnistrian settlement process itself, only two meetings of the 
“5+2” proceeded during the course of 2014. The other three meetings which 
had been planned so as to maintain the regular rhythm in the formal negotiat-
ing process, were postponed at the insistence of the Transnistrian side, under 
pressure from Russia. As a result, the momentum in the settlement process 
has been lost, despite the best efforts by the Special Representative appointed 
under the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship. With his mandate continuing under the 
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Serbian Chairmanship in 2015, the Special Representative will have a further 
opportunity to convince all the parties in the conflict, and in particular Rus-
sia, on the importance of regaining the momentum lost. 
The prospects are not good. Russia will continue to use Moldova and the 
Transnistrian settlement process as a convenient battle ground to make its 
presence felt and to block Moldova's aspirations for European integration. 
Moldova meanwhile has yet to demonstrate it is serious about the much 
needed economic and political reforms for which it is receiving substantial 
EU assistance. It also needs to articulate its vision towards resolving the con-
flict with Transnistria in a manner which will provide a special status for the 
region within Moldova. This should be the first priority for the new govern-
ment elected after the November 2014 general elections, and would be a fit-
ting response to Russian tactics which are all about using Moldova and 
Transnistria as pawns in a broader geopolitical game. 
 
Georgia vs. Abkhazia and  
Southern Ossetia 
 

The conflict in and over Abkhazia1 
Sergey Markedonov 
The dissolution of the USSR at the end of the Cold War brought new chal-
lenges to the Caucasus. The former republics of Soviet Transcaucasia imme-
diately became international actors which identified their own national inter-
ests and foreign policy priorities. The formation of independent states in the 
South Caucasus has been accompanied by a search for new mechanisms to 
ensure regional security and enshrine new formats of international coopera-
tion. The newly independent post-Soviet states are, however, not the only 
product of the collapse of the USST. One of the major consequences of this 
process was the appearance of entities that have also declared their independ-
ence and sovereignty but not obtained UN membership and full-fledged in-
ternational recognition even though they were able to defend themselves 
through armed confrontation as well as bloody conflicts2. 
Abkhazia has become one of the most interesting cases of de facto state-
hood building in Eurasia. More than twenty years ago, in August, 1992, it 
was drawn into an almost 14-month-long conflict with the Georgian govern-
ment and local paramilitary forces. Since 1993, September 30 has traditional-
ly been celebrated in Abkhazia as Victory Day. On that day, the Abkhaz 
armed forces and volunteers from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of 
the Caucasus drove the Georgian troops and militias out of most of the Ab-
khaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. For Tbilisi, that meant the loss 
of jurisdiction over part of its territory recognized de jure as formally belong-
ing to it. For Sukhumi/Sukhum, in contrast, it marked the beginning of its 
campaign to secure international recognition. For the whole intervening peri-
od, Abkhazia’s leaders pursued that objective in the face of controversial 
inter-action with the “mother state” and adverse external influences. In Au-
gust 2008, Abkhazia obtained the first recognition of its independence. While 
the huge role played by Moscow in the transformation of the Georgia-
Abkhaz conflict needs to be recognized, the “hand of the Kremlin” was not 
the core prerequisite for it. The most important reason for it was the desire of 
the Abkhaz elite to determine the status of the former Abkhaz Autonomous 
                                                          
1 A modified version of this chapter was published in Abkhazia: Between the Past and Future 
(2013). Ed. by Islam Tekushev, Sergey Markedonov and Kirill Shevchenko. Prague. Medi-
um Orient, pp. 16-64. 
2 For more detailed observation see: Markedonov, Sergey. The Unrecognized States of Eura-
sia as a Phenomenon of the USSR’s Dissolution (2012) // Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of 
Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 20, no. 2. 
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Soviet Socialist Republic outside the framework of the Georgian independent 
state. 
Political geography 
Abkhazia is located in the north-western part of the southern slope of the 
Greater Caucasus and on the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea. Its capital, 
Sukhum (Sukhumi) serves as the administrative center of this 8,700 square 
kilometer territory. In the north-east, Abkhazia shares a border with Russia 
(the Black Sea coast of the Krasnodar region) and in the south-west it borders 
on Georgia (Samegrelo region). Most members of the UN regard the Abkhaz-
Georgia border purely as an administrative one, rather than a true inter-state 
one.  
The size and composition of the population of Abkhazia is difficult to as-
certain and has often been disputed; the methods for estimating it are ex-
tremely sensitive and controversial. According to the last Soviet census 
(1989), held on the eve of the collapse of the USSR and the Georgian-
Abkhaz armed conflict (1992-1993), the total population of the territory of 
the Abkhaz ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) was 525.061 
people (9.7% of the entire population of the Soviet Georgia), of whom 
239.872 were ethnic Georgians (45.7% of the population), 93,267 were Ab-
khazians (17.8%), 76.541 were Armenians (14.6%), 74,913 were Russians 
(14.3%) and 14,700 were Greeks (2.8%). At various times, however, some of 
those ethnic groups were identified by different names. In the Soviet census 
of 1926, the three Kartvelian ethnic groups (Georgians, Megrelians and 
Svans) were listed separately (there were 41,000 Megrelians, 19,900 Geor-
gians and 6,600 Svans). In subsequent censuses, the generic term “Geor-
gians” was introduced and used to identify all three Kartvelian ethnic groups. 
As a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992-1993, Abkhazia's popu-
lation declined by almost a factor of three. According to the census data (col-
lected from 21 to 28 February 2011), the population of Abkhazia is currently 
240,705 people3. The country is home to 91 separate ethnic groups. The most 
numerous are the Abkhazians, of whom there are 122, 069 (50.71%); Rus-
sians, with 22,077 people (9.17%); Armenians, with 41,864 people (17.39%); 
and Georgians, with 43,166 people (17.93%). Only 3,201 people (1.33%) 
were recorded as Megrelians4. The data provided by Abkhaz statisticians 
                                                          
3 As a result of the armed conflict of 1992-1993 about 8,000 people were killed and 18.000 
were injured. Approximately 200,000 people left the territory of Abkhazia. See more de-
tailed observation: Abkhazia Today. Europe Report N°176 – 15 September 2006. Brussels, 
pp.1,13. 
4 V Abkhazii podvedeny itogi pervoi perepisi [The results of the first census are summed up in 
Abkhazia]. http://abkhasia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/198470/ (28-12-11). 
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raises many questions, however. It is questionable how, given the number of 
Abkhazians who left the republic between 1989 and 2011, the number of the 
ethnic Abkhazians has increased from 93,267 to 122,069. According to 
Georgian statistics, the total population of Abkhazia stood at about 179,000 
people in 2003 and 178,000 in 20055. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny) describes it as “a 
sovereign, democratic State, historically established by the right of the people 
to self-determination.”6 As of December 2012, Abkhazia has been recognized 
as independent by six UN-member states (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, 
Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu). On September 17, 2008 Russia and Abkhazia 
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which 
provides for a Russian military and political presence in the Republic. 
From the point of view of Georgian legislation, Abkhazia is considered an 
“autonomous republic” within the State of Georgia and an integral part of the 
Georgian state. Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Georgia empha-
sizes that “Georgia is an independent, unitary and indivisible state, as con-
firmed by the referendum held on March 31, 1991 across the country, includ-
ing the Abkhaz ASSR and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, 
and the Act on the Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia on April 
9, 1991.” Article 8 declares Abkhazian the official language in Abkhazia, and 
Article 5 establishes representation for Abkhazia in the upper chamber (Sen-
ate) of the Parliament of Georgia “after creating the territorial integrity of 
Georgia and proper conditions for the formation of local self-government.”7 
Under Georgian Law, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are considered “the re-
sult of the military aggression of the Russian Federation”8. Georgia currently 
hosts a “government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia”, which acts 
on Georgian territory and is recognized by Tbilisi as the only legitimate au-
thority of Abkhazia9. 
The origins of ethno-political conflict 
There is no consensus on the question of the origins of the ethno-political 
conflict in Abkhazia either in scholarly literature or in the numerous policy-
                                                          
5 Statistical Yearbook of Georgia 2005 (2005). Department for Statistics, Tbilisi. Population, 
Table 2.1, p. 33. 
6 The Republic of Abkhazia: The Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia (in Russian). 
http://dpashka.narod.ru/konstitut.html. 
7 The Constitution of Georgia (in English). http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=
7523. 
8 See the full text of The Law of Georgia “On Occupied Territories” (in English). http://www.
venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)004-e.asp. 
9 On the activity of this Government see: http://abkhazia.gov.ge. 
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oriented reports devoted to its aftermath. According to Leila Tania, research 
director of the “Civil Initiative and the Man of the Future” Foundation, “un-
officially the notion is circulated that the confrontation between the Abkhazi-
ans and Georgians is not as acute as, say, that between the Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, and the enmity arose only in the course of the armed conflict 
and after it. Unfortunately, such a cursory look at the history and reality of 
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has become entrenched within a number of 
international organizations … An idealized picture of the pre-war phase of 
the conflict is more common among Abkhaz and Georgian participants in the 
informal dialogue, which only reinforces this stereotype among the interna-
tional actors engaged in the conflict resolution process.”10  
The Abkhaz (self-identification “Apsua”) have long populated the Western 
Caucasus. They speak one of the languages of the Abkhazo-Adygeyan (West 
Caucasian) language group. Together with peoples of the western Caucasus 
to whom they are closely related (for example: the Abazins, Adygeyans and 
Kabardians [or Circassians]), they play an important role in the ethno-cultural 
development of the Caucasus. By the beginning of 19th century, the Princi-
pality of Abkhazia (the ruling dynasty Chachba/ Shervashidze) was a formal 
protectorate of the Ottoman Empire. Its incorporation into the Russian Em-
pire began in 1810, and until 1864 it enjoyed de facto autonomy. The aboli-
tion of this autonomy gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction among the Ab-
khaz population. Consequently, as a result of the Lykhny uprising of 1866 
and the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, many ethnic Abkhaz were ex-
pelled from the Russian Empire. According to some estimates, 60% of the 
region’s population in the mid-1860s were forced to leave11. At the same 
time, serfdom was abolished in the Caucasus, making it possible for landless 
peasants from Georgia to emigrate and explore the empty and often aban-
doned neighboring territories. In 1877, the famous Georgian public figure 
and teacher Jacob Gogebashvili (1840-1912) described this process as fol-
lows: “Resettlement is, without a doubt, not temporary, but permanent. Ab-
khazia will never again see its sons”. Gogebashvili nonetheless stressed that 
“… the anguish and the lack of land in Samegrelo … make it highly desirable 
for many Megrelians to resettle in Abkhazia.”12 Meanwhile, the Russian im-
perial administration encouraged the resettlement of Christian peoples in Ab-
khazia (mainly Armenians, Greeks, Russians and Estonians). As a result, the 
                                                          
10 Leila Taniya, Varianty strategii uregulirovaniya gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta [The vari-
ants of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict resolution strategies] (2003). Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. No. 5, p. 51. 
11 Brooks, Willis. Russia’s conquest and pacification of the Caucasus: relocation becomes a 
pogrom in the post-Crimean period 1995). In Nationalities Papers, no. 23(4), pp. 675-86. 
12 Gogebashvili, Jacob. Kem zaselit’ Abkhaziyu? [With whom should Abkhazia be settled?] 
(1877) In Tifliskii Vestnik [The Tiflis Messenger], no. 209, September, 27.  
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early 20th century was a period of radical ethno-demographic transition in the 
region. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Sukhum district (created as a 
result of the conversion of the Sukhum Military Department in 1883) was 
part of the Kutaisi province and thus subordinated to the Russian Caucasian 
administration in Tbilisi. From 1904-1917, Gagra and the adjacent areas were 
included in the Sochi district of the Black Sea province (the smallest province 
of the Russian Empire). Following the collapse of the Russian Empire and 
the creation of the newly independent states on its former territory, the “Ab-
khaz issue” was a focal point in the clash of interests between the Bolsheviks, 
the Armed Forces of South Russia (the “White Movement” led by General 
Anton Denikin) and the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In the summer of 
1918, Abkhazia was incorporated into the new Georgian state. This process 
was accompanied by repressive actions against the Abkhaz national move-
ment and ordinary Abkhazians by the central authorities of Georgia and the 
Georgian armed forces (both the Army and the Georgian National Guard 
were under the command of General George Mazniev [Mazniashvili]). In 
March 1919, the People's Council of Abkhazia, the formation of which was 
decisively influenced by the central government of Georgia, adopted the Act 
on the Entry of Abkhazia into Georgia as an Autonomous Region. This act 
was then approved by the Constituent Assembly of Georgia. According to the 
1921 Constitution of Georgia (Chapter 11, “Independent control”, Article 
107) Abkhazia (Sukhumi region), Muslim Georgia (Batumi region) and 
Zagatala (Zakatalskaya area) were recognized as “inseparable parts of the 
Georgian republic” and granted “autonomous government in local affairs.”13 
The strict and sometimes repressive policies of Georgia’s Menshevik gov-
ernment vis-à-vis ethnic minorities created sympathy for the Abkhaz people 
in Soviet Russia and within the Bolshevik movement. In March 1921, Ab-
khazia was proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic. In December of the same 
year, an agreement was signed between Georgia (which by that time had be-
come Soviet), and the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic. According to that 
document, Abkhazia became part of Georgia. Since then, Abkhazia has been 
considered a contractual republic. The Constitution of the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic adopted by the First Congress of the Soviets of Georgia in 
1922 said that, based on self-determination, it included: the Adjara Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republic, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region 
(Oblast) and the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Constitution of 
the USSR (1924) stated that “the autonomous Republics of Adjara and Ab-
khazia and the autonomous regions of South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh and 
Nakhichevan are represented in the Council of Nationalities by one repre-
                                                          
13 The Constitution of Georgia (adopted in February, 21, 1921 by the Georgian Constituent 
Assembly) (in Russian), http://www.200.org.ge/documents/1918docs/rus/21_02_21.pdf. On 
March, 1922 four districts of the former Zagatala area became parts of Azerbaijan.  
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sentative.”14 In 1925, the Third Congress of the Soviets of Abkhazia adopted 
a constitutional plan involving a contractual relationship between Sukhumi 
and Tbilisi, but this document was rejected by the Transcaucasian Territorial 
Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Subsequently, the leaders of the Abkhaz 
national movement would call it “the first Abkhaz Constitution”. During the 
period of “perestroika” and the dissolution of the USSR, it became an im-
portant tool in the political and legal struggle for Abkhazia’s secession from 
Georgia15. 
In 1931, the Abkhazian ASSR was created within the Georgian SSR. Un-
der Stalin, the Georgian leadership pursued a strict policy of discrimination 
against the Abkhazian population. In 1937-1938, the Abkhaz alphabet was 
replaced by one based on the Georgian schedule and in 1945-1946 Georgian 
became the basic language of instruction in Abkhazian schools. Many Ab-
khaz toponyms were replaced by Georgian ones. “The policy of repression of 
the Abkhaz language and culture implemented by very specific persons of 
Georgian nationality (not only policymakers, but also ordinary people) pro-
moted among the Abkhaz people the image of an enemy in relation to the 
mass of Georgian immigrants who possessed the same social privileges”, 
says Gia Nodia, a contemporary Georgian scholar and social activist16. The 
mass migration of the rural population from the inner regions of Georgia to 
the Abkhaz ASSR became state policy after the Central Committee of the 
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Com-
missars (Sovnarkom) passed a Resolution “On Measures to Protect the Public 
Land of the Collective Farms from Being Left to go to Waste” (1939). In an 
explanatory note on the situation in the Georgian SSR, it was emphasized 
that “collective farmers and individual farmers could use large areas of va-
cant lands which were not cultivated by the local population due to the lack 
of manpower.”17 
                                                          
14 Bor’ba za uprocheniye Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii. Sbornil dokumentov i materialov. 1921-
1925 [The struggle for the Soviet power strengthening in Georgia. Collection of documents 
and materials] (1959). Tbilisi, p. 80. 
15 On July, 23, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia abolished the Constitution of the Abkha-
zian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Georgia and proclaimed the 
“restoration” of the Constitutional draft of 1925. See more detailed observation: Lakoba, 
Stanislav. History: 1917-1989 (1999). In The Abkhazians (Hewitt G., ed.). Richmond, Sur-
vey: Curzon Press, p.93.  
16 Nodia, Gia. Konflikt v Abkhazii: natsionalnye proekty I politicheskie obyazatel’stva [The 
conflict ib Abkhazia: national projects and political obligations] (1998). In Gruziny I Abkha-
zy: puti k primipeniyu [The Georgians and Abkhazians: ways for reconciliation]. Moscow, 
p. 30. 
17 Sagaria, E., Achugba, T. (ed.). Abkhazia: documenty svidetelstvuyut. Sbornik materialov. 
1937-1953 [Abkhazia: documents testify. Collection of materials.1937-1953] (1992). 
Alashara Publishing House, Sukhum/Sukhumi, pp. 6-7.  
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Subsequently the discriminatory measures against the Abkhazian popula-
tion were substantially mitigated, and education in Abkhaz and the Abkhaz 
media were revived. In 1978, during the process of adopting the Abkhaz 
ASSR Constitution, a compromise was reached: the Abkhaz language be-
came, along with Georgian and Russian, a state language in the autonomous 
territory. In addition, special quotas to fill vacant positions in Party, govern-
ment, administrative and economic bodies were also introduced. At the 11th 
Plenum of the Communist Party of Georgia (June 27, 1978), then First Secre-
tary Eduard Shevardnadze publicly criticized the “excesses” of the Georgian 
Communists with regard to the “Abkhaz issue”18. The policy of ethnic dis-
crimination had an extremely negative impact, creating among Abkhazian 
politicians and scientists the perception that even in the 1960s-1980s, the 
social and economic policies of the Georgian SSR were geared to ensuring 
the large scale resettlement of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia with the aim of 
changing the ethno-demographic balance to the detriment of the Abkhaz peo-
ple. Whereas in 1959, there were already 158,221 Georgians in Abkhazia 
compared with 61,193 Abkhaz, by 1970 the number of Georgians had risen 
to 199,955 while the number of Abkhaz was 77,276). In 1979, Georgians 
already constituted 43.9% of the population of the autonomous region 
(213,322)19. In this case, as it was rightly noted by the authors of an Interna-
tional Crisis Group report entitled “Abkhazia Today” (September, 2006), 
“the Georgian portion of the population of Abkhazia and society at large 
within the Georgian SSR perceived a number of ‘liberal measures’ enacted 
by the Brezhnev leadership directed at the Abkhazians as ‘discriminatory’ 
against the Georgians themselves. Abkhazians, being an autonomous ethnic 
minority, occupied about 67% of the administrative positions in the Abkhaz 
ASSR.”20 
Since the creation of the autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR, 
the Abkhazian population has periodically tried to ask for reconsideration of 
its status. In 1931, 1957, 1967, and 1977 the Abkhaz national intelligentsia 
prepared appeals to the leadership of the USSR in favor of secession from the 
Georgian SSR in order either to join the RSFSR or to form a separate Abkhaz 
Union Republic. The so-called “Letter of 130” (December 1977) was the last 
address to this effect directed towards the Kremlin before Gorbachev’s “pere-
stroika” and the subsequent political liberalization that culminated in the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. However this initiative was rejected and its organ-
                                                          
18 Kazenin, K. (ed.) Gruzino-abkhazskii konflikt. 1917-1992 [The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. 
1917-1992] (2007). Europe Publishing House, Moscow, p. 27. 
19 Naselenie Abkhazii [The population of Abkhazia], http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/
rnabkhazia.html. See also: Lezhava, Georgii. Izmenenie klassovo-sotsialnoi structury nase-
leniya Abkhazii [The changes in the social structure of Abkhazia’s population] (1989). 
Alashara Publishing House, Sukhumi/Sukhum.  
20 Abkhazia today…, p. 6. 
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izers were criticized by the Abkhaz Party Committee Bureau (on February 
22, 1978) for promoting “erroneous nationalist views and calumny”21.  
Abkhazia: from Soviet autonomy to a de facto state 
Thus on the eve of “Perestroika”, the Georgian and Abkhaz communities 
inside Abkhazia, as well as Georgian society as a whole, were ready to seize 
the opening provided by the weakening of the Kremlin’s administrative con-
trol and the subsequent political liberalization in order to move ahead with 
their nationalist aspirations. “The Abkhaz problem” became the main “politi-
cal trauma” for post-Soviet Georgia. The struggle of the Georgian National 
Democrats for Georgian independence during the final years of the USSR 
coincided with, and proceeded in tandem with, the Abkhaz movement for 
ethno-political self-determination. The events of the late 1980s and early 
1990s are considered, in post-Soviet Georgian historiography and political 
science, a period of national liberation for the Georgian people. During that 
period, the most important slogans, requirements and programs that became 
the basis for the political, legal and ideological development of post-Soviet 
Georgia were proclaimed. The ethno-nationalist slogans and appeals for the 
restoration of the political and legal continuity of the Georgian Democratic 
Republic (1918-1921), a state with extremely complicated and rather ambig-
uous relations with Abkhazia, was in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of the 
Georgian and Abkhaz national movements of the late 1980s. As a result, the 
start of Georgia’s national liberation expedited the self-determination of the 
Abkhaz people. The escalation of tensions was facilitated by the particulari-
ties of Abkhazia’s “political demography. In contrast to the Ossetians, whose 
ethnic homeland was not confined to South Ossetia (most of the Ossetian 
population of the Georgian SSR had lived outside of the South Ossetian Au-
tonomous Region), the homeland of the Abkhaz was virtually identical with 
the territory of the Abkhaz ASSR (a further 2,000 Abkhazians live in Geor-
gia’s autonomous region of Adjara). Unlike South Ossetia, in Abkhazia the 
“titular” ethnic group did not constitute a numerical majority. This created 
many difficulties for Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia even during the 
Soviet period. The Abkhaz national movement could not appeal to the “will 
of the majority”. As a result, its main task was to control “its own territory”, 
providing full political, social, economic and ideological domination inside 
of that area. However, in a situation where the largest community in Abkha-
zia (Georgians) supported the preservation of the territorial integrity of Geor-
                                                          
21 Markedonov, Sergey. Sovetskii Kavkaz v 1970-e: predchuvstviye grazhdaskoi voiny” [The 
Soviet Caucasus in 1970s: Premonition of civil war] (2007). In Neprikosnovennyi zapas 
[Emergency Reserve], no. 2(52), p. 54. 
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gia within the Georgian SSR, the Abkhaz movement needed an ally in order 
to implement its policy. In Moscow (initially the central administration of the 
USSR, then, following its dissolution, the Russian government), they found 
such an ally. For nearly six decades, the Abkhaz representatives had ad-
dressed their demands to Moscow but a new appeal to Kremlin, adopted on 
March 18, 1989 (when 30.000 people gathered for a rally in the village of 
Lykhny in the Gudauta district, the former residence of the Abkhazian princ-
es), demanded a radically different approach from all previous ones. On the 
one hand, it echoed traditional pro-Soviet slogans such as the “Leninist prin-
ciples of national policy.” On the other hand, the protesters discussed the 
“political, economic and cultural sovereignty” of Abkhazia. Moreover, this 
new appeal to Moscow fostered consensus between the Abkhaz oblast com-
mittee of the CPSU and representatives of the Abkhaz intelligentsia, who had 
been recently accused of “bourgeois nationalism” and “slanderous fabrica-
tions.” The creation of the “Aydgylara” (Popular Forum) movement on De-
cember, 13, 1988 was the practical manifestation of that consensus. National-
ist discourse replaced all other causes in the public sphere and began to play a 
mobilizing and unifying role. Within the context of conditions conducive to 
political liberalization, the growing public activity in Abkhazia attracted un-
precedented attention throughout Georgia. It accelerated the crystallization of 
the Georgian national movement, in that it significantly simplified its ideo-
logical development search for it. The “enemy image” fell into the hands of 
its leaders. In the space of a few months, the “communist-dissident” contro-
versy in Georgia was replaced by the discourse of “national unity”22. It was 
then that the “Abkhazian separatism” movement became linked in the Geor-
gian perception (both national leaders and public opinion as a whole) with 
Russian intrigues. This discourse did not make any serious distinction be-
tween the USSR and the Russian Empire, i.e. the various political forms or 
incarnations of Russian power. The tragic events of April 9, 1989 (the de-
ployment of Soviet Army troops to disperse a peaceful demonstration on Tbi-
lisi’s Rustaveli Avenue) and the Georgian-Abkhaz clashes in Sukhumi and 
other parts of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic in July 1989 ensured the 
development of blood lines between Georgians and Abkhazians23. Attempts 
                                                          
22 The Congress of People’s Deputies Commission (known as the Anatoliy Sobchak Commis-
sion) that investigated the Tbilisi violence of April 1989 brilliantly demonstrated this trend: 
“In those conditions the state and party leadership of Georgia faced the necessity to confirm 
its role of political and ideological vanguard and to follow the “Perestroika” principles in 
order to influence the public opinion preventing the gap between its status and realities on 
the ground. However, Georgia’s Communist Party leaders failed to provide a dialogue and 
effectively cooperate with society”. See: http://sobchak.org/rus/docs/zakluchenie.htm. Sub-
sequent developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia show the Communist leadership’s 
willingness to exploit nationalist rhetoric to preserve its positions.  
23 During the violence in Tbilisi, 19 people were killed and 200 people were injured. During 
two weeks of riots in Abkhazia, 14 people were killed. See for detailed observations: Gruzi-
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to preserve Georgian-Abkhaz “unity” within the existing Soviet political 
framework failed. A landmark event was the split of the Supreme Council of 
the Abkhaz ASSR in 1990 into the Abkhaz and Georgian factions. On Au-
gust 25, 1990 the Abkhaz members of the Supreme Council adopted a “Dec-
laration of State Sovereignty” and a resolution “On the legal guarantees of 
protection of statehood of Abkhazia.” Those documents were voided in turn 
by the Supreme Council’s Georgian members. The mass political split be-
tween the two ethnic communities was reinforced by referendums carried out 
by the Soviet authorities (on voting for a “renewed Union”), and by Geor-
gia’s attempt to secede from the USSR by means of a referendum on the res-
toration of the national independence. The first referendum took place on 
March 17, 1991, and the second on March 31, 1991. The ethnic Abkhaz sup-
ported Moscow and Soviet policy almost unconditionally. For this reason, 
they participated in the first referendum and boycotted the second. Georgians 
living in Abkhazia, as well as their compatriots in the rest of Georgia, refused 
to take part in the vote on the future of the Soviet Union and instead partici-
pated in the referendum on the restoration of Georgian statehood. Those two 
referendums demonstrated to the Abkhaz leadership the need to maintain 
strong relations with allies other than Moscow, and for that reason they 
sought to secure the support of Abkhazia’s ethnic Russians, Greeks and Ar-
menians24. Abkhazia’s leaders cannot claim all the credit for the referendum 
outcome, however, as it was primarily the result of Georgian politicians’ col-
lective failure to create a dialogue with their Abkhaz counterparts because of 
their commitment to radical ethnic nationalism, which included strong anti-
Russian and anti-Armenian elements. This greatly strengthened the Abkhazi-
an national movement in its desire to secede from Georgia. Facing Georgia 
and the largest community inside the Abkhaz ASSR – the Georgians - the 
Abkhazians in those circumstances could not count on ultimate success with-
out the support of the region’s other ethnic minorities. Representatives of the 
Russian and Armenian communities of Abkhazia later played a significant 
role in the formation of this breakaway state. 
In the last two years of the USSR (1989-1991), the Abkhazian movement 
could not be clearly classified as separatist, although it had been identified as 
such in Tbilisi since the early stages of political activity in the Autonomous 
                                                          
ya: Problemy I perspektivy razvitiya [Georgia: problems and perspectives of development] 
(2002). Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow. Vol. 1-2.  
24 Thus in Abkhazia among 318,300 enlisted voters on March, 17, 1991 166.500 people 
(52,3%) participated in the referendum on the “renewed USSR”. At that juncture, ethnic 
Abkhazians constituted 17, 8% of the total population, including both voters and people with 
to right to vote. 98,6% of all Abkhaz voters who participated in the referendum (51,6% of 
the total figure) supported the integrity of the USSR. Representatives of the Russian and 
Armenian communities (Yuri Voronov, Albert Topolyan, Galust Trapizonyan, and Sergey 
Matosyan) played a significant role in the Abkhazia’s de facto state-building.  
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republic. On the one hand, the Abkhazian ASSR, along with the other auton-
omous communities of the Soviet Union, took part in the process of trying to 
obtain “sovereignty”. On the other hand, however, in 1989-1991 most Geor-
gians were opposed to the Union state and wanted to destroy it, while the 
Abkhaz movement supported the territorial integrity of the USSR and was 
prepared to protect it. Vladislav Ardzinba (1945-2010), the leader of the Ab-
khaz national movement and since 1990 the Chairman of the Supreme Coun-
cil of the Abkhaz ASSR, was a member of the parliamentary group “Union 
that Opposed the Secession of the National-State Formations.” Preserving the 
unity of the Soviet Union was seen in Sukhumi as a guarantor against ethno-
political conflict and as a potential opportunity through which loyalty to 
Moscow could be parlayed into support for a higher status for Abkhazia. In 
this regard it is important to pay attention to the common argument among 
the Abkhaz leaders. To them, voting in favor of preserving the USSR gave 
them the right to secede from the newly independent Georgia after the disso-
lution of the Soviet state in December 199125. 
At the same time, it would be incorrect to treat the Abkhaz movement as a 
blind adherent to and champion of the Soviet political system, as Georgian 
observers and political scientists sympathetic to Georgia both from Russia 
and the West did later26. As current Abkhazian Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and political analyst Irakli Khintba rightly stated, voting in favor of 
the USSR “was not a values’ choice for the Abkhaz people.” It was “a tacti-
cal move which then made it possible to appeal to the relevant procedure of 
self-determination of the autonomous republics according to the existing So-
viet legislation ’On the procedure for solving problems related to the seces-
sion of a Union Republic from the USSR.”27 
However, some attempts to use new non-Soviet approaches (ethnic quotas 
instead of majority rule principles) to halt the escalation of ethnic tensions 
were not so successful. In summer 1991, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides 
agreed on a draft electoral draft law which determined the distribution of par-
liamentary seats among the various ethnic communities for the election of the 
Supreme Council of Abkhazia. Twenty-eight seats were reserved for the Ab-
khazians, 26 for the Georgians, and 11 seats for all other ethnic groups. Elec-
                                                          
25 Abkhazia today…, p. 7. 
26 The most prominent example of that approach was the book by Svetlana Chervonnaya. See: 
Chervonnaya, Svetlana. Abkhazia-1992. Postkommunusticheskaya Vendee. [Abkhazia-
1992. The Post-Communist Vendee] (1993). Mosgorpechat’ Publishing House, Moscow.  
27 Cited in: Irakli Khintba: Razval SSSR stal triggerom ethopoliticheskih konfliktov na ego 
okrainah [The USSR collapse triggered ethno-political conflicts in its border regions], 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/182478 (18-3-11). The Law mentioned here was ratified 
on April, 3, 1990. Article 3 of this Law gave the autonomous entities the right to determine 
their status within the Union Republic and the USSR as whole when the Union Republic se-
ceded. For the full text of the Law (in Russian) see: http://pravo.levonevsky.org/
baza/soviet/sssr0973.htm. 
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tions under this scheme were held in October and December 1991. This prac-
tice was later criticized and blamed for promoting apartheid and discrimina-
tion. When trying to oppose his predecessor, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s 
second President Eduard Shevardnadze reproached him for colluding with 
the Abkhaz nationalists. Be that as it may, the compromise in 1991 strength-
ened the Abkhaz side, as it confirmed if not privileged, then special status, as 
well as providing the Abkhaz with greater administrative capacity to influ-
ence the situation in the region. However, the compromise was shortlived, 
and the ethno-political split reemerged in stark fashion just after the opening 
of the new Supreme Council. This was because the parties had by then be-
come the hostages of their maximalist demands. According to Bruno Coppie-
ters, “both sides in practice were not ready to give up the dream of establish-
ing their own exclusive control over the territory of Abkhazia.”28 At the end 
of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, new contradictions were added to the 
age-old inter-ethnic confrontations. On January 6, 1992, the first President of 
Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993), was overthrown and power was 
transferred to the so-called War Council that was replaced in March of the 
same year by a ruling State Council. A cleavage developed within Georgian 
society between the supporters of the elected Head of State and the new lead-
ership that initiated the return to Tbilisi of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former 
Communist Party of Georgia first secretary. This new division in one sense 
helped the Abkhaz leaders weaken the political potential of Tbilisi. It made it 
clear to them that it would be possible to implement a new agenda focused on 
the secession from Georgia after the dissolution of the USSR in December, 
1991. On the other hand, it turned Abkhazia into a hostage of Georgia’s do-
mestic political confrontation. Consolidating the champions of Gamsakhurdia 
(Zviadists) and the supporters of Shevardnadze, who had no legitimacy, be-
came possible by invoking the common enemy of “Abkhaz separatism”. It is 
no accident that on July 24, 1992, 19 ethnic Georgian political parties and 
movements in Abkhazia were united in the “Council of National Unity of 
Georgia” which included in its platform a requirement to preserve the territo-
rial integrity of the country. In August 1992, the State Council of Georgia 
issued a special “Manifesto of Great Reconciliation” addressed to the sup-
porters of the overthrown president. 
Against the background of the two political fractures in the first half of 
1992, the Abkhaz leaders took a number of crucial steps towards creating the 
foundation for their own statehood. They unilaterally provided for the trans-
fer of Abkhazia’s militia (law enforcement forces), military units, enterprises, 
administrative structures and their staff to their own political jurisdiction. At 
the same time, they secured the preponderance of ethnic Abkhazians (Abkhaz 
Interior Minister Givi Lominadze, an ethnic Georgian, was dismissed and 
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Caucasus] (in Russian) (2002). Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, p. 24.  
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replaced by an ethnic Abkhaz, Alexander Ankvab). The Regiment of Internal 
troops of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia was created. In response to these 
steps, the leaders and activists of the Georgian community in Abkhazia 
formed their own militias, such as the local units of “Mkhedrioni” (“Horse-
men”) and others. In this period, paradoxically, the Georigan authorities 
helped the Abkhaz side. As Abkhaz historian Timur Achugba correctly ob-
served, “radical views on the political status of Abkhazia were aggravated 
after the Military Council of Georgia annulled on February 21, 1992 all Sovi-
et-era legislation enacted since February 25, 1921, including the Constitution 
of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1978.” Instead the Constitution 
of 1921 was restored, which contained a paragraph about the “autonomous 
government” in Abkhazia in local affairs but did not consider it an entity with 
any special political and legal status similar to that which the Abkhaz ASSR 
had been accorded in the 1978 Constitution. According to Achugba, “the act 
of the Georgian political elite was perceived as the actual abolition of Abkha-
zia’s statehood.”29 On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia put 
forward a decision to abolish the Constitution of the Abkhazian Autonomous 
Republic within the Georgian SSR and replace it with the constitutional pro-
ject of 1925. This decision spurred Tbilisi to use force, and on August 14, 
1992 the troops of the State Council of Georgia entered the territory of Ab-
khazia. This ethnic conflict developed into an armed conflict between the 
Georgian state (and Georgian community in Abkhazia) on the one hand, and 
the breakaway territory on the other. 
The Georgian-Abkhazian Armed Conflict 
A detailed analysis of the Georgian-Abkhaz military confrontation (1992-
1993) is not among the objectives of this report. The war will be discussed 
only in the context of the evolution of the ethno-political conflict in Abkha-
zia. The Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict has been interpreted differently by 
both sides. From Georgia’s point of view, it was a struggle with a criminal 
separatist regime. According to Eduard Shevardnadze, who was personally 
responsible for the military solution of the “Abkhaz issue”, an ethno-cratic 
dictatorship had been formed in Abkhazia by the summer of 1992 and this 
development necessitated urgent military engagement. In contrast, the wide-
                                                          
29 Achugba, Timur. Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v predvoennoi Abkhazii (Konets 80-h-
nachalo 90-h gg. XX veka) [The ethno-political situation in pre-war Abkhazia (late 80s-early 
90-s of the XX-th century)], http://kvkz.ru/history/2439-yetnopoliticheskaya-situaciya-v-
predvoennoj-abxazii-konec-80-x-nachalo-90-x-gg-xx-veka.html (27-6-10). 
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ly-held Abkhaz viewpoint sees the events of 1992-1993 as the “Great Patriot-
ic War of the Abkhaz people.”30 
In the course of the armed conflict, the Abkhaz elite solved several im-
portant problems. First, it desired to preserve and protect an area which could 
constitute the core of an effective administration and military headquarters 
outside Georgian control. Second, it sought allies both within the republic 
(among other ethnic communities) and outside. Third, it tried to create and 
promote internationally the legitimacy of the Abkhaz secession.  
In contrast, the Georgian authorities were interested in swiftly suppressing 
the separatist challenge in order to focus first on strengthening the domestic 
legitimacy of the new power structure that had replaced Gamsakhurdia, and 
then on consolidating the fragmented society on a “patriotic basis”. Apart 
from Abkhazia, Tbilisi faced a similar standoff with the other breakaway 
region, South Ossetia. Shortly before the outbreak of the armed conflict in 
Abkhazia, Georgia, with the help of Russia, negotiated and signed a ceasefire 
agreement in South Ossetia, the autonomous status of which Gamsakhurdia 
had abolished. But Tbilisi failed to induce the Ossetian leaders to accept 
Georgia’s jurisdiction. In addition to the cease-fire, Georgia ceded part of its 
sovereign control over South Ossetia to the Joint Control Commission and 
the Joint peacekeeping forces, which consisted of Russian, Georgian, and 
Ossetian troops. In this regard, a successful operation in Abkhazia was meant 
to send a “clear message” to the other “rebellious autonomy”. It allowed for 
the creation of a policy platform meant to politically and psychologically 
pressure the leaders of the South Ossetian national movement. 
Initially, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict resulted in a military success for 
the Georgian side. Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, was captured. Even 
though Tbilisi controlled most of Abkhazia’s territory, including Sukhumi, 
from the summer of 1992 until the summer of 1993, the Abkhaz leadership 
managed to create an effective political and military center for their breaka-
way republic in the small town of Gudauta, which stands at the center of the 
district of the same name31. In 1992-1993 Abkhazia had no clear support 
from Russia, which itself was being wracked by separatist conflict (primarily 
in Chechnya), and was therefore not ready to defend the position of the Ab-
khaz side. Political analyst Oksana Antonenko characterized Russia’s policy 
toward Georgia and Abkhazia during this period as “multi-polar”.32 In this 
                                                          
30 Belaya kniga Abkhazii: Dokumenty, materialy, svidetelstva [The Abkhazia’s White book: 
Documents. Materials and testimonies] (1993). Moscow. 
31 During the first months of the conflict, the Abkhaz leadership controlled only a small tract 
of territory around Gudauta, Tkvarcheli and several villages in the Ochamchira district. On 
October, 1992, it retook control over the Gagra district (north-east of Abkhazia).  
32 ntonenko, Oksana. Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia (2005). In State-
hood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Coppieters B. and Legvold R. (eds). 
Cambridge, MA, pp. 208-217. 
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case, the Russian military establishment in particular was sympathetic to the 
Abkhaz side due to its negative attitude to Georgian leader Shevardnadze. 
They attributed the forced withdrawal of Soviet Army troops from Germany, 
the change of the official political position of the USSR in Central and East-
ern Europe, and eventually the collapse of the Soviet Union to Shevardnad-
ze’s actions and policies while Soviet Foreign Minister.  
The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) was ac-
tive in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, as were the armed formations of the 
ethno-national movements in the North Caucasus. The CMPC was created on 
November 1-2, 1991 on the basis of the Assembly of Mountain Peoples es-
tablished in August 1989. The CMPC was led by Musa (Yuri) Shanibov and 
Yusuf Soslambekov, who had been one of the main figures in the “Chechen 
revolution” of 1991. The ideology of the Assembly and subsequently the 
Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus evolved along similar 
lines to those of other nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union. In 
the first phase, national and cultural goals and objectives (the revival of tradi-
tions, religion, etc.) dominated. Later, they were replaced by more pressing 
requirements for the recognition of the political status of a particular ethnic 
group or territory. The CMPC called for the revival of the single Mountain-
ous Republic within the Russian Confederation. Later, the CMPC espoused 
separatist principles and it included in its membership people who had partic-
ipated in the fighting in South Ossetia before 1992. It is thus hard to overes-
timate the role of volunteers from the North Caucasus in Abkhazia. During 
the 14 months of the armed conflict in Abkhazia 2,500 Circassian volunteers 
took part in the fighting. Sultan Sosnaliyev, a ethnic Kabardian, was Chief of 
Staff and then Defense Minister of Abkhazia during the conflict, and again 
from 2005-2007. Kabardian groups led by Muayed Shorov attacked the 
building of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia, where the pro-Georgian 
administration had its headquarters. The Abkhaz separatists were supported 
by the Chechen separatists. On August 17, 1992, the CMPC held a parlia-
mentary session in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during which delegates put 
forward the political slogan "Hands off Abkhazia”. Shamil Basayev, later to 
become a prominent Chechen field commander, first gained notoriety during 
the Abkhaz conflict in which he commanded a unit of about 5,000 fighters. In 
addition to this military aid from the North Caucasus, the Abkhaz side was 
also supported by most representatives of the republic’s other ethnic minori-
ties. Ethnic Russians fought on the Abkhaz side, and the Marshal Baghra-
myan battalion consisted of ethnic Armenians. On the other hand, a small 
number of Armenians fought on the side of Georgia. However, most of them 
were from other regions of Georgia and their engagement was both less struc-
tured and less well known in terms of propaganda. Thus, the ethno-military 
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composition of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was far more varied in com-
parison with the Georgian-Ossetian or Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts33. 
The significant involvement of ethno-nationalist movements from the 
North Caucasus in the Georgian-Abkhazian armed conflict spurred Moscow 
to take more decisive action to end the confrontation. In September 1992, a 
meeting of the leaders of Georgia, Abkhazia and the North Caucasus repub-
lics, with the active participation of the Russian Federation, was held and a 
commission for restoring security in the region was created. However, this 
peace initiative did not achieve any concrete results due to the lack of a clear 
and precise procedure for implementing the decisions it adopted. October 
1992 saw a turning point in the armed conflict, as the Abkhaz side seized the 
military initiative and began to extend its control over the north-west of the 
republic. Abkhaz forces captured Gagra on October 6 and reached the border 
with Russia on the river Psou shortly afterwards. On July 27, 1993, Russia 
mediated the signing between the two sides in Sochi of an agreement on a 
cease-fire and the mechanisms for its implementation. In fact, the implemen-
tation of the Sochi agreement would return the region to the situation in 
summer 1992, i.e. before the military confrontation started. The Sochi 
agreement did not contain any proposals on the future political and legal sta-
tus of Abkhazia, which was the issue that triggered the Tbilisi-Sukhumi disa-
greements in the first place34. The Abkhaz side was not satisfied with these 
conditions and attacked the Georgian positions in September 1993, inflicting 
a definitive defeat on the Georgian armed forces. The Abkhaz offensive coin-
cided with a rebellion by supporters of ousted President Gamsakhurdia in 
West Georgia (Samegrelo). Not having a reliable rear flank in Samegrelo, the 
Georgian armed forces were unable to effectively counter the Abkhaz attack. 
As a result of the Abkhaz offensive and the virtually unilateral violation of 
the Sochi agreement, Georgia lost control over Abkhazia with the exception 
of a small area in the upper reaches of the Kodori Gorge (the Dal Gorge, 
sometimes called the Abkhazian Svaneti). Abkhaz forces secured control of 
that district of the gorge only in August 2008. The active military confronta-
tion ended in the fall of 1993, although sporadic clashes took place in 1994 in 
both the Gali region and the Kodori Gorge. In April 1994, the Russian-
mediated “Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Geor-
gian-Abkhaz conflict” was signed, and in May of that year the Georgian and 
Abkhazian leaders appealed to CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 
Council of Heads of States asking for peacekeeping forces to be deployed in 
the conflict zone. In July 1994, a Russian peacekeeping operation got under-
                                                          
33 Cheterian, Vicken. The Face of the Caucasus (2000). In Armenian International Magazine. 
Vol. 5, no. 3. 
34 Although the Abkhaz side was responsible for violating this agreement, the Georgian side 
too failed to implement its conditions, in particular concerning the full withdrawal of mili-
tary forces). 
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way in Abkhazia. Although many thought that other CIS member states 
would make troops available, in fact the operation, which lasted until August 
2008, was exclusively Russian. Peacekeepers were deployed in a 12-
kilometer territory known as the “security zone” on both sides of the river 
Inguri that marks the boundary between the Gali district of Abkhazia and the 
Zugdidi district of Georgia. 
Abkhazia’s leaders failed during the armed conflict to convince the inter-
national community of the legality of Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia. 
Indeed, they still have not done so today. Georgia’s territorial integrity is 
recognized by an absolute majority of the UN member states. Nevertheless, 
the UN has followed the conflict closely since it began in 1992 and from the 
outset it recognized Abkhazia as a party to the conflict. That was the ap-
proach subsequently followed by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UN-
OMIG)35. 
The armed conflict had disastrous consequences. Four thousand Georgians 
were killed and 1,000 disappeared. More than 3,000 Abkhazians lost their 
lives. The economic losses from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict amounted to 
US$10.7 billion. In the years immediately following the end of hostilities, 
700 people were killed by landmines. Nearly 250,000 Georgians (nearly half 
the pre-war population) were forced to flee Abkhazia, of whom some 40,000-
50,000 later returned to the south-eastern Gali district, which prior to conflict 
had been predominantly Georgian-populated36. There was no mass return of 
refugees (or internally displaced persons, according to the viewpoint of the 
international community) to other parts of Abkhazia.  
The peace process from 1993-2004: Failures and Successes 
By October 1993, Georgia had lost its de facto sovereignty over most of the 
former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia. The Russian-
mediated Moscow ceasefire agreement signed in May 1994 also legally with-
drew aspects of Georgian sovereignty over Abkhazia by placing the peace-
keeping forces under the jurisdiction of the CIS Council of Heads of States. 
However, while the end of the military confrontation closed the book on one 
set of problems, it opened up a host of others. The two parties had different 
perceptions of the transitions that they had to make. The Abkhaz leaders had 
to make the transition from a military-political regime to normal civilian rule, 
                                                          
35 On July 21, 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 937 on the definition of 
the format of its Mission. The mandate of UNOMIG (121 observer) was based on the Mos-
cow agreement on ceasefire on May 14, 1994. See more detailed information on UNOMIG 
activity: http://www.unomig.org 
36 Abkhazia Today… 
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insofar as this was possible under conditions of destruction and blockade. 
Following the euphoria of victory, it was also critical that they establish ele-
mentary order to prevent the total criminalization of society and domination 
by warlords. In their pursuit of political independence from Georgia, Abkha-
zia's leaders began, from the first day after the end of the armed confronta-
tion, building a legal framework upon which the formation of statehood could 
be based (this included the Constitution and the law on citizenship). The 
harmonization of interethnic relations within the country and the prevention 
of new ethno-political crises topped the post-war agenda. Additionally, nego-
tiations on the future status of Abkhazia and the development of international 
contacts became priority directions for policy. 
The Georgian side held the opposite view. With no money or resources for 
a quick military revenge, Tbilisi focused its energies on securing, at the inter-
national level, agreement on the “temporary” (suspended) status of Abkhazia 
and recognition of it as part of the united Georgian state. In addition, the 
Georgian authorities focused on pressuring Abkhazia economically to force it 
to make concessions. 
The peace process developed on several levels. The first was within the 
framework of the UN, under whose auspices the first round of negotiations 
between the parties was held in Geneva, Switzerland from November 28 to 
December 1, 1993. The first round of that “Geneva process” (not to be con-
fused with the “Geneva talks” on security and stability in the Caucasus 
launched in October, 2008 after the Russo-Georgian war) led to the signing 
in December 1993 by the Georgian and Abkhaz representatives of a “Memo-
randum of Understanding”, in which they agreed “not to use force or threaten 
the use of force against each other for the period of ongoing negotiations to 
achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.” In 1994, the 
UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends for Georgia (which originally in-
cluded the United States, Germany, Britain, Russia, and France) was found-
ed. In 1997, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General was ap-
pointed to coordinate the work of the Geneva process, and the UNOMIG 
opened an office in Tbilisi. The Coordination Council and three working 
groups, focusing respectively on non-violence, the return of displaced per-
sons, and economic issues, operated within the framework of the “Geneva 
process”. The last meeting of the Coordination Council was held in May 
2006 after a nearly five-year break caused by the aggravation of the ethno-
political situation in the Kodori Gorge in the fall of 2001. However, the vio-
lation in 2006 of the 1994 Moscow Agreement by Georgian military units 
that entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (a demilitarized zone under 
the terms of the 1994 agreement) ended the work of the Coordination Coun-
cil. In 2001, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, German 
diplomat Dieter Boden, presented an eight-point peace project known as 
“Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and 
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Sukhumi” (also commonly known as the “Boden Plan”). This initiative was 
supported by the UN Security Council (Resolution No. 1393, January 31, 
2002). The Plan was based on the principle of the territorial integrity of 
Georgia and it defined Abkhazia as “a sovereign entity based on the rule of 
law within the State of Georgia.” According to the Boden Plan, the borders of 
the State of Georgia as of December 21, 1991 could not be modified other 
than in accordance with the Georgian Constitution. The distribution of com-
petences was based in accordance with a federal agreement between Tbilisi 
and Sukhumi having the force of the Constitutional Law. Boden himself in-
sisted that his initiative “was not intended to offer ready-made solutions for 
the Abkhaz conflict. Rather, its objective was to invite the two sides to the 
conflict to sit down at the negotiating table and agree on modalities for a 
peaceful settlement”37. The responsibility for the further implementation of 
the document clearly lay with the Georgian and Abkhaz leadership, while the 
UN would potentially be involved as a moderator and the UN Secretary Gen-
eral’s Group of Friends for Georgia would facilitate the process. However, at 
that time neither the Abkhaz side nor the Georgian side was ready to make 
use of this opportunity due to a lack of political will and unwillingness to 
compromise from both sides. The Abkhaz side was adamant in its rejection 
of any decision that placed them “in the state of Georgia”, while the Geor-
gians were too sure of themselves to accept anything that hinted at the “sov-
ereignty” of Abkhazia within Georgia, with each side convinced that time 
was in their favor and a drawn out process would allow them to achieve a 
solution with more favorable conditions. As a result, neither party embraced 
the peace plan. 
The second set of peace efforts consisted of independent attempts by Rus-
sia to resolve the conflict. Faced with the Chechen separatist challenge, Mos-
cow initially supported Tbilisi’s goal of restoring Georgia’s territorial integri-
ty. In February 1994, Russia and Georgia signed a series of agreements that 
provided for assistance from Russia in the development of the Georgian ar-
my, the deployment of Russian border guards, and, most importantly, contin-
ued basing rights for Russia in Georgia. In 1994, Georgia joined the Collec-
tive Security Treaty (CST, which was signed on May 15, 1992) and entered 
the CIS. On November 26, 1994, Abkhazia’s Supreme Council (parliament) 
adopted a new Constitution, despite Moscow’s open opposition. Boris Pas-
tukhov, Personal Envoy of the President of Russia on the Georgian-Abkhaz 
conflict, repeatedly contacted Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba to insist that 
the Abkhaz side not go through with such a “hasty decision”.38 After the out-
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38 Lakoba, Stanislav. Abkhazia de-facto ili Gruziya de jure? (O politike Rossii v Abkhazii v 
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break of anti-separatist campaign in Chechnya on December 19, 1994, the 
border with Abkhazia on the Psou River was closed. From 1995-1997, Russia 
also operated a naval blockade of the breakaway republic and disconnected 
its telecommunications lines with the outside world. Meanwhile, Russia me-
diated a Protocol on the Georgian-Abkhaz settlement initialled on July 25, 
1995 by Georgian Ambassador to Moscow Vazha Lordkipanidze and Repub-
lic of Abkhazia Attorney General Anri Jergenia in his capacity as Ardzinba’s 
personal envoy. The second point of this agreement suggested the following 
proposal on the issue of Abkhazia’s status: “The parties declare consent to 
live in a single federal state within the borders of the former Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Their relationship will be based on Constitutional law.”39 
But the Abkhaz side rescinded its approval almost immediately, and on Au-
gust 22, 1995, the Parliament of Abkhazia branded the document unaccepta-
ble for an independent state. 
On January 19, 1996, the CIS Council of the Heads of State, in which 
Russia and Georgia played decisive roles, adopted a resolution “On measures 
to settle the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia”. It declared the termination of 
relations with the self-proclaimed republic in trade, economics, transporta-
tion, finance and a host of other areas. After Tbilisi announced the introduc-
tion of customs and border control on the territory of Abkhazia, Moscow 
blocked entry and exit for all foreign vessels at the port of Sukhumi. In 1997, 
the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed a formulation in which Abkhazia 
would exist as a “Common state” within the borders of the former Georgian 
Soviet Socialist Republic. This was registered in the new draft of the “Proto-
col on the Georgian-Abkhaz settlement.” Thanks to intensive “shuttle diplo-
macy”, then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov convened a private meeting 
between Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba. But it proved impos-
sible to reach a compromise, as Georgian officials in Tbilisi rejected any 
agreement based on the “common state” principle.  
Russia's position underwent a significant evolution after 1998. This was 
facilitated by the Georgian government attempts to alter the status quo and 
“unfreeze the conflict” unilaterally without considering the interests of the 
Russian Federation, including one such attempt in May 1998 in the Gali dis-
trict of Abkhazia. After the defeat of Russia in the first Chechen anti-
separatist campaign, the official position of Tbilisi towards the leadership of 
the breakaway Chechen Republic Ichkeria, changed. Georgian leaders over-
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estimated “the weakness of Russia”, considering Russia’s military defeat in 
Chechnya in 1996 to be the beginning of a great geopolitical retreat from the 
Caucasus. In August 1997, then Chechen Republic Ichkeria President Aslan 
Maskhadov visited Tbilisi where he met with Zurab Zhvania, then Chairman 
of the Georgian parliament. Soon after this meeting, an Office of the Repre-
sentative of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria opened in Georgia. When Rus-
sia launched the second anti-separatist operation in Chechnya in 1999, Geor-
gia opened its borders to Chechen refugees. About 7,000 people moved into 
the Pankisi Gorge40. In addition to refugees, numerous combatant Chechen 
separatist groups and a number of influential field commanders (such as 
Ruslan Gelayev) found a “safe haven” on Georgian territory41. Tbilisi sought 
to restore its control over Abkhazia with the aid of those Chechen groups. 
Thus on September 25, 2001, Chechen rebels alongside Georgian units (a 
total of 450 people) tried to seize the Gulripsh district of Abkhazia after trav-
elling 400 km across Georgia. However by mid-October this attack was re-
pulsed.  
The second consequence of Tbilisi’s reassessment of Russia and the per-
ception of Russian “weakness” that it created was the intensification of 
Georgia’s contacts with NATO. In 1998, for the first time since the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union, a man with a Western military education (David 
Tevzadze) was named Georgia’s defence minister42. One of Eduard Shevard-
nadze’s main foreign policy slogans during his presidential election cam-
paign in 2000 was his promise to “knock on NATO’s door” by 200543. In 
April 2002, the United States and Georgia signed the “Train and Equip” 
agreement on military cooperation, which was intended to cover the prepara-
tion of 2,000 Georgian commandos. The official purpose of the agreement 
was to prepare Georgian troops for an operation against Chechen “terrorists” 
encamped in the Pankisi Gorge. Russia, however, saw it as a move to “inter-
nationalize” resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian con-
flicts, and as a threat to Russia’s exclusive, preeminent position in the Greater 
Caucasus. 
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43 Kasayev, Alan. Shevardnadze postuchitsya v dver’ NATO lichno [Shevardnadze will knock 
on NATO’s door personally]. In Nezavisimaya gazeta [Independent newspaper], 11 April 
2000. 
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All these factors contributed to a significant transformation of the Russian 
position on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. By 1999-2000, Moscow had re-
laxed the sanctions against Abkhazia, although they were finally lifted only 
in 2008. The distribution of Russian passports (a foreign model different 
from the domestic IDs) to the residents of Abkhazia drew the ire of Tbilisi 
and the West and was regarded by many as a component of the “creeping 
annexation” of Georgian territory by Russia. In the early 2000s, Russo-
Georgian relations deteriorated sharply. In December 2000 Russia introduced 
visas for Georgian citizens, and in March 2001 the so-called “period of ad-
justment” for the new rules ended and the visa regime came into force. Bilat-
eral relations were seriously poisoned by the unconstructive public rhetoric of 
both sides. At a meeting in Sochi in March 2003, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin and his Georgian counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze attempted to return 
to a more constructive bilateral relationship. Following this meeting, an 
agreement was signed that established three working groups: the first on the 
return of refugees/IDPs (originally in the Gali district); the second on the 
rehabilitation of the railway line between Sochi and Tbilisi via Abkhazia; and 
the third on the renovation of the Inguri hydropower plant. However, the sub-
sequent deterioration of Russo-Georgian relations rendered implementation 
of those proposals impossible. 
When discussing the failure of the peace process, it is necessary to stress 
that since 1993, the Abkhaz leadership had taken a number of steps to 
strengthen and institutionalize its de facto state institutions and independent 
political identity separate from the Georgian political and legal framework. It 
managed to survive the blockade by Russia and Georgia and to adopt a pack-
age of laws that defined the functioning of the government and administra-
tion, law enforcement, the security forces and the army. In 1993, the Abkhaz 
Parliament adopted a Law on Citizenship (it was amended in 1995, and in 
2005 a new version of the law was adopted). In 1994, the Constitution of the 
Abkhaz Republic was adopted, and in 1999 the “Act of State Independence 
of the Republic of Abkhazia” proclaimed the fundamental principles of the 
de facto state. Article 49 of the Constitution of Abkhazia stipulated that it 
was the exclusive prerogative of ethnic Abkhazian citizens of the Republic of 
Abkhazia between the ages of 35 and 65 to occupy the post of Head of the 
Republic,44 meaning the foundations of this de facto state included strong 
elements of ethnocracy45. Later this model evolved into an ethno-democracy, 
a model in which democratic procedures are complemented by restrictions on 
the basis of ethnicity. Prior to the “five-day war” of 2008, presidential elec-
                                                          
44 The Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia… 
45 There are minor exclusions from this general rule. So the Vice-Chairman of Parliament is 
held by the ethnic Armenian. In the Gali/Gal District, where there the Georgian (Megrelian) 
ethnic dominance has kept even after 1993, the education in Georgian is provided and the 
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tions had been held in Abkhazia in 1994, 1999, and 2004/2005, and parlia-
mentary elections in 2002 and 2007. In 1994, the head of state was elected by 
the parliament, while in 1999 there was only one presidential candidate. In 
2004/2005, however, the Republic experienced a truly competitive and un-
predictable presidential election race, in which the then leadership failed to 
secure the victory of its preferred candidate. The first peaceful transfer of 
presidential power took place in 2005. In contrast, in post-Soviet Georgia the 
first peaceful transfer of presidential power took place in 2013 in the after-
math of presidential elections 
Thus during the years of negotiations, the original positions of Georgia 
(focused on Georgia's territorial integrity and the return of all refugees/IDPs 
to the entire territory of Abkhazia) and Abkhazia (focused on the independ-
ence of the breakaway republic and the return only of those who did not take 
part in military operations against the Abkhaz forces) did not change signifi-
cantly. As such, a formula for political compromise was not found. The con-
flicting parties were nonetheless able to establish a constructive partnership 
to exploit the Inguri hydropower plant. This large energy facility that services 
the whole Caucasus region was built in 1977; 60% of the electricity it gener-
ates goes to Georgia, with 40% going to Abkhazia. 
Unfreezing the Conflict: 2004-2008 
New possible avenues for the resolution of the conflict arose between 2003- 
2005. As a result of the “Rose Revolution”, Georgian President Eduard She-
vardnadze, who had been associated with the armed conflict with Abkhazia 
and subsequent lesser confrontations in 1998 and 2001, resigned and a new 
generation of politicians came to power in Georgia. These new political fig-
ures were not burdened by the experience and political pressures of past 
years. During the 2004-2005 election cycle, Sergey Bagapsh (1949-2011), 
who had a reputation as “a moderate” leader, was elected to the presidency of 
Abkhazia. While the image of him as the “dove of peace” had little basis in 
reality, Bagapsh, unlike his predecessor Vladislav Ardzinba, was not per-
ceived as aggressive by Georgian society. He was not suspected of having 
participated in or supported the escalation of the military confrontation in the 
early 1990s. Additionally, some had hoped for a more positive role for Russia 
in the resolution of the conflict. Moscow’s position on the political crisis in 
Adjara in winter and spring of 2004, where they were constructive and coop-
erative in their approach, strengthened the confidence of all involved. The 
armed conflict in that autonomous region of Georgia was averted through 
negotiations between Russia and Georgia. Russian authorities promised not 
to oppose the restoration of Tbilisi’s control over Adjara in exchange for 
guarantees of the personal immunity of Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, who 
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finally was taken to Moscow46. During the first months of his term, newly 
elected Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili repeatedly expressed in pub-
lic his admiration for Vladimir Putin and emphasized his role in bringing 
about positive changes in Russia. He also repeatedly stressed the necessity of 
starting bilateral relations anew from a “clean slate”. The initial steps of the 
new Georgian government vis-à-vis Abkhazia engendered cautious hopes for 
the development of new approaches to the peace process. Tbilisi took steps to 
reform the so-called “Abkhazian government in exile”, which together with 
the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, which played the role of “parliament in 
exile”, had operated in Georgia since 1995. For many years those two bodies 
had focused on the domestic Georgian audience. Their bureaucracy was pro-
hibitively bloated, even by post-Soviet standards, and they were incredibly 
inefficient. By the early 2000s, the “government in exile” consisted of no 
fewer than 5,000 functionaries47. Their members were Georgian refugees and 
IDPs from Abkhazia who were far less willing to compromise with the 
breakaway republic than were the government officials in Tbilisi involved in 
the negotiation process with Sukhumi. After coming to power, Saakashvili 
significantly reduced the size of the bureaucracy of the “government-in-
exile” and dismissed Tamaz Nadareishvili, who had been considered in Ab-
khazia in the 1990s as the leader of a “Fifth column”. The participation of the 
“Abkhazian representatives” in the Georgian parliament was suspended, as 
they had received their mandates in 1992 and had not been reconfirmed 
through elections at any point since the armed conflict. Tbilisi also stopped 
cooperating with insurgent groups such as the “Forest Brothers” and the 
“White Legion” operating in Abkhazia’s Gali district. A young and enterpris-
ing politician, Irakli Alasania, was appointed presidential envoy for conflict 
resolution.  
However, this promising start did not lead to irreversible progress. The 
parties to the conflict agreed only on the text of the Protocol on the Non-
resumption of Hostilities (in December 2005). All the positive steps that had 
been taken by Tbilisi were almost immediately undercut by the irresponsible 
political rhetoric of the Georgian leadership. Georgia’s new president made 
the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia the idée fixe of both his 
domestic and foreign policies, seeing this as a way to overcome the legacy of 
Shevardnadze. In May 2004, the new Georgian president stated that: “We 
will return Abkhazia within my presidential term.”48 A number of other fac-
tors also had a significant influence on the ethno-political conflict. In May 
2004, the process of destroying the existing political, legal, social, economic, 
                                                          
46 Aslan Abashidze was leader of Adjara for 13 years, first as Chairman of the Supreme Coun-
cil (1991-2001) and then as the Head of the Autonomous region (2001-2004). 
47 Abkhazia Today…, p. 29. 
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military and political status quo in South Ossetia began. For the first time 
since cease-fire agreement of 1992, the breakaway republic experienced re-
newed military clashes and bloodshed. Hopes that a new generation of Geor-
gian politicians could build on the other peaceful approaches to the settle-
ment of these protracted conflicts were quickly dashed. This affected not only 
South Ossetia, but the entire course of the peace process in Abkhazia, rein-
forcing the already pervasive distrust between the two sides. 
In addition to the deterioration of the situation in South Ossetia, which di-
rectly affected Russia’s position in the North Caucasus (taking into account 
the strong political ties between the breakaway republic and the Russian con-
stituency in North Ossetia, as well as the unresolved Ossetian-Ingush con-
flict), the Georgian authorities moved two other contentious issues to the top 
of their policy agenda. First, they accelerated Georgia’s cooperation and inte-
gration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which served 
to create immense tension in their bilateral relations with Russia as Russia 
was rather skeptical of and sensitive to NATO enlargement in the former 
USSR. Second, the new government implemented a full-scale program to 
modernize the armed forces. The U.S. became the most consistent lobbyist in 
favor of Georgia-NATO integration. In March 2007, a bill called the “NATO 
Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007” was supported by members of the 
House of Representatives by a simple majority of votes. Earlier (November 
2006), this document had been approved by the U.S. Senate. In April 2007, 
the Law was signed by the president of the United States (at that time George 
W. Bush), and on April 3, 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest, a Decla-
ration supporting Georgia’s NATO aspirations was adopted. It should be not-
ed that this declaration did not provide for a “Membership Action Plan” for 
Georgia (the penultimate stage in the process of attainting full NATO mem-
bership)49. Thus, Washington provided not only military and political sup-
port, but also served as a powerful advocate for Georgia internationally, rep-
resenting the former Soviet Caucasus republic as a “beacon of democracy”. 
Even the tough actions of Georgian law enforcement agencies against the 
opposition in November 2007, in addition to the short-term implementation 
of a state of emergency and the postponement of national and local elections, 
did not induce the United States to modify its approaches to the Georgian 
administration All these activities strengthened expectations in Tbilisi that 
any and all of Georgia’s policies on Abkhazia, up to and including military 
actions, would be supported by the United States and its allies. As such, the 
budget for defense and security in Georgia expanded rapidly between 2004 
and 2008. On September 14, 2007, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolu-
tion to increase the troop level of the armed forces to 32,000 people and then 
on July 15, 2008 to 37,000 troops. In 2008, a fateful year for Georgia, de-
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fense expenditures exceeded a quarter of the total budget, amounting to 8% 
of GDP50. John Colarusso, a well-known Canadian expert on the Caucasus 
(he served as a back channel diplomat between Washington and Moscow and 
an advisor on the Caucasus during the Clinton administration), rightly noted 
that “President Saakashvili listened to some imprudent voices in Washington, 
and that he himself had based too much of his domestic image on wielding 
military might and on reintegrating South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force 
instead of by a realistic process of dialogue.”51 
As for Georgia’s policy with regard to Abkhazia, the most important 
method of “unfreezing” the conflict was the creation of new structures not 
covered by the legal framework enshrined in the cease-fire agreement. A re-
vitalization of the Abkhaz “authorities-in-exile” began during this period. In 
July 2006, the Georgian government deployed law-enforcement troops to the 
upper part of the Kodori Gorge, a part of Abkhazia that had been designated 
as a “demilitarized zone” and that, since 1993, had not controlled by Sukhu-
mi52. This territory was subsequently proclaimed the residence of the “Ab-
khaz government-in-exile." According to Saakashvili this step signified the 
return of the legitimate authorities to Abkhazian territory. Tbilisi thus violat-
ed the 1994 Moscow agreement in two ways: first by establishing the “gov-
ernment-in-exile" in Kodori (renamed “Upper Abkhazia”), and second by 
deploying military or police units in the region. These steps were followed by 
comments from Georgian representatives on the strategic importance of the 
Kodori Gorge, with Saakashvili even going so far as to refer to it as the met-
aphorical “Heart of Abkhazia.”53 Givi Targamadze, then chairman of the De-
fense and Security Parliamentary Committee of Georgia, said during that 
period: “It is a strategic area from which the helicopter flight time to Sukhu-
mi is only five minutes.”54 These actions fundamentally changed the tenor of 
                                                          
50 Pukhov, R. (ed.). The tanks of August (2010). Center for Analysis of Strategies and Tech-
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54 Cited in: International Crisis Group. Abkhazia: Ways Forward. Europe Report N°179 – 
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relations between Georgia and the breakaway republic of Abkhazia. The 
“government-in-exile” that had previously been a secondary structure became 
the sole source of legitimacy in Abkhazia in the eyes of the Saakashvili gov-
ernment. The Georgian president decreed that all foreign diplomats engaged 
in the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict should travel to the vil-
lage of Chkhalta, which had become the residence of the “Government of 
Abkhazia”. In this sense, Tbilisi demonstrated that its priority was not the 
harmonization of Georgian-Abkhaz relations, but rather the imposition of 
exclusive Georgian political and military control over Abkhazia. The opera-
tion in the Kodori Gorge became very important symbolically and served as 
an unambiguous message to the de facto leadership of the Republic. Tbilisi’s 
determination to position the representatives of the former Georgian commu-
nity of Abkhazia as the only legitimate spokesmen for the interests of the 
disputed area destroyed the old status quo that had been in favor of Georgia 
and could potentially have put an end to the de-facto statehood status of Ab-
khazia. In this case, the issue of recognition did not play a primary role. Until 
2006, Sukhumi and Tbilisi negotiated, albeit in fits and starts. After the oper-
ation in the Kodori Gorge, the negotiation process ceased. Each side prepared 
for further changes to the status quo that had prevailed since 1993-1994.  
At the same time that it violated the status quo, Tbilisi appealed to Su-
khumi through populist initiatives. On March 28, 2008, at a meeting with 
political analysts from the Tbilisi Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies, President Saakashvili offered Abkhazia “unlimited autonomous sta-
tus” within Georgia, as well as “federalism and security guarantees of peace-
ful development.”55 But Georgian leaders’ proposals contained fundamental 
contradictions (for example, autonomous status and federalism cannot be 
identified as identical political and legal principles). The last conflict resolu-
tion proposal prior to the “five-day war” was made by then German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in July 2008. The first stage of Steinmei-
er’s three-step peace plan envisaged that Georgia would abjure the use of 
force and Abkhazia would agree to the return of Georgian refugees. At the 
second stage, the conflict parties would start to elaborate and implement joint 
projects, and at the third, the status of Abkhazia would finally be determined. 
The Steinmeier project was supported by Russia (especially on the issue of an 
agreement on the non-use of force), and partially supported by Georgia 
(which was especially concerned with the steps included in the third stage), 
but was almost unilaterally rejected by Abkhazia, whose representatives 
voiced many comments, objections and complaints.  
Russia too contributed to the “unfreezing” of the conflict in the spring and 
summer of 2008. On March 21, 2008 the Russian State Duma considered 
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revising the conditions of the Russian approach to the recognition of the terri-
torial integrity of Georgia. The lower chamber of the Russian parliament 
identified two conditions for possible recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, the first being Georgia's accession to NATO and the second being 
the use of military force against the two breakaway republics. In April 2008, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the federal government to render 
assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stressing primarily economic and 
humanitarian issues. On May 30, 2008 Russia’s Railway Troops (400 in all) 
were deployed to Abkhazia to restore the delapidated railway infrastructure. 
That deployment was not envisaged under the conditions of the 1994 Mos-
cow ceasefire and separation of forces agreement.  
The Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 affected Abkhazia to a much 
lesser degree than South Ossetia, where Russia was directly engaged. How-
ever, the leadership of the Republic of Abkhazia exploited the situation to 
their benefit. On August 9, 2008, Abkhaz armed forces opened a “second 
front” and took control of the Kodori Gorge, without encountering serious 
opposition from the Georgian military and police units deployed there, who 
ceded the territory and retreated together with the “government of Abkhazia-
in-exile.” For the first time since 1993, the de facto government established 
complete control over the entire territory of the former Abkhazian Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republic. On August 26, 2008 Russia became the first 
country to recognize the independence of Abkhazia. On August 30, 2008, 
Georgia withdrew from the 1994 Moscow Agreement. 
After Recognition: New Realities and New Challenges 
The recognition of Abkhazian independence opened up a new page in the 
history of the conflict. For the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, a precedent for the recognition of a former Soviet autonomous entity 
as an independent state was created. The formation of an Abkhazian state 
received little international recognition and minimal support outside the Eur-
asian region. Only five other counties have recognized Abkhazian independ-
ence. Indirectly, however, the new realities in the region have nonetheless 
been recognized by the West. Abkhazia gained access to the “Geneva discus-
sions” on security and stability in the South Caucasus (which began on Octo-
ber 15, 2008), although the Abkhaz representatives have not yet obtained 
official diplomatic status but participate as “experts”. Even so, their very par-
ticipation in multilateral discussion on humanitarian issues and the preven-
tion of further incidents has partially served to confirm the recognition of 
Abkhazia’s status as a separate political entity. Interest in “engagement with 
Abkhazia” without it having received explicit recognition from the European 
Union also demonstrates this point. The EU sponsors projects to rehabilitate 
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and support the non-governmental sector in Abkhazia, as do other interna-
tional agencies and NGOs. 
Meanwhile, the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia by Russia 
has contributed to an increase in Russian military, economic and political 
influence in Abkhazia. After the “five-day war”, international engagement in 
Abkhazia was scaled back. The UNOMIG (consisting of approximately 150 
observers) ceased its activities after Russia used its veto power in June 2009 
to block a routine vote in the UN Security Council on extending UNOMIG’s 
mandate. The Russian side, in agreeing to recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, formulated the following approach: the territo-
rial integrity of Georgia that had been recognized by the countries of the 
West and the Russian Federation prior the August 26, 2008 had ceased to 
exist. Assuming the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a legally 
accomplished fact, the Kremlin initiated the reformulation of the UN mission. 
According to this approach, no international mission which operated on the 
de jure territory of the Georgian state through August 2008 should ignore the 
new realities and consider their activities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
part of their activities in Georgia. On February 13, 2009 the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution No. 1866, which extended the UNOMIG man-
date for four months. Both Moscow and Tbilisi expressed satisfaction with 
that decision. However, the February resolution did not resolve the political 
and legal deadlock in which all of the interested parties were engaged. The 
primary issue was not only the Russian desire to expel the international ob-
servers, but also the fact that the UNOMIG mandate was not suited to the 
post-2008 realities, as it had been defined and adopted prior to the 2008 war. 
The mandate was based on the Moscow Agreement of May 14, 1994, which, 
after August 2008, lost its judicial power. Georgia’s decision to withdraw 
from the Agreement was guided by a Parliament resolution on “Peacekeeping 
Forces Located on the Territory of Georgia”, adopted on July 18, 2006 and 
“The Law on the Occupied Territories of Georgia” adopted on August 28, 
2008, as well as emergency orders of the Georgian government from August 
27, 2008. With its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, Russia 
abandoned its peacekeeping status and became the patron of the ethno-
political self-determination of the two breakaway republics. The realities es-
tablished in 2008 were radically different from those of the early 1990s, 
when Moscow had recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia, and Tbilisi 
had supported the involvement of the Russian Federation as a mediator. 
However none of these new factors were taken into account in the drafting of 
the extension for the missions’ mandate. In fact, the proposals were limited to 
a so-called “Technical Extension” (i.e. the extension of the mission for the 
sake of its activities). Moscow refused to support such a scenario. 
The character of Russian-Abkhaz relations has changed during the for-
mation of the new status quo. The peacekeepers were replaced by military 
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troops and border guards meant to directly support the ethno-political self-
determination of Abkhazia, rather than to maintain the ceasefire between 
Abkhazia and Georgia. On April 30, 2009, Moscow and Sukhumi signed an 
agreement establishing joint efforts for the protection of the state border of 
Abkhazia, as a result of which a special Office for the Protection of the Bor-
der of the Republic of Abkhazia was created within Russia’s Federal Security 
Service (FSB). The first outpost of this office was opened on December 8, 
2010 in the village Pichora in Abkhazia’s Gali district. On February 17, 
2010, Moscow and Sukhumi agreed to establish a joint military base with 
Russian troops on the territory of Abkhazia. In 2010, Russia allocated 1.8 
billion rubles in grants for Abkhazia and the carry-over for 2011 amounted to 
1.2 billion rubles. These facts pointing to Russian patronage have caused 
some authors to conclude that Abkhazia was not transformed into a partially 
recognized Republic, but rather into a “Russian protectorate”.56 Today it is 
probably too early draw any final conclusion about the evolution of Abkhazia 
into a full protectorate. After August 2008, the issue of “the Georgian threat” 
in Abkhaz politics was rapidly marginalized. It is significant that for the first 
time since the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992-1993, none of the candi-
dates in the December 2009 Abkhaz presidential election was labeled “pro-
Georgian”. Two new issues came to dominate the Abkhazian agenda: first, 
the quality of Abkhazia’s independence and statehood; and second, the “cost” 
of Russian patronage (primarily focused on the military-political and socio-
economic penetration of Russia into the Republic). These issues became a 
major subject of discussion between the candidates for the December 2009 
presidential election, the first following the recognition of national independ-
ence. As in 2004-2005, the campaign between five registered candidates was 
highly competitive. Incumbent Sergey Bagapsh won in the first round with 
61.16% of the vote. Two of his opponents, former Vice-President Raul 
Khajimba and former parliament deputy Beslan Butba, criticized the gov-
ernment for yielding to Russia’s interests and neglecting Abkhazia’s national 
interests. (Of particular concern was the transfer of strategic assets like re-
sorts and the railway to Russian control). However, criticism of the authori-
ties did not violate the political consensus on the political and legal status of 
Abkhazia established in the early 1990s. An important feature of the 2009 
campaign was the restraint shown by the Kremlin. Unlike in 2004-2005, the 
Russian authorities tried to not intervene in the election and Vladimir Putin, 
then the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, even met with opposition 
candidate Raul Khajimba during the campaign. This was a typical practice 
for Russian diplomacy in Eurasia. Thus that election cycle saw Russia re-
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place Georgia as the primary issue on Abkhazia’s domestic and foreign poli-
cy agenda.  
Today we can register several contradictions within the asymmetric Rus-
sian-Abkhaz partnership. The first is the scale and volume of Russian busi-
ness penetration into the Abkhaz economy, which had been devastated during 
the armed conflict of 1992-1993 and had not undergone full-scale privatiza-
tion and integration into the regional and international economy). The second 
is the prospect of an increased Russian military presence in Abkhazia. The 
third is the wide range of property issues in Abkhazia, as the extended ethno-
political conflict prevented the full development of the norms, regulations, 
and legal institutions that ensure a functioning market and respect for private 
property, offsetting the prioritized rights of the “titular” ethnic group to its 
“primordial land”. The fourth concerns the prospects for broad international 
recognition of Abkhazia, which is in the interests of Sukhumi and at the same 
time constitutes a “headache” for Moscow, as it challenges its exclusive pres-
ence in the region. 
The sudden death of the second President of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, on 
May 29, 2011, occurred in a partially recognized republic facing this new set 
of complex problems. Bagapsh died half way through his second presidential 
term. He did not manage to name a potential successor, and yet this problem 
was little discussed. In Abkhazia, his death occasioned both pain and regret 
due to the fact that during the six years of his presidency he had demonstrated 
the ability to negotiate and reach a compromise even in the most difficult of 
situations. His name will be inextricably linked with two historic events for 
Abkhazia: the recognition of the republic’s independence and the civilized 
and peaceful transfer of the presidency. Three candidates participated in the 
pre-term election for Bagapsh’s successor, all of them well-known political 
figures: acting Vice-President Aleksandr Ankvab, Prime Minister Sergei 
Shamba (previously a long-serving minister of foreign affairs), and Raul 
Khajimba, who placed second after Bagapsh in the presidential elections of 
2004 and 2009. The campaign in 2011 was not as heated as the elections in 
2004. It was rather like the first presidential elections following the recogni-
tion of the independence of Abkhazia in December 2009. Fears that 
Bagapsh’s death would provoke domestic political splits with serious geopo-
litical consequences contributed to this muted electoral atmosphere. All three 
candidates signed a “Charter for Fair Elections”, which nonetheless failed to 
prevent a major scandal caused by an interview in which former Georgian 
Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani claimed Ankvab had ties to the Georgian 
intelligence services. However, the “black” PR-technology that had proven 
effective in 1990s did not work in 2011, and Ankvab ultimately emerged 
victorious. As Irakli Khintba (a political analyst and the current deputy for-
eign minister) rightly noted, “people are tired of this topic. We have a whole 
generation that grew up after the war. Besides, there is public demand for fair 
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elections and when someone openly violates [the charter], it can only annoy 
people.”57 
The military and political defeat of Georgia in August 2008 strengthened 
and provided momentum for the pro-American and North Atlantic vector of 
Georgian foreign policy. Georgia signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership 
with the United States in January 2009. This document designated Georgia a 
special partner of Washington outside NATO. The steps by the Kremlin to 
recognize independence of the two former autonomous regions of the Geor-
gian SSR were perceived in the West not as support to two states for years de 
facto existing outside Georgia, but as Russian territorial expansion. In this 
regard, Strobe Talbott, an iconic figures in Russian-American relations who 
served as the Deputy Secretary of State on CIS issues from 1994 to 2001, 
spoke for many when he affirmed that: “It may be that officially Russia con-
siders Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent states, but in the West it is 
perceived as an extension of the Russian territory. It happened for the first 
time since the end of the Soviet era and I think this is a dangerous phenome-
non.”58 The United States and its allies have followed this line since 2008 in 
spite of the change of heads of state, foreign ministers and the heads of the 
legislative bodies. The United States and Georgia began talks on American 
military bases in Poti and Marneuli (this step is considered a counterweight to 
the creation of Russian military infrastructure on the territory of Abkhazia in 
Ochamchira and Gudauta). There is a paradoxical situation in which the 
strengthening of the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and the U.S. (and 
NATO) presence in Georgia can only reinforce the new post-August 2008 
status quo. The military capability of the United States will not be used 
against Russia, and vice versa. The presence of the military “fists” of Mos-
cow in Abkhazia and an American military presence in Georgia would serve 
to deter Tbilisi on the one hand and Sukhumi on the other from any “reckless 
actions.” All these factors would objectively work to preserve the status quo 
that emerged in the aftermath of the war of August 2008. Meanwhile, the 
Russian military buildup in Abkhazia creates difficulties for Moscow itself. 
Deployment of bases on one side would improve the internal infrastructure in 
Abkhazia (where today tourism is actually limited to the space between the 
Russian border and Sukhumi/Sukhum, though to the east of the capital it has 
been underdeveloped). New security guarantees from Moscow will also help 
guarantee the revival of Abkhazia. At the same time, however, the arrival and 
presence of troops from large neighboring countries does not contribute to 
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the development of national statehood over the long term. On the contrary, it 
creates new collisions.  
Though the Ukrainian crisis has had no direct impact on the situation in 
Abkhazia and around it the Georgians view the situation in Ukraine as part of 
a wider geopolitical stand-off between Russia and the West rather than as a 
crisis sui generis resulting from domestic political developments in Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian crisis and worries about Moscow’s real intentions strength-
ened Georgia’s desire for joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus in 2014 
Tbilisi signed an Association Agreement with the European Union. NATO at 
the Wales summit in September 2014 reaffirmed its promise of Georgia’s 
membership and provided for a substantial package of assistance to strength-
en Georgia’s defense capability and its interoperability with the Alliance.59  
Georgia’s fears seemed justified also by the developments in Abkhazia, 
where the Ukrainian conflict was cited by the secessionists as calling for fur-
ther moves away from Georgia. It also made topical some issues related to 
the Georgian minority in the East of the republic. The revolt against President 
Alexander Ankvab in May 2014 was attributed to public anger over his poli-
cy toward the ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia. This policy was widely per-
ceived as too liberal, particularly since it allowed the ethnic Georgians to 
register as voters and to receive Abkhazian passports. A. Ankvab resigned 
and was replaced as President of Abkhazia by Raul Khadzhimba who favors 
stronger politico-military ties to Russia and freezing all contacts along the 
breakaway region’s frontier with Georgia.  
In November 2014 a new bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation was 
signed. It meant deeper economic integration and further liberalization on the 
de facto Russia-Abkhazia border. Its first (“Moscow”) draft provoked heated 
discussions among Abkhaz politicians and NGO leaders. The Abkhaz politi-
cal elite strongly objected to full “integration” as contrary to the cause they 
have fought for. The Abkhaz side managed to remove some stipulations from 
the initial draft, which for example, would have allowed Russian citizens to 
acquire also Abkhaz citizenship. At present the Abkhaz elite is much more 
afraid of a potential shift in the ethnic balance than of the Georgian threat. 
The easier access to Abkhazian citizenship would have opened the way for 
the Russian citizens (including the ethnic Georgians holding Russian pass-
ports) to acquire property in Abkhazia or to attempt to reclaim confiscated 
property they owned previously. The Abkhazian negotiators also insisted on 
maintaining Abkhazia’s military forces and did not accept obligatory “coor-
dination” of its foreign policy with Moscow. In fact the treaty has not 
changed much in the asymmetric relations between Russia and Abkhazia 
although it did not exclude the possibility of their further evolution.  
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Abkhazia aspires for independence but remains highly dependent on Rus-
sia for its defense and security, not to mention the balancing of its budget and 
everything from social benefits to post-war reconstruction. For its part Russia 
desires a greater access to the Caucasus and the Black Sea, which would offer 
additional opportunities for Russian big business and create an additional 
barrier to NATO’s penetration into the post-Soviet space. At the same time, 
however, Moscow cannot support Abkhazia’s ethnocratic policy, since any 
discrimination of its own citizens on ethnic grounds would create a danger-
ous precedent. The Abkhazian elite, on the other hand, refuses to move away 
from the ethnocratic rule which it has developed since the armed conflict 
with Georgia.60 Abkhazia is not Nagorny Karabakh, or even South Ossetia, 
where the titular ethnic groups enjoy a clear numerical superiority. It is un-
likely that the Armenian, Russian and Georgian (Mingrelian) population of 
the republic will accept indefinitely the constitutional provision (Article 49 of 
the Constitution of Abkhazia) reserving to the ethnic Abkhaz only the exclu-
sive right to occupy the post of President. It will be also necessary to take 
into account the growing economic weight of the Armenian community, 
which is almost equal numerically to the Abkhaz. Hence sooner or later new 
approaches in developing an optimal nation-building model. will be called 
for. A state which has been based on expedience (because otherwise it could 
not survive in the conflict) will have to evolve and move towards the rule of 
law. According to the American scholar Gerard Toal, “Abkhazia’s biggest 
challenges today are not about recognition, but about creating stable founda-
tions for its internal legitimacy.”61 By taking this path, the partly internation-
ally recognized Abkhazia could achieve its real international independence, 
not just independence from Georgia. 
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Comments 
David Matsaberidze 
The chapter written by Sergey Markedonov represents a general and rather 
balanced overview of the Abkhazian conflict but with no clear research ob-
jective, no problem definition in the introduction and no conclusion. Its title 
is well formulated as the conflict could not be regarded as simply a conflict 
between the center and the periphery, but is rather a small episode in the 
post-Soviet geopolitical games. 
At different points the author claims that during the Tsarist and Soviet 
times respectively the migration and resettlement of ethnic Georgians on the 
territory of Abkhazia was aimed at changing the ethno-demographic balance 
in Abkhazia. This is one line of possible interpretation. In fact however the 
massive resettlement took place twice. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878 a great number of Moslem Abkhazians left for Turkey on religious 
grounds. It is improper however to present the subsequent movement of land-
less peasants as resettlement from Georgia to Abkhazia. In the process of 
consolidation of the Tsarist rule in the Caucasus the principality of Abkhazia 
as well as other former Georgian principalities lost their status of principali-
ties. In 1864 they were incorporated in Kutaisi Gubernia (including the mod-
ern-day territory of Abkhazia), and Tbilisi Gubernia (today’s Eastern Geor-
gia). Thus, the migration of population took place on the territory of Georgia, 
including Abkhazia, and not from Georgia to Abkhazia. The region was thus 
gradually repopulated. Several decades later, in the 1930s, during the collec-
tivization period, there was a movement of working force in order to fill in its 
shortage in the region. A group of Abkhazian and Russian authors calls this 
process the “Georgianization” of Abkhazia, evidently trying to enhance the 
legitimacy of Abkhazia’s secession in 1991. 
In his analysis of Abkhazia under the Democratic Republic of Georgia 
(1918-1921) the author presents no empirical evidence of “the strict and 
sometimes repressive policies of Georgia’s Menshevik government vis-à-vis 
ethnic minorities (which) created sympathy for the Abkhaz people in Soviet 
Russia and within the Bolshevik movement”. I think that this thesis repre-
sents a replication of the former Soviet propaganda.  
During the Soviet time  the ethnic Abkhazians enjoyed a quota system giv-
ing them a considerable political weight. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union the population of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic stood at 
530,000, out of which 300,000, or 56.6 per cent were ethnic Georgians. The 
number of Abkhazians stood then at about 80,000, or 16 per cent of the popu-
lation. The remainder was composed of the Russians, Armenians, Estonians 
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and Jews. In spite of a great difference in numerical terms between the ethnic 
Georgians and Abkhazians, eight ethnic Abkhazians out of the 15 deputies 
were sent to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union from that autonomous 
republic; out of eight posts of the first secretary five were occupied by the 
ethnic Abkhazians; out of 140 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia 
57 were the ethnic Abkhazians and only 53 the ethnic Georgians; out of 12 
regional ministers eight were the Abkhazians (Nadareishvili, 1996, p. 11).1 
The ethnic Abkhazians maintained their political privileges in independent 
Georgia as well. According to the Constitutional Project by Dr. Levan Ale-
ksidze a new formula for the distribution of seats in the Abkhazian assembly 
was offered – 28 ethnic Abkhazians, 26 ethnic Georgians and 11 representa-
tives of other ethnic groups. The intention was to ease tensions in the region, 
first and foremost between the ethnic Abkhazians and the Georgians. Accord-
ing to the law of July 9, 1991, the Abkhazians (representing about 17 percent 
of the population at that time) were guaranteed 28 mandates in the Abkhazian 
assembly, the Georgians (46 percent at that time) were given 26 mandates 
while other nationalities (mainly the Armenians, Greeks and Russians repre-
senting 37 percent) only 11 mandates.2  
In autumn 1991, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian 
ASSR were held according to this new formula. Altogether 63 deputies were 
elected, among them 28 Abkhazians and 24 Georgians. At the first session 
Vladislav Ardzinba, an ethnic Abkhazian, was elected to preside in the Su-
preme Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR. Thus, the Abkhazians had had no 
ground to fear Georgian political domination in their own autonomous re-
gion. According to the Soviet Constitution Abkhazia had no right to secede 
from a USSR member state and thus could not subordinate itself directly to 
Moscow during and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its “separation” 
had to be blessed by Tbilisi. Moreover the local ethnic Georgians did not 
participate in the Abkhazian referendum of March 17, 1991 on the new union 
treaty of the Soviet Union. Thus the outcome of this referendum could not be 
deemed legitimate since the participation of all voters was not assured. 
According to the post-Soviet Georgian historiography and political sci-
ence, 1991 was the period of national liberation of all Georgian people, in-
cluding national minorities, rather than the struggle for independence of 
Georgia as state (which was won on April 9, 1991). While stressing the his-
torical importance of the village Likhni it would have been fair to add that 
Likhni was not only the former residence of Abkhazian princes, but also the 
location of a former Soviet military base used by the Russians in Abkhazia. It 
should be stressed that “the ethno-nationalist slogans and appeals for the 
restoration of the political and legal continuity of the Georgian Democratic 
                                                          
1 Nadareishvili, T. Genocide in Abkhazia (1996). Tbilisi (in Georgian). 
2 Tamaz Disamidze (ed.). Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian AO. Abkhazian SSR 
(1989-2005), A Collection of Political and Legal Acts (2005). Tbilisi, p. 76. 
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Republic (1918-1921)” according to the Constitution of 1921 were made by 
the Military Council only after the civil war in the winter of 1992 while Pres-
ident Z. Gamsakhurdia declared Georgia a successor state of the Soviet Un-
ion. 
The author argues that Tbilisi was provoked to send its troops to Abkhazia 
by the decision of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet of July 23, 1992 to abolish 
the Constitution of 1978 of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic within the 
Georgian SSR and to replace it by the Constitutional Project of 1925. How-
ever according to the order relocating military units, issued by the central 
Georgian authorities, as well as to the memoirs of Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
troops relocation was caused by frequent attacks and robberies by local par-
amilitaries on the railway connecting the Russian Federation with Armenia 
via Abkhazia. Thus the Georgian troops were relocated on the territory of the 
Republic of Georgia for the defense of that vital railway link. In addition, the 
author creates the impression that Georgia willfully joined the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), presumably because “… Moscow initial-
ly supported Tbilisi’s goal of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity…” In 
reality, Georgia joined the CIS under heavy pressure from Russia in ex-
change (hopefully) for ending the war in Abkhazia and for avoiding Geor-
gia’s forceful partition into Abkhazia, Western Georgia (controlled by ex-
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his supporters), Eastern Georgia (con-
trolled by Eduard Shevardnadze), and South Ossetia. 
When describing peace agreements between the Abkhazian secessionists 
and the central Georgian authorities, the author pointed out that the Abkhazi-
an side violated them in order to gain full control over Abkhazia. He however 
failed to mention that these peace accords were reached with the Russian 
Federation acting as mediator and guarantor of their implementation. The 
Russian Federation was thus legally liable for their unilateral violations by 
the Abkhazian secessionists. Furthermore, during the Russian-Georgian War 
in August 2008 the Abkhazian forces succeded in taking control of the Ko-
dori Gorge primarily thanks to open Russian threats to the rest of Georgia, 
buttressed by the advance of Russian troops towards Tbilisi. When stating 
that the “negotiations on the future status of Abkhazia and the development 
of international contacts became priority directions for policy”, the author 
omits to mention the fact that Abkhazia has not participated in these activities 
as an independent political actor but as a Russian protectorate. 
The Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty signed between the Russian 
Federation and Abkhazia (a similar treaty was signed also with the Tskhinva-
li Region/South Ossetia) stipulates the creation of a common social and eco-
nomic space and Russian assistance to Abkhazia’s social-economic develop-
ment. It paves the way to Abkhazia’s full integration into the Russian econ-
omy. According to the treaty Abkhazia is obliged, within 18 months after its 
entry into force, to put its customs legislation in line with the Russian-led 
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Eurasian Economic Union. The newly elected Abkhaz President Raul 
Khajimba apparently intends to further liberalize the border crossings with 
Russia while tightening controls on the border with Georgia, including clos-
ing down the crossing point on the Enguri River. These measures would cer-
tainly preclude the political and economic aspects of peace proposals by the 
central Georgian authorities. Considering however the already voiced com-
plaints over the too heavy political dependence of Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia on Russia these Georgian proposals might be useful at some point in the 
future. 
 
The South Ossetia conflict 
Sergey Markedonov 
The Georgian – Ossetian conflict was the first ethnic confrontation in post-
Soviet Georgia that escalated into full-scale fighting. The South Ossetian 
Autonomous Region within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic – the 
precursor of the unrecognized state of the Republic of South Ossetia – was 
established on 20 April 1922. The territory of this nation-state made up 6.5% 
of the total territory of Georgia (3,840 square kilometers). According to the 
Soviet census of 1989, there were 98,500 people living in South Ossetia at 
the time (63,200 Ossetians; 28,500 Georgians; 2,100 Russians; and 900 of 
Jews). As of 1989 the number of Ossetians in Georgia totaled 165,000, or 3% 
of the population. Some 100,000 Ossetians lived in inland Georgia, with the 
largest communities living in Tbilisi, Gori and Rustavi. The legal status of 
South Ossetia in the pre-crisis period was regulated by the law on the South 
Ossetian Autonomous Region, adopted in 1980.1 
The conflict passed through several stages: from a local confrontation little 
known and of little interest to the world community, to an event of interna-
tional significance. The first stage of the conflict (1988-89) might be called 
ideological. During this period, the conflicting parties identified their claims 
against each other and composed plausible ethno-political guidelines for a 
future conflict. For example, Georgian historians and journalists began de-
scribing the Ossetians as “strangers in the Georgian land” who migrated from 
the North Caucasus. Their Ossetian counterparts intensively exploited the 
thesis about the “common Alan heritage” of the two Ossetias (North Ossetia 
in Russia and South Ossetia in Georgia).2 The Georgian national movement 
for independence endeavored to establish a new Georgian state within the 
borders of the former Georgian SSR. At the same time its leaders were rather 
suspicious of the autonomies considering them as artificial entities and Mos-
cow’s instruments for exerting pressure on Georgia. They failed to engage 
the autonomies and national minorities in a common movement based on 
democratic civic values. Thus since the late 1980s the movement for Geor-
gian independence became pretty nationally exclusive. This line of action 
was especially risky in the autonomous regions which had their own power 
structures and also the means for mass mobilization. The South Ossetian 
leaders became afraid of discrimination in the newly established independent 
                                                          
1 Skakov, Alexander. South Ossetia: Demography, Economy, Policy [in Russian], Georgia: 
Its Problems and Perspectives II (2002), p. 167. 
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Georgia. In contrast to Georgian nationalists the South Ossetian elite wanted 
to preserve South Ossetia’s autonomos political and legal status as guarantees 
for safeguarding their national rights. The elite also remembered the negative 
historical experience of 1918-1920 when peasant rebellions in South Ossetia, 
supported by the Bolsheviks, were suppressed by the authorities of the Geor-
gian Democratic Republic. Moreover having of the other side the Caucasus 
mountains a kin ethno-national entity in Russia (North Ossetia) the South 
Ossetian leaders in the circumstances of declining USSR were eager to im-
plement jointly with the North Ossetians their right for self-determination. 
The second was a political-legal stage (1989-91) was marked by two years 
of a legalistic (“status”) struggle between Georgia’s central authorities and 
the South Ossetian leadership. On 20 September 1989, the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic published draft which laws infringed upon the rights of the 
South Ossetian Autonomous Region. Two months later, on 10 November 
1989, at a session of the Council of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region 
the People’s Deputies raised the region’s status to an Autonomous Republic 
within Georgia. Tbilisi was outraged by the move which unilaterally gave 
South Ossetia a higher status. On 16 November 1989, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic annulled the deci-
sion of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region Council. A week later, in a 
reprisal thousands of Georgian nationalists staged a march to Tskhinvali, the 
capital of South Ossetia, which claimed first casualties. The subsequent event 
played a key role in the escalation of the conflict. On 11 December 1990, 
Georgia’s Supreme Soviet abolished the South Ossetian Autonomy. Simulta-
neously, the Soviet authorities declared a state of emergency in the South 
Ossetian Autonomy while the Georgian government imposed a blockade on 
South Ossetia. 
During the third stage (between January 1991 and July 1992), armed 
clashes broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia. On 6 January 1991, 
troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry left Tskhinvali for their barracks and 
six-thousand Georgian militants invaded the city causing destruction and 
killing civilians. In the course of the hostilities in February – March of 1991, 
and in June 1992 the capital of South Ossetia suffered three assaults. One 
hundred villages were burned and more than 1,000 people were killed in the 
fighting. North Ossetia, Autonomous Republic in the Russian Federation, 
was dragged into the conflict. It was flooded with 43,000 refugees from 
South Ossetian and Georgian districts. Moscow could not the directly control 
North Ossetia’s actions. Moreover, Vladikavkaz threatened that it would not 
sign a new federal treaty unless in one form or another Moscow supports 
South Ossetia. In late May 1992 North Ossetia shut down the pipeline run-
ning to Georgia. 
On 24 June 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian President 
Eduard Shevardnadze signed the Dagomys (Sochi) accords on the principles 
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of settling the Georgian – South Ossetian conflict. A peacekeeping operation 
began on 14 July when the Russian Federation, Georgia and North Ossetia 
deployed their peacekeeping contingents in the area, and the Joint Control 
Commission (JCC) was set up to monitor the ceasefire arrangements. The 
armed conflict was thus “frozen” signifying the beginning of the fourth stage 
which continued until May 2004. Until August 2008, unlike in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia had not seen large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Georgian 
population as the Georgians and the Ossetians lived peacefully side by side. 
The Constitution of the self-proclaimed Autonomous Republic of South Os-
setia recognized Georgian as a minority language. In 1992 exchanges of fire, 
blockades and provocations were stopped, and a relative peace was imposed. 
Until 2004 a direct bus line had operated between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. In 
places like Ergneti the Georgians and the Ossetians traded on the markets 
side by side. Georgia and South Ossetia mutually recognized license plates 
on cars crossing the borders. It should be noted that in the post-war condi-
tions smuggling constituted the backbone of the economy of the country with 
a “deferred status”, and that traders from both ethnic groups were involved in 
smuggling. This shadow economy strongly attached South Ossetia to Geor-
gia, and was also a major – albeit informal – confidence-building activity 
improving the relations between the two communities in conflict.  
North Ossetia’s President Alexander Dzasokhov (elected in 1998) should 
be credited with playing a key role in easing tensions, often through direct 
informal contacts with Eduard Shevardnadze, who was his colleague in the 
former Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, a considerable positive experience had been accumulated during 
the 12 years. The peacekeeping mission had been jointly managed by the 
Russian and the Georgian military and secondly, important documents were 
signed providing for rehabilitation of the conflict area. Of special note are the 
“Memorandum on the Security and Confidence-Building Measures” signed 
on 16 May 1996 by the parties in the conflict and the Russian – Georgian 
intergovernmental agreement of 3 December 2000, on rebuilding the econo-
my in the zone of the Georgian – Ossetian conflict, and on the return of refu-
gees. 
The fifth stage can be described as “unfreezing” of the conflict. It began 
with attempts by Tbilisi to change the balance of forces along the border with 
South Ossetia and the political-legal format of defacto peaceful coexistence. 
The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in October-November 2003 and Mikhail 
Saakashvili’s landslide victory in the presidential election in January 2004 
(he obtained a stunning 97% of the votes) stimulated by a “patriotic” uprising 
similarly as in the 1990s. In their speeches, Saakashvili and his associates 
appealed for rebuilding one Georgia and calling to take revenge for the “na-
tional humiliation” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On 31 May 2004 the 
Georgian government, without consulting the JCC, dispatched 300 soldiers of 
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a special task force to South Ossetia on the pretext of combating smuggling. 
Other JCC partners branded the move as a breach of the Dagomys accords of 
1992. Georgia then accused the Russian peacekeepers of an ethnic bias and 
of crimes. On 20 July 2004, the Georgian president publicly declared that he 
did not rule out a revocation of the Dagomys accords: “I’m not prepared to 
recognize those agreements which prohibit us to display our national flag in 
the centre of Georgia. If Shevardnadze’s signature is under them I’m ready to 
scrap them and to effect their termination”.3 Saakashvili’s statement indicated 
three goals he was striving to achieve: i) internationalize the Georgian – Os-
setian conflict by involving the US and European countries in its resolution; 
ii) instead of a Georgian – Ossetian to present the conflict as a Georgian – 
Russian one and as a manifestation of Russian neo-imperialism; iii) terminate 
Russia’s role as the exclusive guarantor of peace in the region. 
The realization of these goals became the quintessence of the fifth stage of 
the Georgian – Ossetian conflict. On 8-19 August 2004 a second war broke 
out in South Ossetia. In this confrontation the parties did not use only small 
arms, but also artillery. Although the warring sides, stopped fighting briefly 
by the end of the month, August 2004 marked the beginning of a new wave 
of shelling, attacks, provocations and blockades of vital lines of communica-
tions. From that time onwards, “small incidents involving the military” be-
came daily routine on the border with South Ossetia. 
This brief war was a turning point in the Russian policy towards the re-
gion. Until 2004 Moscow had been anxious to remain unbiased, neutral, and 
maintain the status quo which it regarded as the best way option. After 2004 
the Russian Federation having realized that the security of entire North Cau-
casus depended also on the situation in South Ossetia, de facto sided with the 
self-proclaimed republic. Firstly, Moscow began to view Tskhinvali as an 
instrument to influence Tbilisi – which, by then, had embarked not only on a 
very pro-American, but also on an anti-Russian path. Secondly, the loss of 
South Ossetia became to be seen as a threat to the Russian Federation itself. 
The Ossetian – Ingush conflict, which still remains unresolved, has been 
closely linked to the tensions around the self-proclaimed republic. In 2005-
06, the Georgian parliament adopted several resolutions (“Regarding the Cur-
rent Situation in the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and Ongo-
ing Peace Operations” of 11 October 2005, “On the Current Situation in the 
Former Autonomous District of South Ossetia and Ongoing Peace Process” 
of 15 February 2006, “On the Peacekeeping Forces Located on the Territory 
of Georgia” of 18 July 2006) which branded the Russian peacekeeping mis-
                                                          
3 See “Georgia Threatens to Withdraw from the Treaty on Ossetia” [in Russian], BBC Russia, 
20 June 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_3911000/3911101.stm. 
 The South Ossetia conflict 115 
 
sion as “extremely negative”, and actions by the Russian Federation as “per-
manent efforts aimed at annexation of this region of Georgia”.4 
In autumn of 2006 Tbilisi launched the project of “an alternative South 
Ossetia” headed by Dmitry Sanakoyev, a former prime minister and defence 
minister of that non-recognized entity who did not have any support in the 
Tskhinvali-controlled areas. The purpose of the project was to transform the 
negotiating process by circumventing the direct dialog with Tskhinvali. In 
March 2007, Tbilisi set up a provisional administration for the territory of 
South Ossetia, thus effectively terminating talks with Tskhinvali. Tbilisi tried 
to achieve international legitimacy for Sanakoyev who took part in gatherings 
in Strasbourg and Brussels, and in contrast with Eduard Kokoity was present-
ed as a “positive and cooperative” representative of the South Ossetians. 
The policy of “unfreezing” culminated in the transfer of the Georgian 
peacekeeping battalion, formerly under the command of the JCC, under the 
control of the Georgian Defence Ministry and in repeated threats by Geor-
gia’s Reintegration Minister Temuri Yakobashvili to withdraw from the exis-
ting framework of conflict management. In addition, in July 2006, Georgia, 
in violation of the “Basic Moscow Agreement on the Ceasefire and Disen-
gagement” of 14 May 1994, deployed its army and police units in the upper 
part of Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia which was declared a demilitarised zone 
by the Moscow agreement. The status quo was therefore breached also in 
Abkhazia. The conflicting parties stopped negotiating. 
Georgia’s strong (and not always effective) actions in 2004-08 are difficult 
to explain without taking into account an external factor, although not a deci-
sive one. In 2003 its frustrated public opinion deeply disappointed by She-
vardnadze’s rule, embraced the idea of a strong Georgia, meaning a territori-
ally united country. The military-technical assistance and diplomatic patron-
age, mainly by the US, as well as closer ties with NATO misled Georgia’s 
leadership to believe that the West would approve and support its actions for 
reintegration of the country. Tbilisi felt increasingly confident that the US 
and their allies would turn a blind eye on its violations of peace accords with 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also expected the West to react only half-
heartedly to the backtracking from democratic standards inside Georgia itself. 
Such actions included the police crackdown on 7 November 2007 and the use 
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2006, http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=98&info_id=13089. 
116 Sergey Markedonov  
of administrative pressures on the opposition during the elections in 2004 and 
in 2006. In 2008, Moscow also contributed to the “unfreezing” of the con-
flicts in Georgia. On 21 March, the Russian State Duma adopted a resolution 
which set out two conditions for a possible recognition of Abkhazia’s and 
South Ossetia’s independence. These were Georgia’s accession to NATO and 
the use of force against the two self-proclaimed republics.5 
In April 2008, the outgoing Russian president Vladimir Putin, instructed 
his federal authorities to provide “substantive assistance” to the people of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The instruction envisioned, among other things, 
the establishment of direct official contacts between Moscow and Tskhinvali 
and Sukhumi. In its immediate and verbally tough response the West de-
clared that it supported Georgia’s territorial integrity. 
In fact however the status quo had been disrupted on a number of occa-
sions in South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent in Abkhazia already prior to 
7 August 2008. As a result of armed clashes in 2004, some 70 people died, 
while in subsequent years (according to different estimates), the number of 
deaths on each side totaled about 100. However August 2008 saw a qualita-
tive change. The escalation of violence led to a Georgian massive armed as-
sault on Tskhinvali and a very tough response by Russia which apparently 
was unexpected by both Tbilisi and by the West. The long-simmering con-
flict between Georgia and South Ossetia thus escalated in to a five day war in 
August and became the third armed confrontation between Georgia and 
South Ossetia since the early 1990s. Saakashvili’s military-political adven-
ture and Russia’s direct intervention in the Georgian – Ossetian conflict 
stemmed from the preceding stage of “conflict unfreezing”. Until 26 August 
2008 the Russian Federation officially recognized South Ossetia as legally 
part of Georgia.  
However, the fighting in August 2008 differed markedly from the two 
previous conflicts. Unlike individual Russian servicemen who acted sponta-
neously in the Georgian – Abkhazian war of 1992-93, Moscow this time di-
rectly ordered and guided the Russian army’s attacks calling it “an operation 
to compel Georgia to peace” and to save the Ossetian people from a full-scale 
humanitarian disaster. Unlike in the previous Georgian – Ossetian confronta-
tions (in 1991-92, 1992-93 and 2004) the US and the EU were diplomatically 
involved in the conflict. Ukraine tried to play a role in Abkhazia but was pre-
vented by the interpositioned Russia’s Black Sea Fleet – which participated 
in the operation in Abkhazia. 
For the first time Tbilisi was simultaneously fighting then on two fronts its 
two separatist provinces – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The events in and 
around South Ossetia made headlines in international media. At the outset of 
                                                          
5 See “The State Duma Made the Statement on Russia’s Policy to Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transnistria” [in Russian], Regnum, 21 March 2008, http://www.regnum.ru/news/
975032.html. 
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the five day war, the UN Security Council was convened three times to dis-
cuss the situation in the Caucasus. For the first time since the armed conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh in 1991-94, West-
ern mass media published alarming forecasts of the Caucasus possibly pro-
voking a new big war. 
Over the entire course of the conflict Russia has changed its status and 
role. In 1992-2004 it tended to act as a peacemaker and mediator supporting 
officially the territorial integrity of Georgia. Facing the Chechen separatist 
challenge in the early 1990s Moscow was interested to develop positive and 
constructive relationship with Tbilisi also in the form of security and military 
cooperation. In 1996 Kremlin negatively reacted to the South Ossetian deci-
sion to establish the institution of a President and to organize presidential 
elections. However some attempts by Tbilisi, especially in 2004-2008, to 
“unfreeze” the conflict through revising the format of peacekeeping and de-
creasing the Russian role in the process of its management contributed to a 
radical change in Moscow’s behaviour. Since 2004 Russia started moving 
from the position of a peacekeeper to that of the patron of the secessionist 
entity. By having recognized South Ossetia’s independence in August, 2008 
Russian leadership completed this evolution. 
Thus in 2008 a new status quo was formed. The Russian Federation guar-
anties today the security and economic revival of South Ossetia who enjoys 
its new status somewhere between that of a Russia’s region and partial inde-
pendence. According to the Presidential Envoy to the Federal District North 
Caucasus Alexander Khloponin, Russia’s financial aid to South Ossetia in 
2008-2013 amounted to about 34 billion rubles (just over U.S. $ 1 billion.)6 
Moscow’s financial and security influence has substantively grown. At the 
same time it created tensions between Kremlin and Ossetia’s leadership be-
cause it infringes on South Ossetian internal politics. The political impact of 
the “Georgian factor” on the South Ossetian domestic scene has been mar-
ginalized. The 2011 presidential elections clearly demonstrated that under 
current conditions the labeling of opponents as “pro-Georgian” does not ef-
fectively bring political benefits. As main gains from independence the South 
Ossetian population desires a better professional quality of officials, their 
higher legitimacy and a more transparent political process.  
Tbilisi, on the other hand, has not really changed its basic approach to 
South Ossetia considering it an “occupied territory” and viewing the South 
Ossetian leadership as Russian “puppet figures”. The current Georgian gov-
ernment has nevertheless publicly spoken in favor of a direct dialogue with 
the South Ossetian people. However this potentially highly positive idea 
looks insufficient unless the relevant Georgian legislation is corrected and the 
status of South Ossetia thoroughly revised. Unlike Abkhazia South Ossetia 
                                                          
6 Khloponin: the Russian financial aid reached 34 billion rubles, http://www.newsru.com/
finance/19jul2013/sosetiarumoney.html (19-7-13). 
118 Sergey Markedonov  
has extremely limited resources for its development (no access to the Black 
sea, the absence of wealthy and influential diaspora, the lack of its own natu-
ral resources) as well as the precarious position between Georgia and the 
Russian Federation. This situation however does not make easier its reconcil-
iation with Georgia especially taking into account the grave consequences of 
armed clashes since 1991 and numerous unresolved political, economic, hu-
manitarian and other problems. The prospects of conflict resolution depend 
largely on advances in the Russia-Georgia normalization relations. The re-
solving of outstanding humanitarian issues (trans-border traffic, trade, educa-
tion, health care and so on) and a dialogue between the Georgian and South 
Ossetian civil societies would certainly help in this respect. “Small steps” in 
promoting confidence-building could create fundamental prerequisites for a 
constructive discussion on such touchy subjects as South Ossetia’s political 
and legal status. 
The most important consequence of the war in 2008 was Moscow’s offi-
cial recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. The two 
formerly autonomous republics of Georgia have thus joined the group of par-
tially recognized independent states. They might never be admitted to UN but 
have established close, full-fledged relations with a Eurasian great power 
who is a member of the nuclear club and a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. Both Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia signed in 2014-2015 
far-reaching treaties on close economic and political cooperation with the 
Russian Federation, also in defense and security-related matters. Abkhazia’s 
and South Ossetia’s growing dependence on Russia has provoked anxiety in 
the West concerning the obvious restoration of Russia’s strong influence over 
the post-Soviet space. The South Ossetian situation has been considered in a 
broader framework of Moscow’s foreign policy in Eurasia and of its relation-
ship with the West. However Moscow apparently does not intend to legally 
incorporate South Ossetia into the Russian Federation.  
 
Comments 
David Matsaberidze 
The chapter written by Sergey Markedonov is not a problem-based paper but 
rather a general review or description of different stages in the South Osse-
tian conflict. My remarks will concentrate on the author’s vision of the con-
flict and on some questionable formulations and debatable interpretations 
suggested by him. 
The author states, for example, that Georgian refugees fled from the South 
Ossetian and Georgian districts but his meaning is unclear. Does he refer 
under Georgian districts to the areas in the South Ossetian AO populated pre-
dominately by ethnic Georgians? Similarly, the statement that the Kremlin 
could not directly control North Ossetia’s actions needs clarification. Does 
he refer to the considerable weakening of Moscow’s central power in the 
early 1990s to control the periphery of the Russian Federation? Additional 
explanation is needed also for the author's statement that “unlike Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia never saw large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Georgian popu-
lation”. This point might be partially valid for the period prior to 2008. This 
was due to the fact that in the South Ossetian AO the villages populated by 
the Georgians or by the Ossetians were clearly demarcated. However August 
2008 witnessed a forcible removal of the entire Georgian population from the 
previously Georgian villages in the former South Ossetian AO. Moreover the 
author should have quoted relevant articles of the Ossetian Constitution to 
support his claim that the Georgian language has the status of a minority lan-
guage in the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia. Another questiona-
ble point in the text is related to the implementation of the Memorandum on 
Security and Confidence-Building Measures between the Parties to the 
Georgian-Ossetian Conflict. According to its provisions Georgia was entitled 
to deploy up to 1500 soldiers in the joint peacekeeping unit but until 2004 
had not used in full its quota. Contrary to the author’s assessment the filling 
of the Georgean quota did not alter the balance of deployed military forces in 
the region. I also disagree with his statement that “until 2004, Moscow had 
been anxious to remain unbiased and neutral”. Had she been really unbi-
ased? Quite the opposite, at different points since the early 1990s she has in 
fact contributed to periodic deterioration of the political situation in South 
Ossetia (and in Abkhazia). 
Likewise I do not agree with the description of the Saakashvili's govern-
ment’s early activities related to the conflict which he qualified as Tbilisi’s 
revenge in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Until the breakout of the Russian-
Georgian War in August 2008 in Tskhinvali Region Saakashvili and other 
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Georgian politicians never spoke of or called for a revenge against the South 
Ossetians (and the Abkhazians). Quite to the contrary, the central Georgian 
authorities periodically repeated that a solution of the conflicts should come 
through peace initiatives and a dialogue between Georgian and Abkhazian/S. 
Ossetian representatives. Corresponding peace proposals were also presented 
by them for discussion. Tbilisi’s last peace initiative was made shortly prior 
to the August War of 2008. Tbilisi proposed later to change the format of 
relations with South Ossetia involving in them also the European Union. The 
author’s statement on the intended revenge by Tbilisi is thus untrue. 
In the concluding paragraph the author presents a rather balanced picture 
of developments which gradually culminated in the “unfreezing” of the con-
flict. The periodic exchange of fire between military units of the central 
Georgian government and of Ossetian paramilitaries had periodically taken 
place since 1994 but did not lead to a full-scale war and to a Russian military 
intervention as it happened during and after August 6-8, 2008. The hostilities 
in August 2008 should be accurately called not an armed conflict between 
Georgia and South Ossetia but that between Georgia and the Russian Federa-
tion. And last but not the least, since August 2008 there has been nothing 
substantively new in the relations between South Ossetia and the Russian 
Federation except a different legal facade. 
 
Recommendations1 
International Crisis Group  
In order to improve the security environment we recommend that all partici-
pants – Georgian, Russian and Abkhaz – in the Geneva International Discus-
sions: 
1. Agree to a draft statement at the Geneva International Discussions 
on the non-use of force. 
2. Resume participation in the Gali Incident Prevention and Response 
Mechanism (IPRM), at an expert level initially if that is the most 
suitable, and in its joint fact-finding missions when violent incidents 
occur.  
3. Better provide for internally displaced persons (IDPs).  
The Georgian Government: 
4. Suspends efforts to secure annual UN General Assembly resolutions 
on IDPs.  
The Abkhaz authorities: 
5. Re-engage fully in the Working Group II of the Geneva Internation-
al Discussions and seriously engage in a good-faith discussion of 
mechanisms to begin addressing property return and compensation 
for IDPs and refugees. 
6. Improve conditions for other persons affected by the conflict. 
The Georgian, Russian and Abkhaz authorities: 
7. Guarantee freedom of movement for goods and people across the 
ABL, open new crossing points and remove bureaucratic impedi-
ments to movement.  
8. The Abkhaz authorities should lift legal and practical obstacles to 
Georgian language education in the ethnic Georgian Gali region, 
and take steps to include local Georgians in administrative, govern-
ment and police structures.  
9. Georgia should continue to modify legislation and practices related 
to its “law on occupied territories” that limit free movement of 
goods and people in and out of Abkhazia; and encourage its interna-
                                                          
1 Europe Report No. 224, 10 April 2013, Executive summary and recommendations, http://
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-roa
d-to-reconciliation.aspx (19-8-13). 
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tional partners to facilitate the issuing of visas especially, but not on-
ly, for residents of Abkhazia wishing to study abroad.  
10. Russia should fully implement the ceasefire agreements and strictly 
control all transfers from its federal budget to limit corruption. 
11. Improve Abkhazia’s external access and exposure.  
We recommend that the international community, in particular the UN De-
velopment Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU):  
12. Strengthen the very limited international presence in Abkhazia. For 
example, the EU should offer to expand its police liaison activities; 
open an EU information point in Sukhumi; and begin implementing 
its new assistance program focusing on health, education and im-
proving local livelihoods, while the Abkhaz authorities should not 
rebuff these efforts and others that increase access and exposure to 
foreign expertise.  
13. Conduct a comprehensive study on the feasibility of redeveloping 
regional economic and transportation corridors, including rail, road 
and sea transport, between Abkhazia, Georgia and other regional 
hubs.  
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The elusive search for resolution of the Nagorny 
Karabakh dispute 
Thomas de Waal 
The conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the highland region in 
the South Caucasus known as Nagorny Karabakh is the longest-running eth-
no-territorial dispute in the post-Communist world. It erupted in its present 
form in February 1988, when there were no signs of trouble in the Baltic 
States, Georgia, Kosovo, Croatia or Bosnia. Other conflicts have come and 
gone, but Karabakh has remained unresolved. In 1994, the Armenian side 
won a military victory on the ground, gaining control of not only almost all 
of the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh itself, but, wholly or partially, 
seven Azerbaijani regions around it. But the dispute carries on, as Azerbaijan 
does not renounce its claim to a land that is recognized internationally as be-
ing de jure part of its territory and uses all levers it can to try and reverse the 
status quo.  
Since March 1992, when the fighting was at its height, the conflict has 
been mediated by the so-called Minsk Group of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, up until December 1994 the CSCE). 
Many negotiators have come and gone and several have said they were close 
to declaring success. The continuing pattern of non-resolution and failed me-
diation over more than 20 years makes the efforts to solve the Karabakh con-
flict resemble the myth of Sisyphus: many times the heavy stone of peace has 
been rolled up near to the top of the hill but it has always rolled down again.  
June 2011 saw the most recent intense international effort to push the 
stone over the hill, with Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev convening a 
meeting of President Ilham Aliev and Serzh Sarkisian in Kazan to persuade 
them to agree to so-called Document on Basic Principles, a short framework 
agreement of 14 points that had been under discussion since 2006. If a deal 
can be made on the document – a possibility that many people discount given 
the relations between the two sides –, it would be a major achievement. But 
even that would only be the beginning of a more comprehensive peace pro-
cess, with many more episodes in it.  
Since the failure in Kazan in 2011, the situation has got worse, not better. 
The international context has not improved. In 2012 the return of Vladimir 
Putin to the Kremlin as president of Russia signalled a lowering of priorities 
by Moscow in the negotiating process. Where Medevedev had made achiev-
ing a success over Nagorny Karabakh a strategic goal, Putin made it clear 
was focused on other issues and appears content to see the conflict “man-
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aged” rather than resolved. This cynical approach was underlined by the fact 
that Russia has sold weapons to both sides in the conflict.  
The Ukraine crisis diverted international attention from the conflict, at 
least until a small outbreak of violence in the summer of 2014. The quarrel 
between Moscow and its Western colleagues in the Minsk Group posed a 
new challenge to the capacity of the mediators to work effectively together. 
Although the format of three Minsk Group co-chairs has survived as has the 
“Basic Principles” plan they collectively endorse, levels of cynicism in the 
region about the conflict have reached new highs.  
Inside the region itself, each side has sought to entrench its position. The 
Armenian side busies itself with “normalizing the facts on the ground” – they 
continue to build infrastructure in Nagorny Karabakh itself and road links 
between Karabakh and Armenia. In 2012 construction was finished on a new 
airport in Karabakh itself and announced it intended to receive civilian flights 
from Yerevan. This provoked an angry reaction from Baku that such a move 
would be in contravention of the Chicago Convention on international flights 
and that it would take action if an airplane did fly to Karabakh. International 
actors warned both sides not to inflame the situation, telling the Armenians 
not to undertake any flights and the Azerbaijanis not to threaten Armenian 
aircraft if a flight did take place. However, both sides appeared to have boxed 
themselves in and raised the possibility of an armed clash. 
The main change in the region is the growing perception by Azerbaijan of 
its own strength. Azerbaijan now spends more than $4 billion a year on its 
military: the figure was a deliberate target by the government in Baku, which 
wanted to be able to declare that it had a military budget higher than the en-
tire Armenian state budget. This has been coupled with increased diplomatic 
muscle. In January 2012 Azerbaijan became a non-permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council. It now has more than 50 consulates and 
embassies worldwide. 
This has not strengthened Azerbaijan’s objective situation vis-a-vis the 
Armenians. However it has hardened attitudes and reduced the scope for 
compromise. This hard-line attitude has manifested itself in two provocative 
moves that have hurt Azerbaijan's image abroad and weakened the peace 
process.  
The first was the pardoning of convicted murderer Ramil Safarov in Au-
gust 2012. Safarov had been serving a life-sentence in prison in Hungary 
after he killed Armenian office Gurgen Margarian on a NATO English-
language course in 2004. In circumstances that have thus far not been fully 
explained, Hungary agreed that he be returned to Azerbaijan on condition 
that he serve out the rest of his sentence in prison. Instead, as soon as he ar-
rived in Azerbaijan, Safarov was pardoned, given a promotion and a free 
apartment in Baku and treated as a hero.  
 The elusive search for resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh dispute 127 
 
The pardoning of Safarov, whose only claim to fame was to have killed a 
sleeping man, dealt a heavy blow to the peace process. Naturally there was an 
outraged reaction in Armenia. There was also international condemnation, 
with the White House saying that President Obama was “deeply concerned” 
by the pardon.  
Five months later, the government in Baku put out another aggressive 
message this time in relation to the writer Akram Aylisli. Aylisli, a revered 
writer from the Soviet era, published a novel in Russian entitled Stone 
Dreams (Kamennye Sny) in which he depicted Azerbaijani violence against 
Armenians and portrayed Armenians in a positive light. He was publicly vili-
fied for this breaking of a taboo. He was stripped of state awards, his wife 
and son were dismissed from their jobs and he was attacked in the media. By 
encouraging this, the Azerbaijani government was publicly attacking the idea 
of compromise with Armenians.  
The summer of 2014 saw the worst violence on the Line of Contact sepa-
rating the armed forces of the two sides in 20 years. Although figures were 
hard to verify, it seems likely that more than 30 Armenian and Azerbaijani 
soldiers had died in a few days, or more than in all of 2013. Several of those 
who died had been born after the ceasefire agreement of May 1994 was 
signed.  
A meeting arranged by President Putin in Sochi saw both leaders agree to 
de-escalate tensions on the ceasefire line. But there was no progress on the 
major issues in the negotiations. Despite Putin’s intervention, the rhetoric 
continued. President Aliev took to his Twitter account to broadcast a barrage 
of 47 aggressive Tweets against Armenia. President Sargsyan told a televi-
sion interviewer on his return from Sochi that his missiles were capable of 
reducing Azerbaijani cities to ruins.  
In this article [the first version was published in November 2011] I outline 
reasons why the Karabakh conflict has so far eluded resolution and a brief 
summary of more positive factors which are cause for hope that it can still be 
resolved.  
A Soviet Legacy 
The Nagorny Karabakh conflict was not created by the Soviet Union and 
indeed the region enjoyed inter-ethnic peace and stability for most of the So-
viet period. But the Soviet experience has defined the modern contours of the 
problem. 
Geography underlies the conflict: a region with a large Armenian popula-
tion and a long Armenian history lies geographically within the territory of 
Azerbaijan and also contains a city, Shusha, with a strong Azerbaijani herit-
age. Following the collapse of the tsarist empire in 1917-18, the region was 
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the location for a bloody Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which ended when 
the Bolshevik Eleventh Army conquered the region in the summer of 1920. 
In 1921 the Bolshevik Caucasus Bureau, meeting in Georgia, declared a 
compromise that pleased neither side: a new autonomous province of Na-
gorny Karabakh, with an overwhelming Armenian majority, was to be estab-
lished inside the territory of new Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1923, the Nagorny 
Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO in the Russian acronym) was created 
with Armenians constituting 94 per cent of the population. 
The Bolsheviks congratulated themselves for ending a civil war and de-
clared that socialist brotherhood would erase ethnic distinctions. But NKAO 
was an unstable arrangement which caused occasional rumblings of discon-
tent in Soviet times. It was one of only two instances within the Soviet sys-
tem in which a province with a strong ethnic affiliation to one Union Repub-
lic (Armenia) was located within the borders of another Union Republic, 
(Azerbaijan). (The other example, Crimea after 1954, also caused tensions, 
but has remained peacefully primarily because Russians and Ukrainians are 
closer and much more inter-mixed than are Armenians and Azerbaijanis). 
After the 1920s, the concept of autonomy became increasingly devalued in 
the Soviet system, with power being exercised mainly from Moscow and 
from the capitals of the Union Republic. In the case of Nagorny Karabakh, 
that meant that local Armenians said they felt like second-class citizens in-
side Azerbaijan and in the post-war period, Baku worked to “Azerbaijanify” 
its Armenian province. In the last Soviet census of 1989, the Armenian pro-
portion of the population of NKAO had fallen to three quarters of the total.  
The Soviet Union’s rigid political system made its ethno-federal structures 
strong but brittle. The vertical power relationships of the Soviet system meant 
that there were almost no mechanisms for mediating problems between the 
Karabakh Armenians and Baku. Instead, each side petitioned its patrons in 
Moscow for support. In 1988, the Karabakh Armenians directed their appeal 
to leave Soviet Azerbaijan and join Soviet Armenia to Moscow, while Baku 
in turn asked Moscow to rule in its favour – which it did. However, the cen-
tral Soviet arbiter grew weaker and increasingly unable to control the situa-
tion on the ground. Low-level violence gradually escalated into full-scale 
war.  
The Soviet legacy persists in a number of ways. Leaders operate in an au-
thoritative secretive manner, not seeking to build consent or take advice from 
people below them. Many ordinary people accept the passive role they are 
given: they still expect a higher arbiter to rule in their favour, rather than 
seeking to engage in dialogue with people on the other side of their conflict. 
This in turn shapes a negotiating process which is very closed, monopolized 
by the elites and has almost no public dimension. Both leaderships, especially 
the Azerbaijani side, discourage Track II activities that do not directly sup-
port their own positions. 
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An Issue of Identity 
In 1991 Armenia and Azerbaijan were both forged as new independent states 
in the crucible of the Karabakh conflict. The conflict is memorialized as a 
symbol of victory and survival on the Armenian side and of martyrdom and 
loss on the Azerbaijani side.  
Leaders rose and fell as a result of the conflict. The first leaders of post-
Communist Armenia, with Levon Ter-Petrosian at their head, rose to promi-
nence in 1988 as members of the so-called Karabakh Committee, who defied 
the Communist Party authorities on this issue. The Popular Front opposition 
in Azerbaijan came to power in 1992 on a wave of dissent triggered by the 
way the post-Communist elite in the newly independent country handled the 
conflict. 
The national discourse of both countries sees the state as being incomplete 
without Nagorny Karabakh. Armenian and Azerbaijani historians, writers and 
journalists are deployed to legitimize the claims of one side and de-legitimize 
the claims of the other. For Armenians, Nagorny Karabakh is a historic east-
ern outpost of Armenian self-rule, symbolized by numerous churches and the 
legacy of the melik princes who ruled the region in medieval times. In this 
narrative the unrecognized Nagorny Karabakh Republic continues an unbro-
ken tradition of Armenian rule here. For Azerbaijanis it is the seat of the old 
city of Shusha, capital of a khanate founded in the 18th century and an essen-
tial part of the Azerbaijani state. Azerbaijani coins bear on their reverse a 
complete map of Azerbaijan and the nightly weather forecast on television 
informs viewers of the weather in the province. 
These narratives are so powerful that appeals to rational self-interest or the 
promise of economic prosperity are not successful. Indeed, the main attempt 
to resolve the conflict through economic incentives failed. This was the spe-
cial administration, run by an envoy from Moscow Arkady Volsky, which 
was put in charge of Nagorny Karabakh in 1989-90 and which was given a 
large budget to effect an economic “renaissance” there. Volsky’s attempts to 
tie Armenians and Azerbaijanis together with economic projects could not 
compete with two nationalist movements intent on cutting those ties. Theo-
retical scholarship on conflict increasingly confirms this thesis in reference to 
other disputes. In his recent groundbreaking study on successful historic 
normalization processes, “When Enemies Become Friends”, Charles Kup-
chan writes of the 20 cases he studies that it is “striking” to observe “the 
causal insignificance of economic integration during the early phases of sta-
ble peace.” In only one case out of 20 (German unification in the mid-19th 
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century), Kupchan notes, has economic integration been a factor driving a 
peace process.1 
In Armenia and Azerbaijan in the past five years two new narratives have 
embellished the nationalist discourses. Azerbaijan now calls itself a success-
ful and prosperous oil and gas power, which has an indispensable role in the 
future of European energy security.  
In a speech in Baku in May 2011 President Ilham Aliev said,  
The rate of Azerbaijan’s economic development in the last seven years has been unpar-
alleled in the world. Our economy has grown almost three times. Industrial production 
has increased threefold and poverty reduced five times. We already have extensive fi-
nancial opportunities. Our economy is already diversified. At the same time, our energy 
policy rests on the oil strategy determined by Heydar Aliyev. This strategy has been 
aligned with modern requirements and enriched. 
Today Azerbaijan is playing an important part in energy security not only in the re-
gion but also on the continent. Our initiatives, the proposals we are making and the pro-
jects we are implementing are not only strengthening our country, but also creating 
wonderful conditions for regional cooperation.2 
On the Armenian side, there is now a strong narrative that Nagorny Karabakh 
has emerged as a self-sufficient state, whether it is recognized or not, and that 
secession is a fact in modern Europe, following the widespread recognition of 
Kosovo by other states. In the same month as Aliev made his speech, Arme-
nian president Serzh Sarkisian said in an interview to a Russian newspaper, 
As a precedent, yes, creation of new states does have a positive impact on the world’s 
perception regarding the right of the NK people. And it’s not about our recognition of 
the state sovereignty of Kosovo, Southern Sudan, Abkhazia or South Ossetia; it’s about 
the fact that the international community in different combinations accepts that in this 
or that particular case separation is a legal form for the realization of the right for self-
determination.3 
Possession of territory on the ground has also led many Armenians down a 
slippery slope from talk of self-determination towards irredentism. Territories 
which were called a “security zone” or “buffer zone” are now commonly 
referred to as “liberated”. In November 2010 it was reported that the authori-
ties in Nagorny Karabakh had re-named the Azerbaijani town of Aghdam 
“Akna”. 
The issue of how to define the people at the centre of the conflict, the 
Karabakh Armenians, cuts to the heart of this clash of identities. In the Ar-
                                                          
1 Kupchan, Charles. When Enemies Become Friends (2010). Princeton University Press, 399. 
2 Ilham Aliyev attended the solemn ceremony, marking the 88th anniversary of national lead-
er Heydar Aliyev, http://en.president.az/articles/2140 (10-5-11) 
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menian narrative they are one party in the conflict who fought Azerbaijan to 
gain their freedom, supported by the Republic of Armenia. For Azerbaijanis, 
the conflict is an irredentist land-grab by the Republic of Armenia, with the 
Karabakh Armenians playing a mere supporting role.  
Both narratives have elements of truth. On the one hand, the Karabakh 
Armenians are clearly distinct actors, who have a different history and out-
look from Armenians from the Republic of Armenia, along with a dialect that 
is reportedly barely intelligible to fellow Armenians. At certain times, 
Karabakh Armenians have acted to defy the will of Yerevan. In May 1992, 
for example, they captured the city of Shusha right in the middle of Armeni-
an-Azerbaijani negotiations in Teheran, sending a direct message of disap-
proval to the peace plan on offer. In 1993-94 Karabakh Armenian military 
commanders negotiated directly with Azerbaijani counterparts. In 1997, 
Karabakh Armenians moved to veto President Levon Ter-Petrosian’s draft 
peace plan, leading to his eventual resignation. 
On the other hand, Nagorny Karabakh is a small place whose current pop-
ulation is around 100,000. The only route in and out of the province is cur-
rently through Armenia. Karabakh Armenians travel abroad on Armenian 
passports. It could not survive economically or militarily without Yerevan. 
Only a small proportion of the 20,000 or so troops serving on the Armenian 
side of the Line of Contact come from Karabakh itself, the rest coming from 
the Republic of Armenia. Since 1998, two Karabakh Armenians, first Robert 
Kocharian and then (from 2008) Serzh Sarkisian have been presidents of 
Armenia, leading to jokes about how “Karabakh has occupied Armenia.” 
This means that in many ways – although not all – Armenia and Karabakh 
are now one and the same.  
Disputes about the status of the Karabakh Armenians have made the peace 
process extremely complex. Baku seeks to exclude Karabakh Armenians 
from all negotiations (something that has occurred at the political level) and 
stop all international contacts with Nagorny Karabakh. Yerevan tries to give 
the Karabakh Armenians maximum legitimacy and calls them a “third side” 
in the conflict (while also minimizing the role of the smaller Karabakh Azer-
baijani community). It is hard to forge a peace when it is not even clear who 
the peace is between. A conceptual disentanglement is needed alongside po-
litical compromise. 
A Political Instrument  
The Karabakh issue consumes both domestic and foreign politics. It is proba-
bly the one issue in each country which is bigger than the leaders. It can 
make and break presidents. Azerbaijan’s first president, Ayaz Mutalibov, lost 
power in large part because of the Khojali massacre of February 1992 during 
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the early part of the conflict. Subsequently, following the 1994 ceasefire, 
presidents on both sides tried and failed to persuade their inner circles to ap-
prove peace plans. In 1997, Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian ap-
proved a phased peace plan for Nagorny Karabakh in which the resolution of 
its status would be postponed to a future date. Key members of his cabinet 
joined with the Karabakh Armenian leaders to block the plan and to over-
throw Ter-Petrosian, who was forced to resign as president in February 1998.  
On the Azerbaijani side, Heidar Aliev dominated the country for three 
decades and wielded unrivalled power. However, he twice had to beat a re-
treat after trying to endorse a peace agreement. In October 1999, three of his 
top advisers – foreign policy aide Vafa Guluzade, foreign minister Tofik 
Zulfugarov and the head of the presidential secretariat Eldar Namazov – all 
resigned because of their objections to the peace plan under discussion. In 
2001, Aliev travelled to the U.S.-organized peace talks in Key West, Florida, 
having negotiated the bulk of a new deal with his Armenian counterpart, 
Robert Kocharian, in intense secrecy. Aliev gave details of what he had been 
discussing – in effect the yielding of Karabakh to Armenia in exchange for a 
corridor across Armenian territory to the exclave of Nakhichevan – only 
when he arrived at Key West. His inner circle was opposed and Aliev began 
to retreat from the plan as soon as he returned to Baku. 
The leaders use Karabakh as an instrument in domestic politics to assert 
their patriotic credentials, rally youth and the armed forces. Opposition par-
ties use the conflict to burnish their own brand. This plays out in different 
ways on each side of the conflict. On the Azerbaijani side, the mainstream 
political opposition is increasingly marginalized. The Musavat and Popular 
Front parties who form the core of that opposition held power in the 1992-93 
period during the hot phase of the conflict and are associated with a more 
radical position than that of the governing elite, whose father-figure, former 
president HeidarAliev, agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 and negotiated seriously 
with the Armenians up until his death in 2003. 
During the fighting in the summer of 2014, the Karabakh conflict became 
a reason to call on ordinary citizens to “rally round the flag”. Several of the 
pro-democracy activists arrested in Azerbaijan in 2014 were accused of 
working with the Armenians, or having Armenian relatives, as a means of 
discrediting them.  
On the Armenian side, differences have narrowed between the governing 
elite, now led by President Serzh Sarkisian, and the main opposition, led by 
former president Levon Ter-Petrosian. Despite their many differences on 
domestic policies, the two movements hold almost identical positions on the 
Karabakh issue. The current Basic Principles document under discussion is 
basically an updated version of the peace plan Ter-Petrosian supported in 
1997.  
 The elusive search for resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh dispute 133 
 
Armenian opposition comes from political forces, some of which have 
greater support in the Diaspora than in Armenia itself. The Heritage Party, 
led by U.S-born former foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian (who finished in a 
strong second place in the 2013 presidential election with 37 percent of the 
vote), has called on the Armenian government to recognize the Nagorny 
Karabakh Republic as an independent state. The old nationalist Dashnaktsu-
tiun party, founded in 1890, is stronger outside Armenia than inside it and 
also has a strong representation inside Nagorny Karabakh. It strongly op-
posed the Armenia-Turkey normalization process of 2008-10 and opposes 
compromises with Azerbaijan. Both these parties will bring Diaspora influ-
ence to bear to oppose the current peace process. 
The overall result of these domestic political disputes is that the governing 
elites in both countries, and especially in Azerbaijan, face criticism for being 
too soft on the other side in the conflict and little criticism for being too 
harsh. This encourages them to use nationalist rhetoric which then entraps 
them and limits their room for compromise in the peace negotiations. 
Nobody’s Backyard, Everybody’s Problem 
The South Caucasus can be characterized as “nobody’s backyard”. It is an 
area of strategic interest to Russia, Turkey, Iran, the European Union and the 
United States but not a first-order priority for any of them. Compare this situ-
ation to the Balkans, in which, eventually, conflict could not be ignored by 
the European Union and the United States, leading to military missions com-
prising tens of thousands of men and reconstruction work costing billions of 
dollars. 
As a consequence of this, the South Caucasus continues to be a region of 
competing interests of bigger powers and of political lobbies operating within 
those powers. None of the latter-day “Great Powers” have a unified strategic 
vision for the region as a whole. The EU does not hold out the prospect of 
membership. A series of agendas jostle for the attention of policy-makers. 
They range from the campaign of the grandchildren of Anatolian Armenians 
to have the killings of 1915 called a genocide to energy security, transit 
routes to Afghanistan or sanctions against Iran. The result is that the “tail 
wags the dog” and determined lobbying by actors in the region shapes policy. 
The local political elites are skilled at playing off the international actors and 
defending their own interests. To break this unhealthy dynamic there needs to 
be either grassroots democratization, which seems a fairly distant prospect, or 
else stronger and more concerted diplomacy by the bigger powers. 
In the case of the Karabakh dispute, this fractured international agenda en-
ables the presidents of both countries to resist international efforts to re-shape 
or broaden the Karabakh peace process. The two presidents do not want to 
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lose control of the process. They have been the main conductors of the nego-
tiations, setting its tempo and ensuring it is a slow and closed process.  
The years 1992-97 saw intense competition between Russia, which was 
the most active mediator, and Western negotiator, such that local actors com-
plained that they were being forced to mediate between the mediators. Fol-
lowing the establishment of a tri-partite co-chairmanship in 1997, the three 
mediators, which have been the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group since 
then, France, Russia and the United States, have managed to forge a shared 
agenda on the Karabakh conflict. But inevitably all of them, including Rus-
sia, are not prepared to re-deploy resources away from other issues, which are 
first-order priorities for them, onto a difficult and intractable conflict in the 
South Caucasus.  
Discussing the Minsk Group co-chair format is a popular sport in both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. It could probably benefit from a re-design, but this 
is almost certainly the wrong priority. The main problem with the peace pro-
cess is not form, but content. If there was sufficient political will and energy 
from the conflict parties, then any format would be capable of yielding posi-
tive results. As it is, the current format has certain advantages. It deploys ex-
perienced diplomats from three powerful countries, all of them permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, all of them capable of helping under-
write a successful peace settlement on the ground. It keeps Russia, which as 
the former colonial power has many continuing interests in the region, on the 
inside of the process, not outside it.  
The negative sides of the current format are mainly technical and opera-
tional ones. The current process is not conducive to nimble diplomacy. It is a 
cumbersome practice to coordinate meetings between three mediators and 
representatives of two conflict parties. That is why progress was possible 
when one country took the lead, as happened with Russia’s Vladimir Kazimi-
rov negotiating the 1994 ceasefire, French president Jacques Chirac conven-
ing meetings between the two presidents in 2000 and Russian president 
Dmitry Medvedev personally bringing the two leaders together in 2010-11.  
There has been no major initiative since the failure in Kazan in 2011. In 
2014 President Putin brought together the two leaders in Sochi, but although 
they agreed to ease tensions on the ceasefire line, there was conspicuously no 
public joint statement after the meeting. US Secretary of States again brought 
the two presidents together at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 
and President Francois Hollande invited them to Paris in October, 2014. But 
the impression is one of process without result – a position that the negotia-
tors prefer to having no process at all. 
There is a problem also in the fact that the negotiations are run by the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The advantage of the 
OSCE is that it is an inclusive organization with a broad mandate that in-
cludes Russia. However, it is poorly resourced and has no very limited opera-
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tional capacity. A High-Level Planning Group in Vienna was established at 
the Budapest summit of 1994 to plan for the OSCE’s first-ever peace-keeping 
operation for Nagorny Karabakh, but few expect the organization actually to 
be able to lead operations on the ground when and if a peace deal is ever 
signed. Likewise there is a widespread assumption that, as in the Balkans, the 
EU will play the leading role in the post-conflict settlement on the ground. 
But the EU has up until now been a marginal player in the Karabakh peace 
process and its expertise has not been exploited. More broadly, the closed 
nature of the peace process has meant that the OSCE has not sufficiently co-
ordinated its work on the Karabakh conflict with many other actors with ex-
pertise and resources to offer.  
Some Reasons still to Hope 
The negative dynamics of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict make for a dark 
picture. In 2014, 23 years after the end of the Soviet Union and 24 years after 
the beginning of the modern phase of the conflict, societies are still unpre-
pared for the idea of compromise with the other and belligerent tendencies 
are still strong. At the same time, there is a more coordinated international 
push for peace, led by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, and it is harder 
for the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to hide in a process that has not 
delivered results. 
It would also be a mistake to miss the points of light which may help the 
peace process if it does eventually make progress. Behind the aggressive 
rhetoric, there are alternative narratives that tell a different story and which 
can help bridge the gap between the two sides if the peace process begins to 
work. Armenians and Azerbaijanis have fought on several occasions over the 
past two centuries. Just as importantly, they have also cooperated, fought on 
the same side under Russian command, traded and inter-married. On the ter-
ritory of Georgia, outside the political context of the Karabakh conflict, there 
are Armenian-Azerbaijani mixed marriages and mixed villages.  
Obviously, the longer things remain broken, the more people grow apart. 
A new post-Soviet generation is growing up which does not know members 
of the ethnic group from Soviet times, often does not have a shared language 
(Russian) and only hears about Armenians or Azerbaijanis as the enemy. The 
modern ties that bind these young people in a globalized world – for example 
the fact that they are members of a “Facebook generation” – are weaker than 
the ties that bound their parents together. However, there is a foundation that 
can be built on, which is stronger than the relationships between, for exam-
ple, Israelis and Palestinians.  
In a paradoxical way the darker aspects of this conflict can also serve to 
help the peace process. By this I mean that the Karabakh dispute is a combus-
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tible conflict in a strategically sensitive neighbourhood. A potential outbreak 
of fighting in the future would set alight a region containing Iran, Russia, 
Turkey, Georgia and international oil and gas pipelines. This is not a cheerful 
prospect for the international community, which cannot simply ignore the 
issue. In this sense Karabakh is “luckier” than the disputes over Cyprus or 
Transnistria which are easier to resolve but also command less urgent atten-
tion internationally. 
As in every conflict, there are strong forces which resist resolution and 
prefer an entrenched status quo. For progress eventually to be made over 
Karabakh, there is a need for a “perfect storm” of domestic and international 
interests to come into alignment: both a coordinated push by international 
actors who make resolution of the conflict a priority, despite their manifold 
other interests in this region; and a domestic leadership on each side which 
decides that it must seek change because of its long-term interests or calcu-
lates that it has must yield to international pressure to do so. 
 
Comments 
Irada Baghirova 
T. de Waal tried to present an objective picture of the Nagorny Karabakh 
conflict. Reviewing his generally positive attempt to identify its causes and 
possible ways for its peaceful resolution, I would like to advance some re-
marks. 
T. de Waal argues that geography is at the heart of the conflict. However 
the root cause of the conflict is not in the geographic location of Nagorny 
Karabakh. Until 1918 this territory was not delimited by ethnicity and the 
name Nagorny Karabakh had purely geographical significance. The Autono-
mous Region of Nagorny Karabakh (not identical with entire Nagorny 
Karabakh) is geographically located on the territory of Azerbaijan and does 
not border with Armenia. The argument that Nagorny Karabakh had a long 
Armenian history does not hold. Numerous historical sources show a mass 
Armenian migration into Karabakh only following the Russian-Iranian wars 
in 1826-1828. Prior to this influx the Azerbaijanis had lived not only in 
Shusha but also in all other parts of Karabakh. Almost all place-names in 
Nagorny Karabakh before the collapse of the Russian Empire and even until 
the late twentieth century were of Turkic origin and the region has had a 
strong Azeri heritage.  
The Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevics) at its 
meeting on July 5, 1921 in Georgia decided on a compromise solution which 
satisfied neither side. A new autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh con-
taining an overwhelming Armenian majority was thus to be created inside the 
territory of new Soviet Azerbaijan. However the decision by the Caucasian 
Bureau did not stipulate that the autonomy be applied to the Armenian popu-
lation of Nagorny Karabakh only. Consequently the town of Shusha, entirely 
inhabited by the Azerbis, was made the administrative center of the region. 
An ethnic character of the future autonomy was specified only in 1923 in a 
decree by the Azerbaijani Central Executive Committee (ACEC). The decree 
stated that autonomy was to be applied to the Armenian part of Nagorny 
Karabakh only and not to entire Nagorny Karabakh. Accordingly the original 
name of this autonomy used until 1936 was the Autonomous Region of Na-
gorny Karabakh (in Russian Avtonomnaya Oblast Nagornygo Karabakha). 
By the same decree the capital of the autonomous region was moved from 
Shusha to Khankendi, apparently due to a different version of autonomy. The 
borders of the region were fixed only in 1924. The Armenian population of 
Nagorny Karabakh had been namely so interspersed with Azeri villages that 
it was very difficult to delineate clearly the demarcation of the future Arme-
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nian autonomous region. It’s no accident that included into in ARNK there 
were not only villages with the predominantly Armenian population but also 
some with the Azeri population. The delineation resulted in the 94 percent 
share of the Armenians in the region’s population. 
Thomas de Waal claims that Nagorny Karabakh was one of only two in-
stances in the Soviet system, in which a region with strong ethnic ties to an-
other Soviet republic (Armenia) was located within the boundaries of a union 
republic with a different titular nation (Azerbaijan). As the second example 
he cites the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. However the 
Crimean indigenous population was neither Russian not Ukrainian but Cri-
mean Tatar (deported from their native land in May 1944). I think that it’s 
inappropriate to put the transfer of Crimea in the same category as Nagorny 
Karabakh. 
T. de Waal cites Armenian complaints of being presumably treated as sec-
ond-class citizens in Azerbaijan and “azerbaijanization” imposed by the Baku 
authorities on the predominantly Armenian region. Unfortunately, this is an 
often repeated argument used by the Armenian propaganda. In fact it was not 
a deliberate policy by the Azeri authorities and the claim itself is not a suffi-
cient ground for a change of the status of Nagorny Karabakh. The demo-
graphic balance in the region has indeed shifted and but for that there were 
objective reasons. During the Second World War the Armenians of Nagorny 
Karabakh, mobilized in the Soviet Army, suffered heavily and lost about 
45,000 mostly men. The Azeri population also greatly suffered but a tradi-
tionally higher rate of population growth among the Azeris in comparison 
with the Armenians, different migration patterns of the Armenians and the 
Azeris, the enhanced status of the Azerbaijani language in the republic and 
especially economic development contributed to a slight increase in the per-
centage of the Azeris in the Nagorny Karabakh population. 
For Azeri historians Karabakh’s past does not begin in the XVIII century 
and is not limited to the period of the Karabakh Khanat will its capital in 
Shusha. After the collapse of the Arab Caliphate, since the middle of the 
IX century Karabakh was a part of many states which existed on the territory 
of today’s Azerbaijan. The names of these states were generally derived from 
the names of ruling Muslim dynasties (Sajid, Salari, Atabek-Eldenid, Elkha-
nid, Jhelairid, Garagoyuunlu, Akgoyunly, Safavi, Afshar and finally Kara-
bakh). 
The author notes that the possession of territory led many Armenians 
down a slippery slope from the demand for self-determination to irredentism 
and the violent seizure of border areas containing a compact ethnic minority 
of the titular nation. At the beginning of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict in 
1988 the Armenian version of irredentism was called “miatsum” (reunion), 
interpreted as the right to self-determination. The Armenians of Nagorny 
Karabakh demanded independence and declared the “Nagorny Karabakh Re-
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public”. This entity remains internationally unrecognized, even by Armenia. 
However one and the same people cannot claim self-determination more than 
one time and secede from the country in which they have lived for decades.  
Thomas de Waal states that in 1994 the Armenian side won a military vic-
tory on the ground having gained control of not only almost entire disputed 
territory of Nagorny Karabakh itself, but wholly or partly also of seven Azeri 
districts around it. It should be noted that Nagorny Karabakh, and more spe-
cifically the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region has not been a disputed 
territory from the Azerbaijani side as it was previously situated within the 
borders of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. The author writes that 
the dispute continues, as Azerbaijan does not give up its claim to the land 
which is recognized internationally as a de jure part of its territory, and uses 
all the levers to change the status quo. This is an inaccurate statement be-
cause, unlike Armenia Azerbaijan can not have a claim to a part of its own 
territory. The change of the status quo means for Azerbaijan an end of mili-
tary occupation of a part of its territory by Armenia.  
Concerning the format of negotiations, the author notes that Armenia has 
been trying to maximize the legitimacy of the Karabakh Armenians calling 
them the “third side” in the conflict and minimizing the role of the Azeri 
community of Nagorny Karabakh. On the other hand Baku does not officially 
accept the proposed trilateral format. In principle, the existing format can be 
considered in a way as a de facto trilateral, because since 1998 three leaders 
of Nagorny Karabakh in turn succeeded each other as presidents of Armenia. 
One of them – Robert Kocharyan also did not insist on the trilateral format in 
1998 having stated that he represented both Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh.  
Thomas de Waal notes that during the Presidency of Dmitry Medvedev in 
the Russian Federation there had been some progress in the negotiation pro-
cess on Nagorny Karabakh, while Vladimir Putin presumably focused more 
on the “management” of the conflict than on finding its solution. Mentioning 
the failure of the talks in Kazan in 2011 the author fails to mention that it was 
the Armenian side who opposed the Madrid principles: 
 the return of the territories surrounding Nagorny Karabakh to Azer-
baijani control, 
 an interim status for Nagorny Karabakh with a provision for guaran-
tees of security and self-governance, 
 a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorny Karabakh, 
 future determination of the final legal status of Nagorny Karabakh 
through a legally binding agreement, 
 the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to 
their former places of residence, 
 international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping 
operation. 
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The Armenian side offered its own version of the so-called updated Madrid 
principles which has not been however accepted by Azerbaijan. I think that 
Medvedev's policy on Nagorny Karabakh in spite of seeming proactivity, was 
no different from Putin’s approach. 
The author notes the lack of coordination of the OSCE’s work on the 
Karabakh conflict with many other actors who offered their expertise and 
resources, which led to the closed nature of the peace process, but the he does 
not mention these actors and does not offer an alternative to the OSCE, which 
would make it a more concrete proposals. 
The author comes to the conclusion that the current situation requires great 
efforts from both parties in the conflict and from the great powers who act as 
mediators in order to put an end this oldest conflict in the post-Soviet space. 
His main proposal is a “perfect storm”. By this he means a coordinated push 
by international mediators who would make conflict resolution as their priori-
ty and by state leaderships on both sides who would yield to international 
pressure. This action would combine domestic and international interests and 
can be called perfect. Unfortunately the current situation does not allow for 
its realization in practice.  
In conclusion, and on an optimistic note I hope that all efforts by the nego-
tiating parties, international mediators and representatives of civil society 
were not in vain, as was king Sisyphus’ toiling. 
Recent international developments have impacted also on South Caucasus. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, as well as hostilities in South-
East Ukraine have clearly demonstrated that the Kremlin perceives the post-
Soviet space, except the Baltic states, as its sphere of influence. Azerbaijan 
has from the very outset taken an unambiguous stand on the illegality of 
Crimea’s annexation and voted for the UN GA Resolution on the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine. Despite the latest rapprochement between Azerbaijan 
and Russia on some issues official Baku adamantly insists on the primacy of 
territorial integrity of states over the right to self-determination. 
Apparently convinced that the Ukrainian crisis is likely to impact on the 
Nagorny Karabakh issue, the American co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk 
Group James Warlick made a statement on May 7, 2014 on six basic princi-
ples of resolution. Although his formulation did not radically differ from the 
updated Madrid principles, there was something new in the statement which 
prompted the Armenian side to respond negatively. It strongly objected to the 
omission of a “referendum” in resolving the future status of Nagorny 
Karabakh and to the characterization of the Azerbaijani territory to be re-
turned as an “occupied” land. Azerbaijan’s reaction to these proposals, on the 
other hand, was positive, E. Mamedyarov, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, em-
phasized that the proposal offered a new opportunity to resume negotiations. 
Azerbaijani political experts believe that under current circumstances War-
lick’s proposals are the lesser of the two evils.  
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An aggravation on the Karabakh front in early August 2014 for the first 
time since 1994 threatened with a relapse to outright warfare. On August 10, 
2014 a meeting was held in Sochi on Vladimir Putin’s initiative with the par-
ticipation of three Presidents. Its very important result was a cease-fire. In so 
doing, Vladimir Putin once again reminded the parties to the conflict, as well 
as all mediators of Russia’s indispensable role in managing the conflict. As 
the Karabakh conflict has long reflected a wider geopolitical confrontation, 
the Western co-chairmen responded by arranging a meeting on September 4, 
2014 in Wales of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia I. Aliyev and 
S. Sargsyan with US Secretary of State J. Kerry. Next came a Paris meeting 
at which French President Francois Holland proposed to start drafting a com-
prehensive peace treaty. The next meeting of the two Presidents is scheduled 
for September 2015 at the UN General Assembly in New York. Before it 
happens, the low-intensity process is likely to stagnate. Some observers  
speculate that the weakening of Russia’s position on the world scene, could 
expedite this process. In this case Thomas de Waal’ dream of a “perfect 
storm” might become a reality. 
 

Comments 
Aram Simonyan, Menua Soghomonyan and Alik Gharibyan 
The author relatively well presented the topic and at the end constructive im-
portant suggestions for preserving peace in the area.  
However he is mistaken stating that the “Armenians and Azerbaijanis have 
fought on several occasions over the past two centuries”. In fact Azerbaijan 
as country and the ethnic group of Azeris have appeared only in the XXth 
century. Actually Azerbaijan was for the first time formed in 1918. As the 
present capital Baku was then an international city the Musavat party pro-
claimed Azerbaijan’s independence in Gandzhak, named Gyanja by the Aze-
ris. Numerous tombs and memorials testify to the millennial Armenian histo-
ry in Karabakh, called Artsakh in Armenian language. The Karabakh prob-
lem arose only after the independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia were formed following the collapse of the Russian Empire. On No-
vember 30, 1920 after the establishment of Soviet rule in Armenia. Nagorny 
Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan were recognized by the president of 
the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee Nariman Narimanov and by its 
commissar for foreign affairs M. Huseinov as inseparable parts of the Soviet 
Republic of Armenia. On July 4, 1921 by the decision of the Caucasian Bu-
reau of the Russian Bolshevik Party Nagorny Karabakh should have been 
united with Armenia. Instead following an intervention by Joseph Stalin, it 
was forcefully annexed by Azerbaijan on July 5, 1921. The Karabakh Arme-
nians protested then against this illegal action.  
The author also stated that “a region with a large Armenian population and 
a long Armenian history lies geographically within the territory of Azerbaijan 
and also contains a city, Shusha, with a strong Azerbaijani heritage.” In fact 
Shushi was founded by the Armenians and it has had a strong Armenian her-
itage. The Armenian population of Shushi was massacred on March 22, 1920 
by the troops of Khosrov Bek Sultanov, appointed by Azerbaijan as a gover-
nor. More than 8.000 Armenians were then killed. and 15.000 fled from Shu-
shi to various parts of Karabakh.  
The term Nagorny Karabakh refers only to the Nagorny Karabakh Auton-
omous Oblast. On July 7, 1923, two years after the notorious decision to in-
clude Nagorny Karabakh into Azerbaijan SSR with a high level of autonomy, 
the Azerbaijani authorities, only with great reluctance determined its borders. 
They excluded from Nagorny Karabakh Lachin, Karvachar, Koubatlou, 
Jabrail, Shahumyan, Khanlar and the northern part of Karabagh. During the 
Soviet rule the Azeri rulers tried to destroy the Armenian culture and historic 
heritage in Shushi. The hate policy of Azerbaijani authorities towards the 
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Armenians has resulted in the migration of Karabakh Armenians. The reset-
tlement of Azeris in Karabakh has been carried out artificially and by the 
dominating elite of the Soviet Azerbaijan in order to alter the ethnic composi-
tion of entire Karabakh. Constituting 94 percent of Nagorny Karabakh’s pop-
ulation the Armenians could not have a future in Azerbaijan. It is not acci-
dental that on November 23, 1977 the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Un-
ion recognized that Nagorny Karabakh had been artificially annexed to Azer-
baijan without giving due attention to the historic record, to the desire of the 
population and to economic considerations.1 
In 1991 Azerbaijan declared itself the successor of Musavatist Azerbaijan 
(1918-1920), a republic that had never been de jure internationally recog-
nized and whose state borders had never been legally established. The “resto-
ration” of Azerbaijan’s independence was proclaimed on August 30, 1991. 
Three days later, on September 2, 1991 the Nagorny Karabakh Assembly 
responded by declaring the autonomous republic’s independence according to 
the USSR Law of April 3, 1990. This law stipulated that upon the secession 
of a Soviet Republic from the Soviet Union autonomies or compactly settled 
ethnic groups can freely choose their political status. Premeditated massacres 
and plundering of Armenians in Sumgait and Baku took place in February 
1988 and in January 1990. Especially in Sumgayit the lists of the Armenian 
dwellers were compiled in advance, the Azeri criminals were released from 
prisons and given weapons, tools and for three days electricity in Armenian 
quarters had been turned off. Almost all Armenians of Sumgait had been per-
secuted and plundered. The same occurred also in Baku. In 1991 Azerbaijan 
unleashed armed attacks also on Armenia using ammunition and arms left 
from the Soviet Union. Stepanakert, the center of Karabakh, was continuous-
ly bombarded from Shushi in late summer 1991. Many Armenians fled and 
their massive emigration from Azerbaijan started. The Armenian armed forc-
es, on the other hand, really liberated only some parts of Nagorny Karabakh, 
while its considerable part still remains under Azerbaijani occupation (Sha-
humyan, Khanlar, Northern Karabakh). It should be noted that the Khojali 
massacre of Azeris during the early stage of the conflict in February 1992 
was not planned by the Armenians. The Azeri forces intentionally blocked 
then the retreat of peaceful Armenian population. The result was not a pre-
meditated massacre. There were war victims on both sides and the number of 
Azeri victims did not exceed 1500.  
The Karabakh conflict has become an object of political manipulation both 
in Armenia and in Azerbaijan. But while on the Armenian side it is a problem 
of national identity and of securing the physical existence for the Karabakh 
Armenians, in Azerbaijan it is just a problem of maintaining the Aliev regime 
in power. Baku’s resolute position of not recognizing the Karabakh Armeni-
                                                          
1 Protocol of the USSR Council of Ministers, November 23, 1977. 
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ans (who claimed their right of self-determinantion) as a negotiating side 
makes the solution of the conflict very difficult. Any kind of a democratic 
referendum would truly express the will of Nagorny Karabakh’s population. 
Ceding some Armenian-controlled areas near Nagorny-Karabagh to Azerbai-
jan would not guarantee peace. The author states erroneously that “the main 
problem with the peace process is not the form, but content. If there was suf-
ficient political will and energy from the conflict parties, then any format 
would be capable of yielding positive results”. The fact is however that both 
the Russian Federation and Armenia oppose the resolution of the Nagorny 
Karabakh problem by military means. On the other hand, President Ilham 
Aliev of Azerbaijan apparently envisions and prepares for a military show-
down. By the way, Azerbaijani snipers regularly violate the ceasefire along 
the border.  
The author’s several formulations do not correspond to the reality. One of 
them is the author’s statement: “for Azerbaijanis the conflict is an irredentist 
land grab by the Republic of Armenia with the Karabagh Armenians playing 
a mere supporting role” which contains elements of truth. The Nagorny 
Karabagh problem has not been nevertheless just a struggle for land but also 
for survival and freedom. The war took lives from almost every Armenian 
family in Nagorny Karabagh. Secondly, the Karabagh Armenians are key 
actors in the conflict. They demanded self-determination not because of a 
different history and outlook from those of the Armenians in the Republic of 
Armenia, as de Waal contends. His arguments about the separateness of the 
Karabagh Armenian dialect and about the cultural differences between the 
Nagorny Karabagh Armenians and those in the Republic of Armenia do not 
stand. Firstly, Armenian is the official language in both republics. Secondly, 
the Armenians in the Republic of Armenia itself speak a dozen dialects which 
does not make the Armenians living in various regions of the country differ-
ent peoples. Thirdly, the author’s statement “the campaign of the grandchil-
dren of Anatolian Armenians to have the killings of 1915 called a genocide” 
raises a suspicions of his questioning the very historical fact of the genocide. 
The grandchildren of Western Armenians, as well as the Armenians around 
the world demand the recognition and condemnation of the genocide of Ar-
menians in 1915. 
The future status of Kharabakh, the problem of refugees and other ques-
tions need to be solved before and not after arriving at a general compromise. 
And finally the author correctly underlined the positive role and the influence 
of several states, of OSCE, and particularly of the Russian Federation in the 
process of managing the conflict. 
 

Recommendations1 
International Crisis Group 
In order to reduce the dangers of a new war and improve the environment for 
conflict resolution we recommend that: 
 Armenia and Azerbaijan should formally endorse the basic princi-
ples, promote more pragmatic public discussion on the value of such 
an agreement, reduce belligerent rhetoric and not demand at this 
stage that a fixed timeframe be set or a specific outcome be pre-
ordained or excluded in a referendum to determine Nagorny 
Karabakh’s final status.  
 The parties should undertake confidence-building measures along 
the front lines, including withdrawal of snipers from the line of con-
tact (in accordance with OSCE recommendations), suspension of 
large-scale military exercises near the line of contact, the pullback 
and cessation of use of any artillery and a halt to trench advance-
ments towards each other’s positions. Armenia should stop sending 
regular army conscripts to serve in Nagorny Karabakh.  
 Armenia and the de facto Nagorny Karabakh authorities should 
cease supporting activities that make the status quo more intolerable 
for Azerbaijan and thus use of force seem a more attractive option 
for its leaders and public, such as settling Armenians in occupied 
Azerbaijani territories, renaming previously Azerbaijani majority 
towns and undertaking unilateral archaeological excavations.  
 Both Armenia and Azerbaijan should accede to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.  
 The international community should step up its efforts to discourage 
the dangerous arms race in the region. In particular Russia, as an 
OSCE Minsk Group co-chair, but also others, should uphold the 
non-binding UN and OSCE arms embargoes on Armenia and Azer-
baijan.  
 OSCE, with full support of the Minsk co-chair countries, should en-
courage the parties to broaden its observer mission’s mandate to au-
thorise investigation of claimed violations and spontaneous monitor-
ing, including with remote surveillance capabilities, and to agree to 
                                                          
1 International Crisis Group. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War, Europe briefing no. 
60, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/azerbaijan/B60-armenia-
and-azerbaijan-preventing-war.aspx (25-7-12).  
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a significant increase in the number of monitors, as an interim 
measure until a peacekeeping force is deployed as part of the im-
plementation of a peace agreement.  
 
Serbia vs. Kosovo 
 

The Serbia-Kosovo conflict 
Anton Bebler 
The present relation between Serbia and Kosovo reflects a relatively long 
standing conflict between the Serbs and a part of the Albanian nation which 
is not however from a time immemorial. In the famous battle at Kosovo Polje 
(1389), which proved to be fateful for the medieval Serbian state, the Albani-
an tribesmen fought against the Ottomans on the side of the Serbian king 
Lazar. The competition for land, conflictual attitudes and interests between 
the Serbs and the Albanians have developed steadily on the territory of Ko-
sovo over four and a half centuries of the Ottoman rule. The islamization of 
the majority of Albanians had deepened the existing cultural divide, adding 
the religions divide to the language divide between the Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians. The latter as Moslems enjoyed privileges and favors from the Ot-
toman rulers while the former had not. The Ottomans had on many occasions 
used the Kosovar Albanians as allies in suppressing Serbian revolts and up-
risings. All these circumstances increased the conflict component in the mix-
ture of relations between the two ethnic communities which had for several 
centuries included also peaceful coexistence and cooperation at the local lev-
el.  
The elements of conflict had gained the momentum with the growth of 
Serbian and Albanian nationalism in the second half of the XIXth century 
and with the waning of the Ottoman imperial rule in the Balkans. At the turn 
of the XXth century the destiny of Kosovo constituted only a small part of 
the Oriental question and a subchapter in the Albanian national question. 
Several decades earlier Kosovo found itself at the intersection of competing 
interests of great European powers and of four conflicting regional national 
projects. Each of them had implied overlapping and conflicting territorial 
aspirations. The Serbian national project has included since, at least, 1844 the 
inclusion of entire Kosovo into the Serbian state. The Montenegrin project 
had been directed, i. a., towards acquiring Western Kosovo (Metohija), while 
the Bulgarian project aimed i. a. at a part of Eastern Kosovo. The all-
Albanian national project was adopted by the League of Prizren in Kosovo, 
in November 1878. It obviously included also Kosovo as part of a desired 
autonomous Albanian entity within the Ottoman Empire. 
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Kosovo as Serbia’s war booty and nagging problem 
As a sharp clash between the Serbian state and the community of Kosovar 
Albanians the conflict has exploded about a century ago during the First Bal-
kan War (1912-1913). The governments’ of the Kingdoms of Montenegro 
and of Serbia1 had then as their key geostrategic ambitions territorial expan-
sion into Ottoman possessions and an unimpeded permanent territorial access 
to the Mediterranean Sea. The annexation of what is now the Northern part of 
the Republic Albania and of its sea port Durres (Serb. Dra)2 would have 
made Serbia a maritime nation. The conquest of Shkoder (Serb. Skadar) and 
of the fertile land in the estuary of the Bojana River would have very consid-
erably expanded the territory of Montenegro and made it economically more 
viable.  
At the time of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1908 Serbia tried to entice the Russian Empire to join in undertaking a 
military counteraction. Following Russia’s refusal the Serbian government 
waited for another chance to gain territory at the expense of the Ottoman pos-
sessions in the Balkans, including those with Serbian minorities only or even 
without Serbian population. Altogether the much smaller Kingdom of Mon-
tenegro followed the same expansionist line. The Russian Empire3 in its 
competition with the Austro-Hungarian Empire for influence in the Balkans 
had actively encouraged and supported the territorial ambitions of Serbia, 
Montenegro and other predominantly Christian Orthodox states. The Russian 
diplomacy initiated secret meetings of these states’ representatives from 
which an interstate conspiracy developed. Aware of and hostile to the Alba-
nians’ strivings for national self-assertion and emancipation the governments 
of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro secretly plotted to occupy and partition the 
Ottoman possessions with a predominantly or entirely Albanian and Muslim 
population. The conspirators’ clear intention was to preempt the birth of an 
independent Albanian state on the ruins of the “Sublime Porte”.  
In October 1912, according to synchronized war plans the Montenegrin 
army first and soon after wards the Serbian army invaded and quickly con-
quered territories in what is today Northern Albania. By the end of October 
1912 the Montenegrin army “liberated” Western Kosovo (Metohija) and on 
November 4 entered Djakovica, simultaneously with the Serbian army. The 
Serbian conquest of Kosovo was then only a secondary objective while the 
‘liberation’ of its Serbian minority of the “Ottoman bondage” and of Koso-
                                                          
1 Tucovi, D. Serbia and Albania (in Serbian) (1945). Kultura, Belgrade-Zagreb, pp. 7, 13-14. 
2 Tucovi, D. Serbia and Albania (in Serbian) (1945). Kultura, Belgrade-Zagreb, pp. 94-110. 
3 Anufrieva I.V. et. al. The Albanian factor in the crisis development on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia (in Russian) (2006). Documents Vol. 1 (1878-1997). INDRIK, Moscow, pp. 57, 
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vo’s medieval Christian monuments served as a convenient propaganda cover 
for its own and international public.4 
The Serbian government claimed that its right to occupy Kosovo was justi-
fied (1) by the Serbs’ superior level of civilization compared with that of the 
Albanians’, (2) by the Serbian state’s historic possession of the province in 
the XIIIth-XVth centuries and (3) by the numerical majority enjoyed then by 
the Serbs’ Slavic ancestors. By modern standards however all three argu-
ments have long since become unacceptable as justification for aggressive 
behavior against a neighboring state. Serbia then grossly violated the princi-
ple of territorial integrity of a neighboring state when its armed forces at-
tacked and occupied Kosovo. The Sublime Porte and its legal successor the 
Republic of Turkey never recognized the cession of Kosovo and no corre-
sponding international treaty was concluded. Thus Serbia’s occupation of 
Kosovo was illegal and also illegitimate since Serbia carried it out against the 
will of its majority Albanian population. The Serbian military conquest was 
accompanied by grave violations of international humanitarian law and 
caused about 25,000 deaths among Albanian Kosovars and Turks. The atroci-
ties against Kosovo’s civilian population were vividly described by Leon 
Trotsky (then a Russian correspondent in the Balkans) and were thoroughly 
documented by an international commission of enquiry.5  
The attainment of the ultimate Serbian and Montenegrin strategic objec-
tives was however foiled then by Austro-Hungary (and Italy) who resisted 
Russia’s and its proxies’ penetration into the Adriatic. The Russian imperial 
command felt that Russia was still insufficiently prepared for a major war. 
The Serbian government consequently bowed to an Austro-Hungarian war 
ultimatum. The Serbian Army was ordered to withdraw from Northern Alba-
nia. Montenegro persisted longer but by May 1913 its troops were also forced 
to leave Shkoder. However the European powers (Great Britain, Austro-
Hungary, Germany, France and Italy) at a conference in London, at Russia’s 
insistence, agreed to accord Serbia and Montenegro the occupied Kosovo, 
Sandzak and Vardar Macedonia as war booties. In 1912-1913 Kosovo was 
not even properly legally annexed to Serbia, according to the valid Serbian 
constitution of 1903 and later to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
according to its ‘Vidovdan’ constitution. 
The European powers thus knowingly allowed Serbia to keep Kosovo oc-
cupied against the wishes of its majority population. The host of the London 
conference, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey frankly admitted this 
fact during a debate in the House of Commons. Like later Cyprus and a num-
ber of Arab lands Kosovo was then forcefully amputated from the Ottoman 
Empire and immediately subjected to another foreign rule. The Ottoman pos-
                                                          
4 Tucovi, D. Serbia and Albania (in Serbian) (1945). Kultura, Belgrade-Zagreb, p. 119. 
5 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Report of the International Commission to 
Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (1914). Washington. 
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sessions in the Near East and North Africa were subjugated by France, Great 
Britain and Italy,6 while Kosovo became de facto annexed by small Monte-
negro and Serbia. The Kingdom of Serbia, which only several decades earlier 
became liberated of the Ottoman rule, was thus allowed by the European 
great powers to create its own mini colonial empire in the Balkans. In No-
vember 1918 Montenegro lost its sovereignty, ruling royal dynasty, and its 
very name. Together with Western Kosovo (Metohija) it became absorbed by 
the Kingdom of Serbia before being included by fiat into the “Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians”.  
The two brutal Serbian conquests of Kosovo in 1912 and again in 1918 
left a bitter imprint on the collective memory of the Kosovar Albanians. The 
subsequent harsh Serbian rule under the Karadjordjevic dynasty was also so 
painful that in April 1941 the Kosovar Albanians massively greeted the in-
vading Italian and German troops as liberators. During the Second World 
War the largest part of Kosovo was occupied by Italy and incorporated into 
the satellite ‘Kingdom of Albania’ with the Italian king as head of state. The 
rest of Kosovo was then divided between the “Third Reich” and Bulgaria, the 
latter having annexed its occupation zone in Eastern Kosovo. The Italian, 
German and Bulgarian policies of occupation crisscrossed and partly over-
lapped in Kosovo. On the other hand, the Yugoslav and Albanian resistance 
and liberation movements, dominated by the Communists, made their tangi-
ble inroads into Kosovo only from 1943 on. Prior to the Italian capitulation in 
September 1943 only very few Kosovar Albanians joined the Communist-led 
resistance. The Kosovo National Liberation Council which met at its first 
session in January 1944 adopted a motion according to which Kosovo after 
the war would be reunited with Albania. 
The third conquest (‘liberation’) of Kosovo by Serbian units of the Yugo-
slav Army in autumn 1944 was again accompanied by armed violence 
against the Kosovar Albanians. The act of absorption of Kosovo into Yugo-
slavia was passed in April 1945 under the conditions of martial law, by an 
appointed ‘Kosmet Regional People’s Assembly’. The composition of the 
Assembly was utterly unrepresentative consisting of 142 appointed members, 
among them with only 33 Kosovar Albanians. All appointed deputies were 
Communists and mostly Serbs. The latter represented then only about 20% of 
Kosovo’s population. The annexation was adopted by acclamation, without a 
vote and without a single speech, let alone a debate. There was no preceding 
election or a referendum in Kosovo.7 This Stalinist parody of legality thus 
totally lacked democratic legitimacy.  
Talks related to the future post-war status of Kosovo have taken place 
since 1944 between the leaderships of the Yugoslav and Albanian communist 
parties. After the war Soviet, Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian communist 
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7 Malcolm, N. Kosovo: A Short History (1998). Macmillan, London, pp. 315-316. 
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leaders discussed, on a number of occasions and behind closed doors, a pro-
ject of a Balkan Federation. In 1947-48 this project became one of the con-
troversies which contributed to the Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel and was subse-
quently abandoned.  
Kosovo as Yugoslavia’s thorny problem 
Between 1918 and 1999 Kosovo remained part of three multinational Yugo-
slavias, for most of the time as a non-self-governing province subordinate to 
the Serbian officialdom in Belgrade. The overt political discrimination of 
non-Slavic national groups was built into the very foundation of the first Yu-
goslavia since its inception in 1918, named symbolically the “Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians” only. Between 1919 and 1941 the treatment of 
the Yugoslav Albanians, in majority Moslems, had been much worse than 
that of the German, Hungarian and other Christian minorities. In the com-
munist-ruled second Yugoslavia (FPRY, SFRY) the Kosovar Albanians’ po-
sition had improved considerably compared with that in the the-war monar-
chy. However contrary to the Yugoslav communists’ belief and their public 
pronouncements the “socialist revolution” did not resolve numerous national 
questions in that multinational state, including the Kosovar Albanian one. 
The Kosovar Albanians’ situation had been adversely affected by the Tito-
Stalin conflict and by Albania’s participation in hostile actions against Yugo-
slavia, including border incidents. These actions had given a pretext for harsh 
repression in Kosovo which was relaxed after the dismissal of Aleksandar 
Rankovic in 1966. 
The Kosovo problem in all three Yugoslavias had contained at its kernel a 
political conflict between the Kosovar Albanians’ desire for national emanci-
pation and self-determination8 and, on the other hand, the Serbian elites’ 
strenious endeavors to rule Kosovo. As a result of general liberalization of 
Yugoslavia’s political system Kosovo had gained in 1963 a higher measure 
of internal autonomy and the enhanced legal status of an Autonomous Prov-
ince.  
Furthermore with the adoption in 1974 of the last SFRY constitution Ko-
sovo became an almost full-fledged member of the federation. The Autono-
mous Province of Kosovo had been, according to the last SFRY constitution 
of 1974 an integral part of the Yugoslav federation. It was represented in its 
collective Presidency and in other federal institutions on an equal footing and 
in many respects enjoyed equal rights with the six republics, including Ser-
bia. By then the Kosovar Albanians became the third largest nation in Yugo-
                                                          
8 Rrecaj, Besfort. Kosovo’s right to self-determination and statehood (2006). Besfort Rrecaj, 
Pristina, pp. 41-50. 
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slavia (after the Serbs and Croats). This demographic change and the liberal 
evolution in Yugoslav politics made politically untenable the Kosovar Alba-
nians’ obvious inequality in rights with an even several times smaller Slavic 
nation – the neighboring Montenegrins. However the Kosovar Albanians’ 
desire for full equality in collective rights with Yugoslavia’s Slavic nations, if 
granted and implemented, would have put into question Yugoslavia’s very 
name (“The Land of the Southern Slavs”), its anthem (“Hey, Slavs”), the 
privileged legal status of the Slavs, the existing power relations and the Bel-
grade bureaucracy’s pivotal position in the federal state etc.  
As a constant source of political and security troubles Kosovo tangibly 
contributed in 1941, 1991 and 2003 to ruining all three Yugoslavias - the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (KY), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The dismantling of 
SFRJ started when on March 28, 1989 the Serbian People’s Assembly effec-
tively abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. By adopting constitutional amendments 
the Serbian parliament subjected the province to direct rule from Belgrade. 
The Provincial Assembly of Kosovo was disbanded by the Serbian Assembly 
on July 5, 1990. This action was accompanied by brutal police intimidation 
and numerous arrests of Kosovar Albanian deputies in the Provincial Assem-
bly, buttressed visibly by the presence of JNA tanks in the streets of Pristina.9 
Kosovo’s subjugated majority population had been exposed to outright dis-
crimination and harsh treatment by the Serbian police and Serbian courts. By 
its unilateral action and by severe anti-Albanian repression the Serbian gov-
ernment gravely undermined the Yugoslav constitutional order. It raised not 
entirely unfounded fears in Croatia and Slovenia that the Serbian leadership, 
aligned with the federal military, would attempt subsequently to undertake 
similar actions elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The repression in Kosovo conse-
quently badly soared Serbia’s relations with Croatia and Slovenia and deep-
ened the boiling Yugoslav crisis.  
The sinister events in Kosovo in 1988-89 had taken place in the already 
shaky federal state while outside Yugoslavia’s borders a political upheaval 
swept Eastern Europe. The massive geopolitical change on the continent had 
accelerated the demise of the authoritarian communist regime in SFR Yugo-
slavia as well. The crisis in Kosovo was followed soon by armed violence in 
Croatia’s Serbian Kraina instigated from Belgrade. By 1991-1992 the ultra-
nationalist policy of the Milosevic regime, supported by the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church and by majority public opinion among the Serbs, ruined the sec-
ond Yugoslavia and the achievements of the Serbian national project since 
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1918. In the following 17 years the Yugoslav federal state created by the 
Communists in 1945 disintegrated into seven separate states.  
Kosovo as an issue of international politics since the 1990s 
As long as the second Yugoslavia existed Kosovo had represented predomi-
nantly an internal problem in Yugoslavia. Only occasionally this issue was 
raised by neighboring Albania. The repression and blatant violations of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo had thus long gone on un-
opposed by the Council of Europe and other international organizations, 
largely because Kosovo was regarded as an internal affair of a sovereign 
state. The breakdown of SFRY, to which the conflict in and over Kosovo 
substantively contributed, had had however appreciable wider international 
reverberations and implications. It attracted exceptional international atten-
tion and raised serious worries among the Western powers about its domino 
effect on the ex-Soviet space. Due to this fear (which turned out to be highly 
exaggerated) the Yugoslav drama was catapulted to the top rank of acute in-
ternational problems. 
The Kosovo problem surfaced as a distinct and contentions international 
issue only when it became clear to the Western powers that the pacification 
of the ex- Yugoslav space would be incomplete without resolving it as well. 
In spring 1997 after the forceful imposition of peace on Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the Kosovo problem was finally explicitly raised in several interna-
tional fora, including UN and OSCE. However all attempts by the Western 
powers to reach a satisfactory peaceful solution through bilateral talks with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), diplomatic pressures and by clear 
military threats brought no desirable results. The final failure of these efforts 
at an international conference at Rambouillet, France was followed in March 
1999 by the first armed attack by NATO against a UN member state. FRY 
filed then a complaint against the NATO members’ ‘illegal use of force’. The 
International Court of Justice rejected the motion and declined to examine the 
legality of NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’.10 
Already prior to the NATO intervention the Milosevic regime decided to 
exploit a “historic” opportunity and to get rid for good of most Albanian and 
other Muslim population of Kosovo. The displacement of about 350.000 Ko-
sovar Albanians, Turks and other non-Serbs was carried out by the Yugoslav 
Army and by the militarized Serbian police already in summer 1998. The 
beginning of NATO air attacks in March 1999 was followed by a still more 
massive wave of terror and of organized mass expulsion of Kosovar Albani-
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of the Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo (The Hague, 22 July 2010). 
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ans and Turks to Macedonia and Albania.11 The Serbian regime’s attempted 
act of genocide provided legitimacy to NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’12 
as an expression of the “responsibility to protect”13 Kosovo’s civilian popula-
tion. A small group of NATO member states participated in the operation 
directly while a half dozen other members indirectly. Like earlier in Bosnia 
& Herzegovina the Kosovo problem would not have been even half-resolved 
without a determined military action by USA and NATO. 
The Operation Allied Force raised Kosovo to the rank of burning interna-
tional problems. This intervention, undertaken without a UN Security Coun-
cil’s authorization, resulted in the second foreign occupation, after Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, of a part of ex-SFRY’s territory. Under the terms of the Kuma-
novo protocol signed with NATO in June 1999 FRY/Serbia removed from 
Kosovo its army, police and civilian administration. Thus in summer 1999 
FRY/Serbia lost three key elements of sovereignty in Kosovo: the control 
over its territory, its population and borders. The NATO peace-enforcing 
intervention physically detached Kosovo from Serbia and placed the province 
under temporary UN administration (UNMIK). After the retreat of the Yugo-
slav army, Serbian police and civilian administration from Kosovo, interna-
tional organizations, notably the UN High Commissariat for Refugees and 
International Migration Organization, undertook a large scale operation of 
humanitarian assistance. During the second half of 1999 about 1,3 million 
refugees and displaced Albanian Kosovars and Turks returned to their homes 
in Kosovo. They found mostly ruined and burnt-out homesteads without 
roofs, vandalized and often mined houses, apartments, schools and other pub-
lic buildings. 
With the adoption of the seminal UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 
June 10, 1999 Kosovo became an international protectorate with various se-
curity, surveillance, control, assistance and other roles played by several in-
ternational organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, World 
Bank etc.).14  
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Resolution 1244, inter alia, established the UN Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the international military presence in the 
form of the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR). At its height in 2001 UNMIK 
was the largest civilian peacekeeping mission to date in the history of the 
United Nations. It consisted of over ten thousand international staff and local 
staffers. UNMIK was tasked with organizing and overseeing the development 
of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government 
pending a political settlement and transferring its administrative responsibili-
ties, as these institutions would be created. Initially UNMIK established the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) consisting of Pristina-based 
administrative departments for services delivery and revenue collection as 
well as local administrations and councils at the municipal level. The Police 
service had been then a solely UNMIK responsibility. Since the high point 
the competencies of UNMIK were gradually reduced. The role and the size of 
the UNMIK Police has correspondingly steadily fallen from the initial high 
of about 4.700 to only six policemen in 2014. This reduction has been due to 
the development of Kosovo self-governing institutions and the presence and 
activities of other international organizations.  
The NATO-led force KFOR at the time of its deployment in summer 1999 
was composed of nearly 50.000 troops, provided by 19 NATO members and 
19 non-NATO members. The territory of Kosovo was divided then into five 
zones of responsibility with lead-contingents provided by USA, UK, France, 
Italy and Turkey. The Russian Federation endeavoured to obtain its own zone 
of responsibility but was refused by the Western powers who feared a repeti-
tion of a Transnistria-like Serbian secession under Russian protection. Rus-
sian units were deployed in several KFOR zones, including the U.S.-led zone 
of responsibility on the southeastern periphery of Kosovo. One Russian com-
pany had participated in joint U.S./Russian vehicular patrols along the border 
with Macedonia. Russia withdrew its contingent from KFOR in June 2003, 
handing over the facilities it had occupied to the local Kosovo Serbs rather 
than to UNMIK which was the legal administrator. KFOR’s original tasks 
were defined as (a) deterring renewed hostilities; (b) demilitarizing the Koso-
vo Liberation Army (KLA); (c) establishing a secure environment; (d) ensur-
ing public safety and order; (e) supervising demining; (f) conducting border 
monitoring; (g) ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of all in-
ternational organizations. Effectively KFOR has undertaken control of Koso-
vo’s external borders, airspace, key communication channels as well as the 
protection of Serbian religious monuments and enclaves. Since then the 
numbers of soldiers and of contributory nations were steadily reduced. This 
process was temporarily interrupted in March 2004 as a reaction to an out-
burst of interethnic violence and later resumed.  
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has operated under the mandate of UNSC 
Resolution 1244 and the decision of the OSCE Permanent Council from July 
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1999. It has been the largest OSCE field operation running a wide range of 
activities: developing democratic institutions and civil society, promoting 
human rights and the rule of law, organizing five rounds of elections, helping 
the Central Election Commission, assisting the Assembly of Kosovo and oth-
er public institutions, monitoring the work of Kosovo institutions, providing 
training of public officials, developing an independent media environment 
etc. The Mission has employed some 550 people in its various units and 
around 2330 in its field operations. 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) 
was established in February 2008, started operating in December 2008, and 
by May 2010 comprised 2814 staff (1717 international staff and 1097 local 
staff). It has been supported by 28 EU member states and five contributing 
non-member states. EULEX’ Executive Division investigates, prosecutes and 
adjudicates sensitive criminal cases, while the Strengthening Division moni-
tors, mentors and advises local counterparts in the Kosovo police, judiciary 
and customs service. 
The government of Serbia has maintained on its own territory a “Ministry 
for Kosovo & Metohija”, outposts of Serbia’s ministries, security organs, 
customs and tax authorities, postal services, courts, extraterritorial offices of 
the Kosovo municipalities located to the South of the Ibar River etc. It has 
exercised a considerable measure of control through its proxies over the pre-
dominantly Serbian municipalities in the North of Kosovo and in the en-
claves to the South of the Ibar River.  
Kosovo’s proclamation of independence and its present 
status 
Legally Kosovo has remained under the UN authority although this UN role 
became a legal fiction. A system of multilevel governance combined with 
international protectorate over Kosovo had officially operated for about 
twelve years (1999-2012). 
All Serbian and former Yugoslav laws became there invalid, most legal 
archives and other administrative documentation have been missing (evacu-
ated to Serbia proper) while the new UNMIK legislation was widely incom-
plete, resulting in a legal limbo in most of Kosovo.  
The model of Kosovo’s enhanced autonomy with Serbia had been for sev-
eral years a solution preferred by Western powers. However the psychologi-
cal fallout of Serbian repression in 1988-1991 and of the armed conflict in 
1999 made its application politically impossible. The former President of 
Finland Marti Ahtisaari’s “Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status 
settlement” commissioned by the UN Secretary General was submitted to the 
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UN Security Council in March 2007. Its key recommendation reads “Kosovo 
is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a prece-
dent for other unresolved conflicts”15. The Ahtisaari plan envisaged interna-
tionally supervised (and thus limited) independence for Kosovo, with its dis-
tinct national symbols, the right to conclude international treaties and to seek 
membership in international organizations. Kosovo had to provide high level 
protection of the rights of national minorities and additional security for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. The international community were to supervise, 
monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient im-
plementation of the conflict settlement. However the adoption of Ahtisaari’s 
blueprint was blocked by the Russian Federation and by the People’s Repub-
lic of China. 
After considerable vacillation the Western members of the Contact group 
(USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy) had by 2007 concluded that 
the restoration of even only formal Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo would 
be totally politically unacceptable to and violently resisted by its majority 
Albanian population. Hence Kosovo’s limited and supervised independence 
was considered to be the least objectionable among all available alternatives. 
The acute international problem was then only formally resolved. The proc-
lamation of Kosovo’s independence on February 18, 2008 ex-post facto le-
galized, by an internal act, Kosovo’s previous de facto detachment from Ser-
bia. In its VIIIth principle the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 allowed for a peace-
ful change of state borders on the basis of democratically expressed self-
determination. The Kosovo proclamation had indeed been preceded by sever-
al referenda and was carried out in a peaceful, orderly and civilized manner. 
The only acts of violence were committed then by the protesting Serbs, most-
ly in Serbia proper. Although the act of proclamation was carried out without 
an authorization by the UN Security Council, this body has not subsequently 
annulled Kosovo’s independence, as Serbia demanded. The Kosovo procla-
mation has presumably completed the almost two decades’ long dissolution 
of SFR Yugoslavia. Similarly as the neighboring Albania in 1912-1913 Ko-
sovo was emancipated with the explicit support of Western powers and 
against the stiff opposition by Serbia, supported on both occasions by Russia. 
The Belgrade government angrily responded to Kosovo’s declaration not 
only by an official refusal to acknowledge its independence but also by clos-
ing Serbia’s borders to trade with Kosovo. During demonstrations in Bel-
grade the Kostunica government more than tolerated the mob violence 
against several foreign embassies, accompanied by downtown looting and 
arson. Serbia also temporarily recalled its ambassadors from most states 
which recognized Kosovo as an independent state. The latter action was a 
Serbian variation of the Hallstein doctrine which was applied in the past by 
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the Federal Republic of Germany to punish selectively some states which 
recognized and established diplomatic relations with the German Democratic 
Republic.  
Following Kosovo’s proclamation of independence the government of 
Serbia started an action which initially looked as a shrewd diplomatic ma-
neuver. Its immediate political objective was to mollify Serbian public opin-
ion, to gain time and slow down the process of Kosovo’s international recog-
nition. In early October 2008 the Serbian delegation succeeded in obtaining 
an UN General Assembly’s resolution demanding ICJ’s advisory opinion on 
the accordance of Kosovo’s ‘unilateral declaration of independence’ with 
international law16. The Serbian diplomacy however unwisely formulated the 
request. Namely, declarations of independence are facts which concern the 
internal constitutional and political orders of states. International law is mute 
on this subject, neither permitting nor prohibiting such declarations. In addi-
tion, the declaration was not really an unilateral act by Kosovo as its sub-
stance, wording and very timing were coordinated beforehand with the five 
Western members of the Contact group, including three permanent members 
of the UN Security Council. By adopting this document Kosovo only de-
clared its intention to gain independence, voluntarily accepted numerous 
limitations of its sovereignty and did not in fact become an independent state. 
According to the submitted Serbian statement17 the presumed illegality of 
the Kosovo declaration resulted from: 
1. its violation of the principle of the respect for the territorial integrity 
of states; 
2. the inapplicability of the principle of self-determination to Kosovo; 
and  
3. its violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (which 
presumably affirmed Serbia’s continuous sovereignty over Kosovo). 
It took ICJ about a year and a half to decide on the UN General Assembly’s 
request. The ICJ opinion was expected to fall somewhere between the two 
opposite sets of arguments satisfying fully neither of the two sides. Having 
examined the statements on the subject submitted by 32 states the Interna-
tional Court of Justice delivered its non-binding advisory opinion on July 22, 
201018. The Court surprised many observers by its conclusion adopted by the 
strong majority of ten to four votes. Following the procedural decision to 
limit its task to strict consideration of the submitted request the Court avoided 
dealing with wider issues of external self-determination which were raised in 
                                                          
16 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/03. (October 8, 2008). United Nations, New York. 
17 International Court of Justice (April 15, 2009). Written statement of the Government of the 
Republic of Serbia. The Hague. 
18 International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law 
of the Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo (July 22, 2010). The Hague.  
 The Serbia-Kosovo conflict 163 
 
Serbia’s submission, in the comments by Kosovo and by other states. Within 
this narrow legal framework ICJ straightforwardly determined that the decla-
ration of Kosovo’s independence did not violate the norms of general interna-
tional law, the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework 
enacted by the UN Interim Administration. ICJ intentionally avoided to pro-
nounce on or imply the legality and legitimacy of all declarations of inde-
pendence. Very importantly ICJ did not base its opinion on the right to self-
determination and did not at all deal with the question of Kosovo’s interna-
tional recognition. The Court has been criticized for having missed the oppor-
tunity to clarify a hotly contentious issue in international law.19 The political 
effects of the ICJ decision were however immediately and abundantly clear - 
a painful defeat for Serbian diplomacy and a vindication of Kosovo’s posi-
tion.  
Since summer 1999 Kosovo has developed a separate from Serbia parlia-
mentary political system, free market economy and adopted a different cur-
rency (the Euro). The economic, social and political situation in Kosovo has 
appreciably improved since separation from Serbia in 1999. It was largely 
due to international assistance (around 21% GNP) and to the Kosovars’ re-
mittances from abroad (roughly 15% of GNP). However the Pristina gov-
ernment still lacks control over Kosovo’s entire territory, borders and popula-
tion. The country has deficient economic viability, suffers from excessive 
external financial dependence and has been burdened by the region-wide 
problems of corruption, illegal trafficking and organized crime. A number of 
Kosovo’s burning political and social problems have remained unresolved. 
Poverty (about 50% of the population) and very high unemployment (about 
45% generally and about 75% among the females and the young)20, poor 
governance, malfunctioning rule of law and the obstacles to free travel pose 
daunting problems to Kosovo’s majority population. 
While reflecting the benevolent involvement and good will by the interna-
tional community the multilevel system of governance in Kosovo had proven 
to be too cumbersome, confusing and rather ineffective in providing for the 
normalization of inter-ethnic relations and for healthy social and economic 
progress in Kosovo. On September 10, 2012 the International Steering Group 
for Kosovo officially terminated the supervision of Kosovo’s limited inde-
pendence and closed the Office of the International Civilian Representative. 
However these symbolic acts have so far brought only moderate change in 
the real functioning of international tutelage over Kosovo. Its entire system is 
comprised at present of over 7000 international military, police and civilian 
personnel, without counting the foreign diplomatic personnel also involved in 
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20 Koro, L. A decade of socio-economic change in Kosovo (2010). In A decade of internatio-
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overseeing Kosovo and, at least, two thousand persons of local staff. A re-
duced Contact group consisting of five Western Ambassadors, supplemented 
by the EU Special Representative has reportedly held regular, weekly meet-
ings with members of the Kosovo government.  
The continuation of the UN mission (UNMIK) in its present form and size 
of 130 international staff has remained highly questionable in view of its 
greatly reduced scope of activities and of importance. At least, its renaming 
and redefinition of tasks have been long overdue. Any substantive reduction, 
let alone discontinuation of UNMIK, and a recommendation by the Security 
Council to the UN General Assembly to admit Kosovo as a member state 
have been prevented by the likelihood of the Russian Federation and China 
exercising their veto power. EULEX has been, so far, the biggest, presently 
about 1.200-strong EU mission in the framework of the EU Common Securi-
ty and Defense Policy. The EU mission’s results in fighting wide-spread cor-
ruption and organized crime in Kosovo have been meagre and hardly com-
mensurable with the annual investment of over € 110 million in its function-
ing. The EULEX mandate was however extended by two years. KFOR’s pre-
sent strength of under 5.000 soldiers, provided by 31 NATO members and 
non-members, and its tasks have been under regular review by the North At-
lantic Council.  
By May 2015 Kosovo has been officially recognized by 108 member 
states of the Organization of United Nations. Included into this tally are three 
permanent members of UN Security Council, more than two thirds of the 
Council of Europe’ membership and all Kosovo’s immediate neighbors and 
all former Yugoslav republics with the exceptions of Serbia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. This evolution allowed for Kosovo’s membership in some in-
ternational organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank and in several regional bodies. However as long as Serbia main-
tains its opposition and the Russian Federation (firmly) and the People’s Re-
public of China (more flexibly) support Serbia’s position Kosovo cannot gain 
a seat in the Organization of United Nations and to enter the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe etc. Although Koso-
vo’s existence has been protected by international forces and its political sur-
vival secured this newcomer in the family of the European nations remains an 
incomplete structure and an “unfinished state”.21  
                                                          
21 Surroi, V. The unfinished state(s) in the Balkans and the EU: the next wave (2011). In Rup-
nik, J., pp. 111-120. 
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The relations between Kosovo and Serbia 
The conflictual relations between Serbia and Kosovo have been symbolically 
reflected in the different ways the latter is officially called. When Kosovo 
became a single administrative unit in 1945, after its annexation into the sec-
ond Yugoslavia (FPRY) it was given a double official name “Kosovo and 
Metokhia”. Since the Albanian Kosovars have rejected its second half as co-
lonial-smacking, the shortened single word designation was adopted in 1963. 
It reflected the enhanced status of an autonomous province within Serbia. 
When in 1989 Kosovo’s autonomy was de facto abolished by the Serbian 
regime under Slobodan Milosevic the double-word name was corresponding-
ly and symbolically reinstated by Belgrade. The present first constitutional 
name of the land is Kosova with the Serbian variation Kosovo as the official 
second name. The state authorities in Serbia and defiant members and organ-
izations of the Serbian minority in Kosovo however still use the double name 
while other states and international organizations utilize the one-word name 
Kosovo or Kosova.  
The detachment and “loss” of Kosovo caused a painful psychological, po-
litical and existential trauma to its Serbian minority and continues to produce 
difficult problems to over a hundred thousand Serbian and Roma refugees in 
Serbia proper. For Serbia Kosovo has represented a problem of psychological 
and political readjustment, a financial “black hole” of several hundred mil-
lion Euros annually, a considerable source of illegal smuggling and of orga-
nized crime (often related to drugs).  
The UN General Assembly’s resolution of September 2010 officially 
sponsored jointly by Serbia and the 27 EU members paved the way to a dia-
logue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical matters, under the auspices 
of the European Union.22 While Kosovo has sought recognition and the es-
tablishment of normal relations with Serbia the former Prime Minister and at 
former Foreign Minister and current Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic had advo-
cated a “readjustment” of borders. It would detach from Kosovo the area of 
around 1000 sq. km to the North of the Ibar River with four municipalities 
(Mitrovica North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic) and up to 40 thou-
sand Serbs. The Western powers, on the other hand, stand firmly by the prin-
ciple of maintaining the internal borders between the former federal units of 
ex-Yugoslavia, including those of the two autonomous provinces. They reject 
redrawing of any of them for the concern that it would open a Pandora box of 
territorial revandication elsewhere in the ex-Yugoslav space. Secondly, it is 
realistically feared that the detachment of Northern Kosovo would unleash a 
                                                          
22 UN General Assembly Resolution 10980 (September 2010). New York: United Nations. 
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mass exodus from the Serbian enclaves to the South of the Ibar River and 
decimate the Serbian minority in Kosovo.  
Another conceivable solution of the conflict has been suggested – a con-
dominium in Northern Kosovo, resembling the Good Friday agreement be-
tween Ireland and the United Kingdom over Ulster. Pristina has rejected any 
power sharing arrangements between Kosovo and Serbia or a tripartite power 
sharing arrangement with EU as they would compromise Kosovo’s inde-
pendence and territorial integrity. In addition a condominium would open the 
question of the adjacent Presevo-Bujanovac area in Southern Serbia which 
historically used to be part of Kosovo. This area has been predominantly in-
habited by ethnic Albanians. The last census for the area gave the figures of 
about 57 thousand Albanian residents who constituted close to 90 percent of 
the total population in the Presevo municipality and about 55 percent in the 
Bujanovac municipality. The present absolute figures and percentages of the 
Albanians are probably still higher. In 1992 in an unofficial referendum about 
95 percent of Albanian residents voted for unification with Kosovo.23 
The overcoming of obstacles on the thorny road of reconciliation and ac-
commodation between the two states has been eased greatly by Serbia’s de-
sire to obtain the status of a candidate country, to open preadmission negotia-
tions and eventually to join the European Union. The subterranean evolution 
of Serbian public opinion has allowed former Serbian ultranationalists, nota-
bly the current President Tomislav Nikoli, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vui 
and Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dai to radically change the course and to 
admit the “loss” of Kosovo.24 Responding to the European Union’s pressure 
and inducements Serbia agreed in 2010 to start bilateral talks with Kosovo on 
outstanding practical problems. Since March 2011 they had been conducted 
under the EU auspices at the level of Prime Ministers and. Serbia’s govern-
ment took a positive step in August 2012 and stopped boycotting regional 
gatherings at which Kosovo was also present. Six rounds of talks in Brussels 
resulted by April 2013 in the conclusion of several agreements on normaliza-
tion of relations without however Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an inde-
pendent state. On the basis of these agreements a de facto self-governing 
Community of Serbian Municipalities was to be created in Northern Kosovo, 
integrated into Kosovo’s constitutional and legal system as well as a North-
ern police region. The agreements obliged Serbia to dissolve its concealed 
security structure in Kosovo and to integrate Serbian policemen in the North 
into the Kosovo police force. These and other relevant provisions in the 
agreements might open the way to and facilitate a revision of the UNSC Res-
olution 1244 or adopting a new one. Following the conclusion of the agree-
ments the European Council granted Serbia the status of a candidate for EU 
                                                          
23 International Crisis Group. Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? ICG Bal-
kans Report No. 116 (10 August 2001). Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, p. 2. 
24 Elisabeth Pond. (2013), p. 7. 
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membership and authorized the opening of negotiations with Kosovo on a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). In April 2013 the two Prime 
Ministers Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci signed in Brussels the “First 
Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” which 
was hailed as a historic achievement. It was concluded with the European’s 
Union facilitation and allowed for EU’s further positive steps and relations 
with both Serbia and Kosovo. However some agreed upon solutions of prac-
tical problems have not be yet implemented. By 2015 there were several 
positive developments in the normalization process – the conclusion of an 
agreement on judiciary and the first visit in Pristina of the Serbian Foreign 
Minister Ivica Dai.  
The Kosovo issue has split the international community, cutting across the 
former East-West divide. In 1999 it posed a serious challenge to NATO’s 
inner political cohesion and badly worsened its relations with the Russian 
Federation. The Alliance was able then to bridge the differences among its 
members and to reach a consensus concerning the pending military action 
against FRY and the KFOR’s subsequent deployment. Eight years after the 
establishment of an international protectorate the problem of Kosovo has 
again divided the EU and NATO members. In 2008 twenty-two EU and 
NATO Member States recognized Kosovo’s independence. A minority, nota-
bly Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia and Romania, have however followed 
Serbia’s position, largely for their internal political reasons. On the question 
of recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia most EU and 
NATO member states as well as the Russian Federation have applied double 
standards honoring the right to self-determination in one case and disregard-
ing in the other(s). 
Since 1998 – 1998 the Kosovo issue has split the international community, 
cutting across the former East-West divide. It posed a serious challenge to 
NATO’s inner political cohesion and badly worsened its relations with the 
Russian Federation. The Alliance was able then to bridge the differences 
among its members and to reach a consensus concerning the pending military 
action against FRY and the KFOR’s subsequent deployment since 1999. 
Eight years after the establishment of international protectorate the problem 
of Kosovo has again divided the EU and NATO members. In 2008 twenty-
two EU and NATO Member States recognized Kosovo’s independence. A 
minority, notably Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia and Romania, have how-
ever followed Serbia’s rejectionist position, largely for their internal political 
reasons. On the question of the recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South-
ern Ossetia most EU and NATO member states as well as the Russian Feder-
ation have applied double standards honoring the right to self-determination 
in one case and disregarding in the other(s). Since the proclamation of Koso-
vo’s independence in February 2008 the Kosovo problem has remained on 
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the agenda of UN Security Council, NATO’s North Atlantic Council, and 
European Union’s Council, the Council of Europe and OSCE. 
On September 10, 2012 the International Steering Group for Kosovo offi-
cially terminated the supervision of Kosovo’s limited independence and 
closed the Office of the International Civilian Representative. However these 
symbolic acts have so far brought a limited change in the functioning of the 
‘de facto’ international protectorate. Although the Kosovar Albanians (sup-
ported by the Kosovar Turks and several other smaller ethnic groups) 
achieved, with the West’s direct support, their historical goal of getting rid of 
Belgrade’s rule Kosovo will remain a controversial regional problem, not 
only for Serbia but also for Macedonia with its numerous Albanian minority. 
The young and very weak state will for many years require external attention 
and assistance of the international community.  
The de facto normalized coexistence of Serbia and Kosovo, even without 
Kosovo’s formal recognition by Serbia has already had positive effects on the 
political climate in the region. By its reasonable and constructive behavior 
the Republic of Serbia has improved its standing with the European Union as 
a candidate country and contributed to the stability in the Western Balkans. 
There was a constructive proposal according to which Serbia and Kosovo 
would regulate their bilateral relations similarly as used to be done in the past 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Re-
public. The sooner the full normalization of relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo happens the better it would be for the entire region and for Europe. 
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The normalization agreements between Kosovo and 
Serbia 
Ilir Deda 
More than six years after the declaration of independence, and two years after 
its supervised independence ended, Kosovo faces two distinct realities re-
garding its statehood and foreign relations: that of an independent entity and 
the one of a sovereign and independent state. It is treated as an independent 
entity in its relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions and majority of states 
which have not recognized Kosovo, while Serbia treats it as both a separate 
territory governed by United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) Resolution 
1244 and as a part of itself. On the other hand, Kosovo is treated as a sover-
eign state only at the bilateral level by the states which have recognized its 
independence. There is thus an imbalance between the scope and intensity of 
bilateral and multilateral relations that reflects the weakness of the current 
international legitimacy of Kosovo and the Western accommodation to a 
“status neutral” policy.  
The Western view of the Pristina-Belgrade endgame is based on an unsub-
stantiated hope that one day Kosovo will be also formally recognized by Ser-
bia. This Western policy is fundamentally flawed. It locks Kosovo in the sit-
uation of unfinished statehood. Demanding continuous internal rearrange-
ments to make Kosovo’s independence acceptable to Serbia while smoothing 
Belgrade’s path to EU accession. Due to this policy Kosovo’s statehood is 
disputed internationally while internally it is forced to continuously transform 
of its state structures. By accepting this anomalous situation Kosovo pays a 
high price for Serbia’s acceptance of it as an independent entity – not a 
state – and unspecified contractual relations with the EU.  
The European Union has played a key role in the process of normalization 
of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Through the Office of the High 
Representative (HR) Catherine Ashton the EU became the sponsor and the 
facilitator of the dialogue. In its conclusions on December 11, 2012 the EU 
Council stated that Kosovo and Serbia needed to improve their relations as 
one of the important criteria for progress on their path towards EU integration 
and should not block one another in these efforts. The two states were also to 
implement in good faith all agreements reached in the dialogue.1 The Repub-
lic of Serbia was requested to: (1) dismantle its illegal justice and police insti-
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General Affairs Council Meeting in Brussels at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
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tutions in Northern Kosovo, (2) make the funding of its sponsored institutions 
in Kosovo transparent, and (3) through improved cooperation with EULEX 
make functional the Mitrovica Court House. The Republic of Kosovo, on the 
other hand, was assured of a single institutional and administrative system 
throughout its entire territory. Kosovo was also obliged to develop an out-
reach plan and address “particular needs” of the local Serbian population in 
Northern Kosovo. In its conclusions, the EU Council expressed its support 
for the political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, welcomed the progress 
made in the implementation of the Integrated Border Management (IBM), the 
decision to appoint liaison persons, the agreement regarding the transparent 
flow of funds to the Serbian community in Kosovo, and the decision of Ko-
sovo to improve the protection of religious and cultural heritage through the 
creation of a special unit within the Kosovo Police.  
In order to strengthen Kosovo’s position in the negotiations, the Assembly 
of Kosovo adopted on 18 October 2012 a “Resolution on Normalization of 
Relations between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia”2. In it 
the Assembly supported the dialogue. It also stated that the results of the dia-
logue should be in accordance with Kosovo’s sovereignty, international sub-
jectivity, territorial integrity and with its constitutional order. Furthermore, 
the resolution stated that the agreements reached in the political dialogue 
should be ratified by the Kosovo Assembly. This resolution was soon violat-
ed further decreasing public trust in the results of the dialogue. The Assembly 
of Kosovo adopted subsequently two more resolutions and in them took three 
contradictory positions on the process of normalization. If it were to be fully 
respected by the Kosovo government the dialogue could have not produced 
any results. 
Meetings between the two sides continued in Brussels, on the premises of 
the EU High Representative. The role of a “facilitator” was considered neces-
sary to keep the process running and to ensure, through the EU policy of a 
“carrot and stick” that agreements are indeed reached and begin being im-
plemented on the ground. Using the appeal of EU accession, Brussels 
strengthened its role as the guarantor of the agreements. On 19 April 2013 
Kosovo and Serbia concluded, the “First Agreement on Principles Governing 
the Normalization of Relations” which was hailed as a historic achievement. 
In May 2013 in a public opinion poll the Kosovars were asked how they 
felt about the agreement struck in April. The Albanian Kosovars were divid-
ed – 43% supported of the agreement, while 38% opposed and 19% were 
undecided or did not reply.3 The Kosovo Serbs were less supportive – those 
                                                          
2 See Assembly of Kosovo documents at http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/
Rezolute_Marredhenive_Kosova_Serbia.pdf. 
3 Kosovar Center for Security Studies, Kosovo Security Barometer – The Voices of Kosovo: 
Insights and Perceptions, May 22, 2013, pg. 11. http://www.qkss.org/en-us/Reports/Koso
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living in Northern Kosovo predominantly opposed the agreement while those 
residing South of Ibar river Ibar predominantly supported it. The “First 
Agreement” was ratified by the Assembly of Kosovo on 27 June 2013, when 
out of 120 MPs 84 voted in favor, 3 against and 1 abstained. 
During thirteen rounds of meetings from 19 October 2012 to 21 June 2013 
Kosovo’s Prime-Minister Hashim Thaci and Serbia’s Prime-Minister Ivica 
Dacic reached a number of agreements: 
 Agreement on the Exchange of Liaison Officers and on a special 
multiethnic Kosovo Police unit to protect the Serbian Religious and 
Cultural Heritage 
The first action of implementation occurred on June 17, 2013 with the de-
ployment of Liaison Officers (LO) in Belgrade and Pristina respectively. On-
ly two days after starting his mission as a Kosovo LO to Belgrade, the former 
Kosovo Ambassador to Sweden, Lulzim Peci, offered his resignation to Ko-
sovo’s President, Atifete Jahjaga. The main reason were the criticisms Koso-
vo Prime-Minister following his statement that the normalization of relations 
will be reached only when Serbia and Kosovo mutually recognize each other 
as sovereign states. On the other hand, the Serbian LO to Kosovo, Dejan Pav-
icevic stated in Pristina that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo. On 20 June 
2013 after Peci’s resignation, Valdet Sadiku, the former Kosovo Ambassador 
to Croatia, was appointed as Kosovo’s LO to Serbia. 
On April 2013 the Kosovo Police has created a two hundred-strong Spe-
cial Multiethnic Kosovo Police Unit. This unit was placed within the Divi-
sion of Special Units, Directorate for the Security of Important Facilities and 
Personalities. The mission of these 200 policemen is to protect externally the 
Cultural Heritage and Religious Facilities. This unit cooperates closely with 
municipalities, police stations and religious clerics. 
 Agreement on a Special Fund for Northern Kosovo 
Since the establishment of the Integrated Border Management posts it was 
required that all goods entering Kosovo were subject to custom duties as re-
quired by the Kosovo laws. The Kosovo Serbs, however, refused to pay du-
ties to the Kosovo budget. On 17 January 2013, the two Prime-Ministers pro-
visionally agreed on the collection of customs duties, levies and VAT with 
Kosovo as a single customs zone. The Kosovo Serbs in the North will begin 
paying customs duties, levies and VAT to the joint Fund for economic and 
infrastructural development of Northern Kosovo. Details of this agreement 
were not however made public with the two sides giving contradictory inter-
pretations. The Kosovo government proposed an amendment to the Kosovo 
Budget Law for 2013. The budgetary implications of this agreement have 
been estimated at around 6 million Euros, with 10 million Euros provided 
additionally by the EU and Serbia. This Fund will be managed by the EU 
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Office in Kosovo, the Kosovo Government, the Community of Serbian mu-
nicipalities while the role of the government of Serbia was left undetermined. 
Southern Mitrovica was excluded from the functioning of the Fund. Instead 
of contributing to interethnic cooperation this exclusion will deepen the eth-
nic division at the Ibar bridge. 
 Agreement on the Principles of Normalization 
On April 19, 2013 a 15 point agreement was reached on the framework of 
Northern Kosovo’s inclusion into the Republic of Kosovo’s legal system. 
The agreement created a de-facto Kosovo Serbian self-governing entity with 
provisions conflicting with Kosovo’s Constitution and applicable laws. Nev-
ertheless on 28 May 2013, the Kosovo government submitted to the Kosovo 
Assembly the plan of its implementation. Under Kosovo’s Constitution inter-
national agreements should be ratified by a two thirds (2/3) majority when 
the issues of territory, peace, alliances, security and military matters, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are considered. Furthermore, international 
agreements ratified by the Kosovo Assembly have precedence over the Con-
stitution and the laws of Kosovo. Since the agreement was initialed as a final 
draft but signed neither by the Serbian Prime-Minister nor by the EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton the question whether this accord could be 
qualified as an international agreement has been a subject of intense internal 
debate.4 Nevertheless on 27 June, 2013 the Assembly of Kosovo ratified the 
agreement as an international agreement with 84 votes in favor, 3 against, 
and 1 abstention. 
 Agreement on the Implementation Plan 
On 21 May 2013 the two Prime-Ministers and the EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton initialed “The Implementation Plan on the Principles Gov-
erning the Normalization of Relations. In it the parties agreed on the estab-
lishment of an Implementation Committee and on deadlines for specific 
measures. 
The Implementation Plan called for the enactment by both Kosovo and 
Serbia by mid-June 2013 of “all necessary legal changes” required for the 
implementation of the First Agreement. On June 18, 2013 the Kosovo As-
sembly amended: the “Law on Local Self-Government” and the “Law on 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members 
in the Republic of Kosovo”. On 25 June 2013 the Government of Kosovo 
approved a draft “Law on Amnesty”. Serbia had conditioned the dissolution 
of its structures in police and judiciary with the passing of this law. It remains 
unclear how many more Kosovo laws will be have to be emended.  
                                                          
4 See First Agreement at http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/3224318/
Originalni%20tekst%20Predloga%20sporazuma.pdf. 
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Article 10 of the Normalization Agreement foresees the integration and 
operation of all judicial authorities within the Kosovo legal framework. Fur-
thermore, according to the agreement the Appellate Court in Pristina will 
establish a division to deal with the municipalities containing a Kosovo Ser-
bian majority. Its administrative staff and judges will be sitting permanently 
in Northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). Each panel of the above 
division will have a majority of Kosovo Serbian judges. Thus the Agreement 
creates a de-facto separate Kosovo Serbian Appellate Court. In accordance 
with the agreement, Serbia instructed the branch of its Appellate Court in 
Northern Mitrovica to stop accepting new cases on 15 July, 2013 and to solve 
as many received cases as possible by 31 August 2013. The employment of 
its personnel by Serbia was to be terminated by 1 September, 2013. 
The Article 124, Chapter 10 of the Constitution of Kosovo, incorporates 
two distinct and separate forms of municipal cooperation derived from 
Ahtisaari’s Plan5. The first is through an association of municipalities, and 
the second through municipal partnerships. An association can be created by 
several municipalities to offer training, capacity building, technical assis-
tance, policy research and policy recommendations to municipalities. Such an 
association is a non-profit organization offering services, organizing and co-
ordinating activities of its members and promoting inter-municipal coopera-
tion. The second – municipal partnerships – can be formed between two or 
more municipalities to provide joint services. Through partnerships munici-
palities can cooperate within their own or enhanced competencies, but not on 
delegated ones. Through partnerships municipalities can jointly execute their 
competencies and provide joint services, but not through an association of 
municipalities.  
The Normalization Agreement merged the two forms of municipal coop-
eration – the associations and partnerships, by explicitly allowing the Kosovo 
Serbian municipalities to collectively exercise joint governance through the 
Community of Serbian Municipalities in its own, enhanced and delegated 
competencies. The Agreement listed four distinct executive competencies of 
the Community of Serbian Municipalities (ZSO) in economic development, 
education, health, urban and rural planning. The ZSO will be governed by the 
Statute of the ZSO; will have a President, Vice-President, Assembly and a 
Council. The ZSO may dissolve itself only with an approval of the participat-
ing municipalities. In addition to these powers, the ZSO will also have a rep-
resentative role as a separate entity at Kosovo’s central institutions and for 
this purpose have a separate seat at the President’s Consultative Council of 
Communities. Also, the ZSO, jointly with the EU and the Kosovo Govern-
ment, will manage the “Fund for the North”. It will receive separate funds 
from Serbia; can obtain additional delegated competencies by Serbia after it 
                                                          
5 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter X, article 124 (Local Government and 
territorial organization). 
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enacts its constitutional law. Furthermore, in Northern Kosovo there will be a 
new company that will produce electricity and provide distribution services 
to customers in the four northern municipalities with Serbian majorities. This 
company will be able to buy and sell electricity on the open market, inde-
pendently from the KEDS in Pristina. The entire territory of the future ZSO 
and other Kosovo Serbian settlements will be provided with telephone ser-
vices by separate, subsidiaries of Serbia’s companies. 
The Implementation Plan called for the creation of a Management Team 
by both parties for the establishment of the ZSO by the end of May, 2014. On 
14 June 2013 the Government of Serbia appointed the four-member ZSO 
Management Team. It has created a precedent of Serbia’s role in the future 
concurrent governance with Pristina in Northern Kosovo. However the gov-
ernment of Kosovo has not officially confirmed the Management Team as the 
Implementation plan envisaged. This Management Team was to draft the 
Statute of the ZSO. The Kosovo “Law on Local Self-Government”, contains 
provisions for the ZSO, including those on its general scope of activities and 
on its dissolution. The amended “Law on Protection and Promotion of Com-
munities and their Members” provides for the representation of the ZSO in 
the Community Consultative Council (CCC) at the Office of the President of 
Kosovo (OP). Pristina and Belgrade still have to produce a detailed plan and 
timetable for the integration of the Serbian security personnel into Kosovo 
structures and for the establishment of any new structures to be carried out 
with the assistance of EULEX. 
The Normalization Agreement creates a Northern police region composed 
of four municipalities: Mitrovica North, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic, 
with a Kosovo Serbian regional police commander. Unlike the other regional 
commanders in Kosovo the Serbian regional commander will be proposed by 
the four mayors on behalf of the ZSO. He will be appointed by the Kosovo 
Ministry of Internal Affairs bypassing the Director General of the Kosovo 
Police (DG) who normally selects all regional commanders. The Implementa-
tion plan called for the establishment of a joint Kosovo-Serbia working group 
to implement Articles 7-9 of the First Agreement, and for the appointment by 
the end of May, 2013 of an Acting Regional Police Commander for four 
northern municipalities. Following a meeting of the two Prime Ministers in 
Brussels on 20 June 2013, on a proposal by Belgrade on behalf of ZSO and 
northern municipalities the Kosovo Minister of Interior Bajram Rexhepi ap-
pointed an acting Police Director for the four Northern municipalities. There 
was, however, no legal basis for this appointment as the person was not nom-
inated by the Director General of the Police. Furthermore this appointee Ne-
nad Djuric was in 2011 dismissed from the Kosovo Police on an explicit pro-
posal by the Director General and by the same minister. The grounds for the 
dismissal were his misconduct, disobedience and abeting criminal activities. 
Nenad Djuric’s new appointment was made even prior the vote on the “Am-
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nesty Law” by the Kosovo Assembly. Serbia disclosed later the names of its 
800 security personnel in Northern Kosovo and in accordance with the Nor-
malization Agreement allowed for their full integration in to Kosovo’s rele-
vant institutions. 
The Normalization Agreement creates a de-facto separate Kosovo Serbian 
authority with conflicting legal guarantees by Kosovo laws and Serbia’s con-
stitutional law. In a situation where Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s in-
dependence this new body will function within a hybrid status framework, 
deriving its legality and legitimacy from two contradictory constitutions. It 
will mean in fact a shared sovereignty and co-governance by Kosovo and 
Serbia over the Kosovo Serbs. The Normalization Agreement legalized an 
institutional separation of the Kosovo Serbs from other ethnic communities 
thus undoing the efforts by the international community to build Kosovo as a 
multi-ethnic society and state. The Agreement went far from the Ahtisaari’s 
Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) by laying down the foundation for a 
new character of our young state. Instead of a multi-ethnic society the Brus-
sels Agreement transforms Kosovo into an unfinished bi-national state. This 
Normalization Agreement also showed the inability of the central Kosovo 
institutions to build a true partnership with the Kosovo Serbs South of the 
Ibar river and penalized them for the unfinished process of decentralization. 
The Normalization Agreement reflected the inability and/or lack of will of 
both the Kosovo Albanian leadership and of the international community to 
build true multi-ethnic institutions. Ultimately, it has allowed Belgrade to 
maintain the separation of the Kosovo Serbs from Pristina.  
On 28 June, 2013, the European Council decided to open the accession 
negotiations with Serbia at the latest by January 2014, pending full imple-
mentation of the Normalization Agreement. It also authorized the opening of 
negotiations with Kosovo on a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA). The EU thus rewarded Kosovo and Serbia for the positive steps taken 
to normalize their relations. In January 2014 the EU Council confirmed its 
decision to begin accession negotiations with Serbia and its intention to con-
clude a SAA with Kosovo. 
The Implementation Plan envisaged holding local elections in Northern 
Kosovo in October 2013. The elections were in fact held on 3 November, 
2013, and the runoff on 1 December, 2013. The Kosovo Serbian political 
scene has undergone the most dramatic political change. Belgrade created, 
sponsored and financed the Civic Initiative “Srpska” (GIS) dominated by 
affiliates of Serbia’s governing parties. This coalition won in nine out of ten 
municipalities with Kosovo Serbian majorities. This victory has marginalized 
the Kosovo Serbian Independent Liberal Party (SLS) and all other Serbian 
political groups. As a consequence Belgrade has become a direct political 
actor and an important stakeholder in Kosovo’s domestic politics. The GIS 
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will probably become the dominant political force among the Kosovo Serbs 
thus making Serbia a de-facto partner in the future government of Kosovo.  
The current framework of the dialogue freezes the status quo by legalizing 
Kosovo’s internal partition and making normalization sustainable in the short 
run, but with the possibility for a potential conflict in the long run. Therefore, 
the current dialogue need to be modified in order to create conditions for true 
normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and to diminish the 
potential of regional destabilization. As an interim solution for the manage-
ment of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, until Serbia’s formal recogni-
tion of Kosovo, the following elements should be included into a possible, 
legally binding treaty on normalization of relations:  
a) Serbia would be explicitly and legally obliged not to consider Kosovo 
(or the ZSO) as part of its territory and of its constitutional and legal 
framework;  
b) Serbia would remove Kosovo from its national defense strategy, 
where it defined Kosovo as the main threat and act accordingly.  
c) Kosovo’s full membership in the UN and all other international organ-
izations should be explicitly allowed, making the question of Koso-
vo’s independence obsolete for the five EU non-recognizers.  
Finally, the above-stated provisions would enable the UN Security Council 
either to amend the Resolution 1244, or to adopt a new one based on the pro-
visions of this treaty. 
 
The Kosovo Serbs and normalization 
Oliver Ivanovi 
Since the last local elections in Kosovo, everything remains the same yet is 
completely different. Although the agreements between Belgrade and Pristina 
on police integration and partly on the judiciary were achieved earlier, the 
key element in the Brussels Agreement was essentially the holding of demo-
cratic, free and fair local elections, which would be organized according to 
legal regulations of Pristina and not those of Serbia. The Chief outcome of 
the agreement will be municipal self-government in municipalities with Ser-
bian majorities which from now on would operate under Kosovo’s laws. At 
the same time the elections in December 2013 confirmed that the government 
of Serbia remains the most influential stakeholder among the Kosovo Serbs. 
This is due to the fact that out of ten municipalities with Serbian majorities in 
nine the mayors-elect were nominated on the “Srpska” electoral ticket which 
was directly and more than obviously promoted and supported by Belgrade. 
In fact, by putting all its resources, from logistics to financial means, at the 
“Srpska” disposal the government of Serbia wished to demonstrate the extent 
of its influence in Kosovo also in the election process.  
This influence is a reality which even the Pristina authorities cannot deny. 
Whether they like it or not, they will have in the future to discuss everything 
with representatives of the Kosovo Serbian local self-government who are 
essentially exponents of the Republic of Serbia’s government. This outcome 
could have two sides. The upside is the strengthening of the homogeneity of 
our Kosovo Serbian community on common standpoints concerning all polit-
ically sensitive issues. The downside could be however exploiting this influ-
ence in order to prevent the formation of an authentic and autonomous Serbi-
an political opinion in Kosovo. We shall see very soon whether the develop-
ment of anything resembling a free Kosovo Serbian thought will be allowed 
at all. The alternative would result in maintaining in Kosovo mere affiliates 
of Belgrade’s political parties who would have only limited autonomy in 
making even the simplest decisions. 
The elections to the Serbian Assembly have always been very important 
for the Serbian communities in Kosovo. The participation of the Kosovo 
Serbs, even in smallest numbers has maintained the feeling of participation in 
the public and political life of the only state they considered to be their own. 
Their influence on the power balance in Serbia has been however minimal. 
Considering the average turnout of 40,000 voters, in addition dispersed 
among five or six political parties, this impact could be hardly stronger. Yet, 
even mere participation in Serbia’s elections meant has psychologically a lot 
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to the Kosovo Serbs. For political parties in Serbia it was also important, if 
only in words, in order to show that Kosovo remained high on their declared 
priority lists. 
Any attempt to ban these elections in Kosovo would cause an enormous 
indignation among the Kosovo Serbs and would have direct and negative 
consequences for their future relations with the common institutions in Koso-
vo and with the international community. I do not rule out the possibility that 
Pristina will undertake in this connection its own political maneuvers. For 
example, it could request as a measure of reciprocity that the Albanians in 
southern Serbia be allowed to cast their ballots in the forthcoming parliamen-
tary elections in Kosovo. However, there can be no reciprocity in these mat-
ters. There were already similar attempts by Pristina as it has tried to draw a 
parallel between the position of the Albanians in southern Serbia and that of 
the Kosovo Serbs. All these requests have been stonewalled. 
I believe that for the Kosovo Serbs the functioning of the Community of 
Serbian Municipalities (CSM) is more politically important than their partici-
pation in Serbia’s and Kosovo’s parliamentary elections, since they will be 
more dependent on it than on either of the two parliaments. It should be kept 
in mind that by accepting the Brussels Agreement Serbia has renounced its 
direct funding of the Serbian communities in Kosovo. Consequently all Ko-
sovo Serbian institutions of health, education, culture, media and social wel-
fare will be heretofore financed through the CSM. There is also no doubt that 
on the basis of the Brussels Agreement the CSM will become an important 
political institution. Although without legislative prerogatives it will have 
considerable executive powers. The most important for the Kosovo Serbs 
will be that they will have a representative body virtually in charge of all lo-
cal affairs. There is no doubt however that the strength of the Community 
will be highly dependent on its leaders. Namely in our part of the Balkans 
there is still a valid rule that an institution is as significant as the credibility 
its leaders. It is thus normal to expect that a clear picture will appear only 
after all local elections, including those in Kosovska Mitrovica. The Republic 
of Serbia’s government lacks a clear concept of the CSM and still wanders 
between the previous delegated and a new combined representative model. It 
cannot any more decide on its own but is forced to consult with the Pristina 
authorities and with the international community, primarily with Brussels. It 
is quite clear that the Community of Serbian Municipalities, if established 
properly, and with a clear framework, program and vision would be a true 
partner of the government of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, Bel-
grade would be the only capital which the CSM would address without any 
hesitation. 
For the moment the Kosovo Serbs do not have the same political interests 
as the Pristina authorities. However common day-to-day needs will stimulate 
activities to assure a better life in entire Kosovo. And this is why the CSM 
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needs to work together with Pristina on the shared pragmatic objectives. But 
any unacceptable demand either by Pristina or by Brussels will meet stiff 
opposition by the CMS. It should be kept in mind that the very existence of 
the CMS will no doubt reduce Pristina’s impact on day-to-day lives of the 
Kosovo Serbs. The Kosovo Serbs will never agree with Kosovo’s separation 
from Serbia, but the level and manifestations of their opposition will depend 
on where they live and work to the north or to the south of the Ibar River. It 
will also depend on one’s personal position, occupation, place of work, on 
whether one’s company’s owner is a Serb or an Albanian etc.  
The Brussels Agreement was signed by Belgrade with Pristina. One of its 
tests is the integration of Kosovo Serbian police officers into the Kosovo 
Police. I doubt that many of them will indeed enter the system which is not 
only new to them but also illegitimate. A no less sensitive subject is the inte-
gration of judiciary, since there is no room for all, almost 400 Kosovo Serbi-
an judges and prosecutors who were so far on the Republic of Serbia’s pay-
roll. Moreover they will have to learn new, Kosovo’s laws and to act accord-
ing to them. This is due to a provision in the Brussels Agreement by which 
Serbia agreed to have Kosovo laws implemented throughout Kosovo’s terri-
tory. Still, the hardest for us, the Kosovo Serbs will be to accept the Kosovo 
Security Force since it has been most directly linked to the former Kosovo 
Liberation Army. The latter was responsible in the past for many crimes 
against the Kosovo Serbs and was previously declared by Serbia’s authorities 
to be a terrorist organization. 
The mayors and counsellors elected in November 2013 have been torn be-
tween their yesterday’s mode of thinking exclusively within the framework 
of the Republic of Serbia’s system, Serbia’s laws and their strong ties to offi-
cial Belgrade and, on the other hand, the present Kosovo system and its laws. 
The international community wishes to see soon the full integration of the 
Kosovo Serbs into the Republic of Kosovo’s system, society, public and po-
litical life. It is willing to support and stimulate this integration by channeling 
considerable funds, especially to Northern Kosovo. Inspite the undisputed 
benefits of rebuilding Kosovo’s infrastructure I am afraid that the whole en-
deavor is based on the false premise that the Kosovo Serbs’ acquiescence 
could be bought. 
Since thousands of Kosovo Serbs are being taken off the Republic of Ser-
bia’s payrolls there is a threat of social instability in the Serbian-inhabited 
areas of Kosovo. Many Kosovo Serbs are yet to be convinced that state em-
ployment is not the only mode of providing for living but they should engage 
themselves also in small private enterprises, in crafts, trade, agriculture etc. 
Of course, all these activities require prerequisites and, above all, initial fi-
nancing. In this regard the assistance by the Republic of Serbia’s govern-
ment, by the international community, and by the Kosovo government is in-
dispensable. This assistance should not be given for propaganda purposes but 
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ought to be an act of responsible authorities regardless whether they are in 
Belgrade, Pristina or Brussels. These authorities should manage the conse-
quences of the tectonic change for the Kosovo Serbs. Independent Kosovo is 
a reality that cannot be ignored any more and we have to work towards the 
creation of a better living in Kosovo. This requires the building of mutual 
trust which takes time and efforts but could be easily destroyed. Until recent-
ly the Kosovo Serbs believed to have lived in Serbia but from now on, alt-
hough remaining loyal citizens of Serbia, they will have to live under Koso-
vo’s laws and regulations. 
 
Serbia’s Recognizing Realities 
Sonja Biserko 
The normalization agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, signed on April 
19, 2013 has been crucial for both regional and bilateral stabilization. The 
agreement put an end to the region’s fragmentation along ethnic lines and to 
the illusion of Serbia’s political and intellectual elites that a shift in interna-
tional constellation would play into Serbia’s hands and enable a partition of 
Kosovo. A “historical agreement” with the Kosovo-Albanians implying the 
partition scenario for Kosovo has been planned from the very beginning of 
ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Refraining from openly advocating this op-
tion Belgrade hypocritically insisted on the inseparability of its “south prov-
ince” as cemented by Serbia’s Constitution of 2006. Actually Belgrade has 
been adjusting its Kosovo policy to the one for Bosnia-Herzegovina while 
waiting for the right moment to come up openly with the partition scenario. 
Ivica Dai finally uttered it in spring 2011. Other officials such as Foreign 
Minister Vuk Jeremic followed in his footsteps. The normalization agreement 
however practically guarantees Pristina’s sovereignty over the entire territory 
of Kosovo and implements the provisions of the 2007 Ahtisaari plan for the 
autonomy of the Serbian community. 
The fact that EU practically imposed the agreement on the official Bel-
grade does not make it less important. The years-long negotiation process 
was opened by the previous Serbian government headed by the Democratic 
Party which concluded several “technical” agreements with Pristina. The 
advisory opinion on Kosovo by the International Court of Justice stating that 
its declaration of independence did not violate international law (2010) pro-
vided a legal basis for the negotiations.  
Faced with strong resistance from the conservative bloc and the grey zone 
of politics, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic skillfully manewered between Brus-
sels’ requests and domestic criticism. The ruling coalition – having itself 
travelled a long path from a denial to an acceptance – obtained domestically 
significant political legitimacy due to the political turn. The Serbian govern-
ment confirmed the agreement only two days after it was initialled in Brus-
sels, while the parliament ratified it with 173 votes out of 250. A political 
consensus was very high with almost all opposition parties backing the 
agreement. Only Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia /DSS/ voted against 
it. The anti-European forces which, apart from DSS, included the Serbian 
Radical Party, unrepresented in the parliament, and various right-wing 
groups, failed to stage massive protests aimed at annulling the agreement. 
Not even with the Serbian Orthodox Church’s open support this part of Ser-
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bia’s social and political scene could not prevent the almost smooth political 
turnabout concerning Kosovo. The leaders of Serbian municipalities in 
Northern Kosovo also raised their voice against the agreement, threatened 
with a referendum but missed the mark.  
All relevant international actors as well as the pro-European part of the 
Serbian civil society welcomed the conclusion of the Belgrade – Pristina 
agreement. The support from the Serbs south of the Ibar river was also ex-
tremely important during the whole negotiating process. 
The first eight rounds of talks between Serbia’s and Kosovo’s Prime Min-
isters Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci settled some key issues such as integrat-
ed border management,1 especially sensitive at the two “most sensitive” 
crossings – Brnjak and Jarinje. The border management agreement tipped the 
balance in the entire negotiating process. The seventh round was the most 
difficult test of Belgrade’s cooperativeness as the Serbian side had to give up 
the partition scenario for Kosovo on which it had insisted from the very be-
ginning. In the turmoil on Serbia’s political scene two positions crystallized: 
a pragmatic stand of Ivica Dacic, on one hand, and, on the other, a strong 
anti-European and xenophobic stand of influential conservative circles who 
counted on President Tomislav Nikolic’s support. The encounters in Brussels 
between I. Dacic and H. Thaci gradually prepared the Serbian public opinion 
to accept the normalization of relations with Pristina as unavoidable. This 
gave the government an alibi to move on.  
Concessions made by Belgrade did not undermine the normalization 
agreement’s strategic dimension – a definite withdrawal of Serbia and of its 
institutions from Northern Kosovo. What Belgrade called “a maximum under 
given circumstances” refered to the fact that only four municipalities with a 
Serbian majority population (and only Northern Mitrovica) will make an au-
tonomous entity in Northern Kosovo and that this community of municipali-
ties will have institutions of its own. According to official Belgrade a major 
accomplishments of the normalization agreement is the Serbian community’s 
right to nominate a regional police commander and to have an appellate court 
in Northern Mitrovica. Finally, Serbia asked for and obtained NATO’s guar-
antees that the Kosovo security forces would not enter and operate in North-
ern Kosovo without the Serbian community’s consent, unless specifically 
ordered by the North Atlantic Alliance. 
After 25 years of an irrational hegemonistic policy the Serbian elites final-
ly changed the course. “Knin, Vukovar, Bosnia, Kosovo were all parts of a 
problem without a solution which did not allow us to deal with other mat-
ters”, wrote Prime Minister Ivica Dacic in his article for the daily Politika. 
Thanks also to correct media coverage of the Brussels negotiations the Serbi-
an public finally calmly recognized the reality.  
                                                          
1 It means that the parties will gradually set up the joint, integrated, single and secure posts at 
all their common crossing points and EULEX will be present. 
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In the 1980s the Serbian Orthodox Church had played a major role in ad-
vocating the policy of conflict and strongly influenced all Serbian govern-
ments. During the dramatic parliamentary debate on the Brussels Agreement 
the Church published Patriarch Irinej’s appeal on behalf of the Holy Synod 
and of its believers. The Patriarch directly requested the three highest state 
officials – President, Prime Minister and Vice-Prime Minister – to keep their 
“promises made during the election campaign and in the post-election period 
to never and on no account surrender, betray or sell Kosovo and Mehotija, 
the historical ‘Old Serbia’.”2 “We shall not accept Europe’s invitation condi-
tioned by Kosovo. If they expect us to abandon and surrender Kosovo we 
shall respond with ‘no, thank you’ and persevere with the hard and painful 
life of the past five hundred years”, stated the Patriarch repeating the 
Church’s most frequently used argument against the normaliazation agree-
ment.3 Prime Minister I. Dacic called the appeal superfluous. He retorted 
harshly that the church should not tell the people “we all should be crucified 
and suffer for the next 500 years to see cloudless skies”. He also reminded 
the church dignitaries that their message was not sent from Pe but from Bel-
grade. “This means that the Serb Patriarchs abandoned Kosovo already in 
1690”.4 This time the Church suffered a clear defeat. The government made 
the Church understand that there was no place for it any more in Serbian poli-
tics. As the crucial decision drew closer the Church’s laic allies noticed that it 
calmed down its Kosovo-related rethoric and openly criticized the Church’s 
opportunism.  
Fortunately the incumbent Serbian leaders in the North failed to prevent 
the signing of the agreement despite raised tensions, barricades and incidents 
they organized and threats they made. They could still obstruct the imple-
mentation of the agreement in a variety of ways. However it is evident that 
they lost Belgrade’s support for operating within Serbia’s institutional system 
and the power to mobilize their own people for subverting regional stability. 
The success of implementation will depend primarily on the resolutenees of 
Serbia’s ruling coalition’s to pursue normalization. The head of the DSS par-
liamentary caucus Slobodan Samardži stated: “All we can look forward to is 
the non-implementation of the agreement. Now that you have signed it you 
are guilty of treason in the true sense of the word. You have betrayed national 
interests, … giving up our territory and people …You have promised to help 
them, but you will be helping them as you helped the Serbs in Romania, 
Hungary, Bosnia, Croatia, etc.”5 The conservative bloc was disappointed by 
the fact that the Serbian Progressive Party, once in power failed to effect a 
                                                          
2 Danas, April 8, 2013. 
3 S. http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/272343/Pravda-za-srpske-zrtve-Parastos-protiv-
presude-Haga.  
4 Politika, April 8, 2013.  
5 Parliamentary debate of April 13, 2013.  
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clear break with the previous “treacherous” policy of the Democratic Party 
and of its then leader Boris Tadic. The conservative bloc’s advocacy of form-
ing a “strong patriotic bloc” as “a genuine opposition and a new force on the 
Serbian political scene” sounds today like a pipedream. 
The historic agreement between Serbia and Kosovo opened the way to re-
gional peace, stability and good neighborly relations. The biggest challenge 
for the Serbian side has been the implementation of the Brussels agreement 
and closing down its parallel institutions in Northern Kosovo, above all the 
security structures whose presence the Serbian government had long denied. 
The Brussels Agreement as a whole provides Serbia with an opportunity to 
exert considerable influence on Kosovo parliament and local self-government 
institutions. On the other hand, its influence is slight when it comes to pro-
tecting Serbian cultural identity because the Serbian community does not 
accept the status of a national minority.  
The normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations has been burdened with 
insufficient capabilities on both sides, high expectations and relatively tight 
deadlines – in the first place for changing both communities’ mindsets. The 
predominant Serbian mindset6 is reflected in the statement by Serbia’s Presi-
dent Tomislav Nikolic, “We are aware that we can hardly survive without 
membership of EU but we are also aware that we cannot survive at all with-
out Kosovo and Metokhia.”7 Given resistance to normalization within the 
government itself Belgrade might well slow down the process of normaliza-
tion. Civil society in Serbia can play an important role in monitoring the 
Brussels agreements and in developing good neighborey relations, primarily 
through educational outreach programs. The Serbia-Kosovo relations cannot 
be stable as long as negative steretypes about the Albanian Kosovars predo-
minate in Serbian citizens’ perception. The biggest challenge will be to acti-
vate the Kosovo Serbian forces willing to work for the integration of Nothern 
Kosovo into Kosovo’s legal system thus helping the Serbs in Nothern Koso-
vo to easier accept and live up with the Brussels agreements. 
The Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s canceling the South Stream project once 
again challenged Serbia’s “both EU and Russia” policy, similar to the once 
“both Kosovo and EU” mantra. Considering Serbia’s candidacy status for EU 
membership, the country is under growing pressure to adjust its international 
posture to EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Prime Minister A. 
Vucic stated that Serbia supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. On the other 
hand, he and President T. Nikolic keep avoiding to condemn publicly Cri-
mea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation by Russia.  
 
                                                          
6 Ethnic discrimination, verbal and physical attacks against “different” persons or groups in 
the Balkans countries is still a reality.  
7 S. http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:454249-Nikolic-Tesko-
cemo-preziveti-bez-EU-a-bez-KiM-ne-mozemo. 
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Crimea and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict 
Anton Bebler 
The most recent addition to the list of “frozen” conflicts in Europe appeared 
in spring 2014 – the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over Crimea. This conflict 
has been closely related to the attempted secessions from Ukraine of the 
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” and to 
the armed violence in Eastern Ukraine in which the Russian Federation has 
been heavily implicated. However the latter conflicts differ in some respects 
from the Crimean conflict.  
Like four other conflicts reviewed in the preceding chapters, Crimea is ge-
ographically located on the Southern periphery of the former Soviet Union. 
Substantively, the newest conflict bears a number of similarities with the four 
other ex-Soviet cases. The ex-Soviet entities involved in these conflicts share 
up to a two centuries-long history of Russian imperialism and, subsequently, 
of Soviet communist rule. The Russian rule of these entities was preceded by 
up to three centuries of direct Ottoman rule or of strong dependency on the 
Subleme Porte. In the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, following Russian victo-
ries in several wars against the Ottomans the five lands were militarily con-
quered by or ceded to and then annexed by the Russian Empire. Russian ex-
pansion in the Black Sea region and in the Caucasus had been strongly op-
posed by the Western powers – Great Britain, France and Austria/Austro-
Hungary. This opposition began in the mid-XIX century and resulted in a 
direct military confrontation, fought mostly on Crimea. 
The immediate pretext for the Crimean War was the Russian occupation of 
two Danubian principalities Wallachia and Moldavia. In January 1854 the 
British and French fleets demonstratively sailed into the Black Sea. Follow-
ing a Russian rejection of the British ultimatum to withdraw Russian troops 
from the principalities (territory that is today’s Romania and Moldova), Great 
Britain and France declared war on Russia. In September 1854 almost one 
million Ottoman, French and British troops landed on Crimea and started a 
yearlong siege of the Russian stronghold Sevastopol. In January 1855 the 
Kingdom of Sardinia joined the coalition. The anti-Russian coalition suffered 
staggering losses of over 300 thousand dead soldiers, due mostly to disease. 
The Western powers and the Ottomans won the war against the Russian Ar-
my (which lost about 400 thousand soldiers) achieved the destruction of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet and of the fortress Sevastopol, as well as the military 
neutralization of the Black Sea. Austria’s threat to join the coalition forced 
nevertheless the Russian government to withdraw its troops from the Danubi-
an principalities. The Russian Empire lost its hegemonic role in the defunct 
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“Holy Alliance” but the Western powers failed, to dislodge Russia from Cri-
mea. All of this happened in a geostrategic environment very different from 
the present one. Almost 160 years later no one in the West even thought of 
undertaking a similar operation against the Russian Federation. 
The newest conflict in and over Crimea has developed since 1991 along 
the porous ethnic, linguistic and cultural line within a young successor state 
of the Soviet Union, other than the Russian Federation. In Ukraine this line 
has separated a majority within the titular nation, on the one hand, and a con-
siderable part of the strong Russian-speaking minority, on the other hand. 
This “Russian” population has constituted however a strong local minority or 
a regional majority in parts of that successor state – in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine and on Crimea. This particularity explains why the conflict in 
Ukraine bears resemblance with the Serbian armed secessions in Croatia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1991-1995. In two other ex-Soviet cases – in Ab-
khazia and Southern Ossetia – the political divide has separated a titular ma-
jority non-Russian nation (the Georgians) from two non-Russian minorities 
living in provinces bordering the Russian Federation, whose members were 
massively given Russian passports. In four out of the five cases considered, 
the presence of the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of a legally inde-
pendent successor state offered not only psychological comfort but also, 
when needed or feared, physical protection to separatists. This protection 
allowed the parastates to carry out illegal referenda, to proclaim and subse-
quently defend the secession. In four cases, the separatists pleaded for and 
received the Russian Federation’s protection.  
Crimea became legally an exception. Unlike in three other cases, it was 
promptly admitted and became reunited with the Russian Federation. This 
exception can be chiefly explained by Russia’s wider geostrategic interests. 
Also historically, for about 168 years, Crimea had been an integral part of 
imperial Russia and, after 1921, of the Russian Soviet Federation. Psycholog-
ically, Crimea is much closer to the hearts of many Russians and particularly 
of the Russian military than any of the four other ex-Soviet territories. Trans-
nistria’s additional drawbacks are related to its territorial discontinuity with 
the Russian Federation, to the landlocked position and awkward configura-
tion of its narrow strip of land on the left bank of the River Dnester. The 
main reasons for not also annexing Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia seem to 
be primarily diplomatic ones, the desire of the Russian government to mend 
its relations with Georgia and the fact that neither of the two populations be-
longs ethnically or culturally to the Russian diaspora. 
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The historic background of the conflict 
Since antiquity and until 2014, the entire territory of Crimea or its parts were 
ruled by many other states and empires, by the Greeks, Bulgars, Scythians, 
Romans, Gots, Huns, Khazars, Kievan Rus, the Byzantine Empire, Venice, 
Genoa, Kipchaks, the Mongol Golden Horde, the Ottoman Empire, the Rus-
sian Empire, Soviet Russia, the Soviet Union, Germany, the Soviet Union 
again and Ukraine. In its long history, Crimea has only been an independent 
state for less than four decades.  
The two leaders involved in the newest conflict over Crimea – Ukrainian 
President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin – both 
represent Slavic nations. However, the present dispute is about the territory 
of the peninsula bearing the name Krim or Krym, which in their closely relat-
ed Eastern Slavic languages was derived from the Turkic word qirim. In the 
XIII century this name was given initially to the capital of a province ruled 
by the Tatar-Mongol Golden Horde. The more ancient Greek name of that 
land Tauris/Taurica, as well as the Hellenic names of Sevastopol, Simfero-
pol, Feodosia and other towns remind of the most ancient recorded inhabit-
ants of Crimea – the Tauris and the Greeks.  
Crimea became a colony of the Russian Empire in the late XVIIIth century 
as a result of Russian victories in wars with the Ottoman Empire. After its 
outright annexation by Russia in April 1783 Crimea was given a new name – 
the Taurida governorate. To the official title of the Russian Empress Cathe-
rine the Second a new title was added – “Empress of Tauridian Hersonis”, 
with a new, Tauridian coat of arms. The renaming of the peninsula and of the 
main towns into former or entirely new Hellenic designations had an im-
portant political meaning. The eradication of the Tatar-Mongol, Ottoman and 
Islamic heritage expressed also symbolically a Christian Reconquista of the 
lands occupied by the Moslems. In this endeavour Russia was then supported 
by Austria. On her first and triumphant trip to Crimea in spring 1787 the 
German-born Catherine the Second was accompanied by the Austrian Em-
peror Joseph the Second. Giving the peninsula a Hellenic name expressed the 
Russian Empire’s intention of liberating all Greeks of Ottoman rule, of re-
conquering Constantipol (renamed by the Turks in 1930 into Istanbul) and 
restoring the Byzantine Empire with Catherine’s younger grandson, unacci-
dentally named by her Konstantin as Emperor. The new, additional imperial 
title reflected Catherine’s grand geopolitical objective of claiming for Russia 
the Byzantine heritage in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.  
The Russian conquest was followed by mass summary executions, the ex-
odus and expulsion of Muslim Tatars and Turks, the demolition or conver-
sion of most mosques and other Islamic monuments and the disbanding of all 
Islamic institutions. Numerous wars, the Russian imperial and later Soviet 
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rule have dramatically changed Crimea – demographically, culturally, eco-
nomically and politically. In the XIXth and XXth centuries, the Russification 
of the Crimean population has been carried out through massive resettlement 
of ethnic Russians and of already Russified subjects from central and north-
ern Russia, through public schools and administration, obligatory military 
service, Orthodox Christianization and later through Russian mass media 
controlled by the Soviet communist regime etc. By 1945 the entire Tatar, 
Greek and Bulgarian minorities were, often brutally, deported and Crimea’s 
population almost fully Slavicized and mostly Russified. It is estimated that 
nearly a half of the deported Crimean Tatars died during and immediately 
following the deportation to Central Asia. Unlike other deported minorities, 
the Tatars were for several decades banned from Crimea. Although legally 
rehabilitated in 1967 and since December 1991 allowed to return to their 
homeland, they still have not been compensated for the losses of life and 
property.  
The legal status of Crimea from 1917 to 2014 
Since the collapse of the Russian Empire, two revolutions in 1917 and the 
end of the Russian Civil War, the official name and the legal status of the 
peninsula has changed many times. The Russian Bosheviki replaced many of 
the previously official imperial names of provinces and cities with new ones. 
As an expression of the new nationality policy and a friendly gesture towards 
Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey, the previous official designation of the peninsula 
Taurida was replaced with a Turkic name, Krym. In October 1921, the Cri-
mean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed as a unit of the 
Russian SFSR. The new name and autonomous status were related to the 
presence of the then still sizeable non-Russian minorities. In 1922, Crimea 
became incorporated into the Soviet Union and remained within the USSR 
until its dissolution in December 1991. The only exception was the period 
from late summer 1941 until spring 1944. Most of Crimea had been then oc-
cupied by the Third Reich and from September 1, 1942 the territory adminis-
tered as the Generalbezirk Krim and Teilbezirk Taurien. In 1945, following 
the radical ethnic cleansing, Crimea was stripped of its pre-war autonomy 
status and became an ordinary oblast of the Russian SFSR.  
In February 1954 the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is-
sued a decree transferring the Crimean Oblast from the Russian Soviet Fed-
erative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian SSR. The transfer had been de-
scribed by official communist propaganda as a symbolic brotherly gesture 
marking the 300th anniversary of Ukraine joining the Russian Empire. This 
momentous decree by the Presidium (and not a federal law and a constitu-
tional amendment passed by the entire Supreme Soviet of the USSR) gave a 
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very dubious legal cover to a decision actually made by the Politburo of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The transfer of Crimea was 
said to has been prompted by the need to bring from Ukraine a large labor 
force and also water for irrigation. The decree however clearly violated Art. 
14 and 18 of the then valid “Stalin’s” constitution of the Soviet Union, which 
required a formal agreement between Soviet Socialist Republics to border 
changes. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR (and not the Presidium) could 
only confirm such an agreement, but not by itself pass a federal law and a 
constitutional amendment to this effect. In the case of Crimea no such par-
liamentary procedure was initiated and duly carried out in the two parlia-
ments, no relevant parliamentary sessions were held, no debates took place, 
no votes were taken and no agreement was adopted and signed. Moreover, 
the Crimean population was deprived of its right to give or deny its consent 
to the major status change. The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was thus illegal 
even in Soviet terms, unconstitutional and clearly illegitimate.  
The next status change of Crimea occurred during the process of dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991. After an all-Ukrainian referendum in 
February 1991, the Crimean Oblast was upgraded again to the status of an 
autonomous republic, this time within Ukraine. In summer 1991, an attempt-
ed coup against Michail Gorbachov took place in Crimea, where the then 
President of the Soviet Union was vacationing. The coup, its aftermath and 
the referendum on Ukraine’s independence on December 2, 1991 actually 
sealed the fate of the USSR. At the latter referendum the population of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea was not consulted on whether it desired to 
remain in Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR or alternatively to rejoin 
the Russian Federation. The Soviet Union was dissolved on December 8, 
1991 at a meeting of the heads of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Bela-
rus. At that gathering in the hunting reserve Belovezhska Pushcha, the Rus-
sian leader Boris Yeltsin failed to request from his Ukrainian colleague, Leo-
nid Kravchuk, Crimea’s return to “mother” Russia.  
On February 26, 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean ASSR, without 
the consent of Ukrainian authorities, changed the official name of the land 
into the Republic of Crimea. On May 5, 1992, the Crimean parliament pro-
claimed Crimea’s independence and passed its first constitution. Under pres-
sure from Kyiv the latter was amended on May 6, 1992 with a sentence on 
Crimea as part of Ukraine. On May 19, 1992, the proclamation of Crimean 
independence was annulled by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada (parliament). As 
a quid pro quo Kyiv agreed to strengthen Crimea’s autonomous status. Ex-
ploiting these increased legal prerogatives, the Crimean parliament estab-
lished on October 14, 1993 the post of President of Crimea and granted the 
Crimean Tatars regular representation in the consultative Council of Four-
teen. On March 17, 1995, Ukrainian parliament annulled Crimea’s constitu-
tion, removed President Yuriy Meshkov and abolished his office. The Presi-
194 Anton Bebler  
dent was charged with anti-state activities and with promoting Crimea’s se-
cession from Ukraine and its integration with the Russian Federation. 
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation by the 
Russian Federation 
Since the breakup of the USSR, political tensions between the two neigh-
bouring states – Ukraine and Russia – have continued on many issues. These 
included also those related to the status of Crimea, to the division of the So-
viet Black Sea Fleet between the two states, to the basing rights of the Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, to the Russian use of military facilities on 
Crimea, and to the number and status of the Russian military personnel on 
Ukrainian territory, etc. Since 1991, Moscow has covertly controlled and 
mostly restrained the actions of Russian separatists on Crimea considering 
friendly relations with Ukraine more important than the wishe of a majority 
among the Crimean Russians for reunification. Moscow has also maintained 
on Crimea a sizeable contingent of its own civilian (FSB) and military intel-
ligence (GRU) agents.  
Russian contingency plans for annexation of Crimea have likely been pre-
pared and regularly updated since, at least, two decades ago. In June 1993 the 
Russian State Duma adopted a resolution designating Sevastopol as a Russian 
city. In 1996 a prominent Russian geostrategist, Sergei Karaganov, wrote 
about a possible disintegration of Ukraine and the absorption of its parts by 
Russia.1 Yulia Timoshenko, the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, publicly 
warned the West in 2007 of Russia’s policy of destabilizing the Ukrainian 
government, particularly in Crimea.2 In 2008, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry 
protested against the mass distribution of Russian passports on Crimea as a 
“real problem” in conjunction with Russia’s declared policy of possible mili-
tary interventions to protect Russian citizens living abroad.3 In August 2009, 
anti-Ukrainian demonstrations broke out on Crimea calling on Russia to act 
in the same way as it did in Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia during the war 
with Georgia in 2008. 
The decision to annex Crimea at an opportune moment was probably made 
in 2008, soon after NATO at its Bucharest summit promised Ukraine (and 
Georgia) future membership in the Alliance. After Victor Yanukovich was 
elected President of Ukraine the subsequent penetration of high governmental 
offices by Russian citizens, the increased financial dependence of Ukraine on 
                                                          
1 Karaganov, Sergei. Russia and the Slav vicinity in Baranovsky, V. (1997), p. 300. 
2 Foreign Affairs, no. 3, 2007 and in Rossia v globalnoy politike, vol. 5, no. 3, 2007, pp. 104-
105. 
3 “Federal Law on the State Policy in Regard to the Fellow Citizens Residing Abroad” (1999). 
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Russia and the expanded cooperation between the two military-industrial 
complexes reduced the need for annexation. The situation changed abruptly 
on February 22, 2014 when President Yanukovich with a group of high 
Ukrainian officials closely connected to the Russian security services unex-
pectedly fled the capital and via Crimea to Russia. In violation of the proce-
dure of impeachment stipulated in Art. 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution the 
Supreme Rada (parliament) swiftly dismissed President Yanukovich and ap-
pointed a temporary President. The state takeover by groups of anti-Russian 
nationalists, openly supported by the West and the general confusion offered 
an almost ideal opportunity for the Kremlin to carry out the latest version of 
its contingency plans for annexing Crimea.  
These plans were exceptionally well executed on the military side and less 
so on the political side. Clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian pro-
testers broke out on February 26, 2014 in front of the parliament building in 
Simferopol. During these clashes and at other rallies, the pro-Russian protest-
ers were demanding the secession from Ukraine and asking for assistance 
from Moscow. In the early hours of February 27, masked armed groups 
seized and locked up government buildings in Simferopol, including the 
building of the Supreme Council of Crimea. At a behind-doors emergency 
session of the Supreme Council, Sergey Aksyonov of the hitherto marginal 
Party of Russian Unity and himself a Russian from Moldova was appointed 
the new Prime Minister of Crimea. The Supreme Council also voted to hold a 
referendum on the status of Crimea. On February 28, 2014, a group of over 
20 deputies submitted to the Speaker of the Russian State Duma a draft 
amendment to the constitutional law on admitting new subjects to the Rus-
sian Federation. The draft specifically justified the incorporation of parts of 
Ukraine into the Russian Federation on the grounds of alleged Ukrainian dis-
crimination of national minorities. A day later, the Qurultay (Assembly) of 
the Crimean Tatars voted on the “Implementation of the Right of Crimean 
Tatar People to Self-Determination in Their Historical Territory-Crimea”. 
With 212 votes for, one against and four abstained, it was decided to start 
political and legal procedures to restore the national-territorial autonomy of 
the Tatars on Crimea. 
Launched into action on February 28, 2014 regular Russian forces, assist-
ed by local “self-defense” militias swiftly seized the strategically important 
Perekop Istmus, blocked or cut off most land, sea and air connections be-
tween Crimea and mainland Ukraine, took over all Crimean ports and air-
ports, radio and TV stations, blocked and occupied all installations of the 
Ukrainian Army and Navy, and expropriated practically all of their stocks of 
arms and ammunition. They also assisted and protected unlawful actions by 
Russian separatists and thus enabled Crimea’s amputation from the Republic 
of Ukraine. The military take-over of Crimea was obviously well-prepared, 
rehearsed in advance and professionally executed. Assembled for this opera-
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tion were about 2,000 naval infantrymen (marines), stationed in and around 
Sevastopol, about 7,000 special troops brought to Crimea in early March 
mostly by air as well as about 15,000 troops transported by ferries to Kerch 
across the straits. These additional units came mainly from the Russian 
Southern Military District. At the time of occupation, the Russian operational 
headquarters, probably located in Rostov, had on its disposal on Crimea 
about 30,000 troops.4 The forces participating in the Crimean operation were 
much better organized, trained and armed than the Russian units engaged in 
the war with Georgia were in 2008. This time they also used a novel tactic 
with an emphasis on the economy of effort. The Russian command actively 
engaged fewer than 10,000 assault troops, mostly on wheeled BTR-80 ar-
moured personnel carriers. The masked “green men” were a hybrid between 
regular infantry and anti-terrorist police units having a secret chain of com-
mand and bearing no insignia or visible rank on their combat fatigues. All 
this was clearly designed to conceal the state identity of the invading force.  
The easy success of the three week-long operation was to a large extent 
facilitated by several factors. The takeover was warmly greeted by a good 
part of the Crimean population. The Russian marines were already legally 
stationed at Sevastopol, could well in advance reconnoitre the field and acted 
unopposed by Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian security agencies had totally 
failed to detect these preparations, to warn the Kyiv authorities and to take 
precautionary measures. The short distances to the most important strategic 
locations on Crimea, including Simferopol international airport, allowed for 
the quick insertion of air – transported special troops from Russia and easy 
acquisition of all targets. Ukrainian military personnel stationed in Crimea 
were not given orders to resist with arms and thus all 190 military installa-
tions and practically all weapons were simply surrendered. About 22,000 
Ukrainian military personnel capitulated without a shot fired. Moreover, a 
majority of them switched their loyalty. Most of the Ukrainian Navy was also 
captured by the Russian military without resistance. The Ukrainian com-
manding officers did not even try to sail off with their ships and crews in 
order to reach Ukrainian mainland ports. Only a few of the serviceable air-
craft of the Ukrainian Navy escaped the capture. The Crimean police person-
nel either failed to act or cooperated with the Russian Special Forces and 
Crimean separatists. Although the Russian Armed Forces de facto occupied 
Crimea, they did not establish a military occupation regime. International law 
namely prohibits an occupying power to create another state on the occupied 
territory or to annex it. 
The referendum on Crimea’s reuniting with the Russian Federation was 
called on February 27, 2014, on too short a notice. The time pressure very 
probably did not allow for and, more importantly, the Crimean secessionist 
                                                          
4 Hannes, Adomeit (2014), p. 7. 
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authorities were not interested in updating the voters’ registers and in pre-
venting multiple voting, obviously by the proponents of secession. The refer-
endum on March 16, 2014 reportedly passed peacefully and orderly but in 
several important respects did not conform to high democratic standards. The 
ballot contained two questions and only one positive response was considered 
valid: 
1. Do you support rejoining Crimea with Russia as a subject of the 
Russian Federation? 
2. Do you support restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic 
of Crimea and Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine? 
The ballot omitted two other possible choices – remaining part of Ukraine 
under the current constitutional structure or Crimea’s independent statehood. 
The time shortage did not allow for a real and substantive public debate on 
such a momentous issue. The referendum was held under the irregular condi-
tions of Russian military occupation. The presence in public places of armed 
local Russian irregulars, of Russian Cossacks and even Serbian “Chetniks”, 
as well as of masked “little green men” undoubtedly belonging to the Russian 
Armed Forces, certainly had an intimidating effect on the opponents of 
Criea’s secession. 
According to the Crimean authorities, 81.36 percent of the registered vot-
ers took part in Crimea’s referendum and 96.77 percent of them voted for its 
separation from Ukraine and for reuniting with Russia. The official figures of 
the voters’ participation and on the approval rate however could not be veri-
fied by impartial international observers and were probably artificially inflat-
ed in order to legitimize Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Federation. 
The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Didier Burkhalter, did not accept an invi-
tation by Crimea’s authorities to send ODIHR observers, citing the unconsti-
tutional nature of the referendum. In addition, the invitation did not come 
from an OSCE participating state. Individually and selectively invited Euro-
pean observers stated that the referendum was carried out without violence 
and visible irregularities. The representatives of the Crimean Tatars denied 
the official results reflecting the position of a presumed majority among Cri-
mea’s indigenous minority population who opposed the separation from 
Ukraine and boycotted the referendum. The main reason for this attitude was 
the painful collective memory of Russian colonialism and of the terror, de-
portation, harsh exile and collective discrimination in the XXth century, 
which were for many decades carried out by the Russian-speaking Soviet 
authorities. A good number of Crimean Ukrainians probably departed before 
the vote, abstained, or voted against the secession. The Ukrainian authorities 
refused to recognize the legality of the referendum and its outcome on consti-
tutional grounds. This opinion was shared by the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission and by a number of EU and NATO member states. 
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Despite numerous shortcomings of the referendum, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the Russian-speaking majority among the Crimean population 
generally favoured Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and its rejoining Russia. 
Their attitudes probably reflected the deep dissatisfaction with the dismal 
state of economic and political affairs in Ukraine and with the widespread 
incompetence and rampant corruption in Kyiv and also in Eastern Ukraine. In 
these respects the feelings of the Crimean Russian speakers largely coincided 
with the feelings of many ethnic Ukrainians, and also those of the Maidan 
protesters. The very unwise bill - hastily passed by the Ukrainian parliament - 
abolishing the official status of the Russian language was also aptly used by 
the separatists and Russian mass media to scare off Russian speakers in 
Ukraine (N.B. The law was vetoed by the interim President and never went 
into effect). Most Russians on Crimea apparently did not want any longer to 
be a national minority in Ukraine, forced to learn and use another official 
language, Moreover, they were promised by the separatists, and indeed ex-
pected, a tangible improvement of their standard of living, including, at least, 
twice as high Russian wages and retirement benefits, etc. These factors help 
to explain to a great extent the outcome of Crimea’s referendum.  
On March 17, 2014, Crimea declared its independence and asked the Rus-
sian Federation to join it. The Sevastopol City Council requested the port’s 
separate admission as a federal city. On March 18, 2014, a treaty on incorpo-
rating Crimea and Sevastopol was signed in Moscow. In only five days the 
“Constitutional Law on admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of 
Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent 
Entities the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevasto-
pol” was quickly railroaded through the Russian Federal Assembly, signed 
by the Russian President and entered into force. 
The Ukrainian government accused the Russian Federation of committing 
a blatant aggression and of violating the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and 
numerous international treaties and agreements. On the other hand, President 
Vladimir Putin used the right of the Crimean people to self-determination in 
the form of secession as the chief argument to justify and legitimize the an-
nexation.5 Russia’s much stronger historic claim to Crimea was also stated. 
Russia conquered Crimea and de facto possessed it much longer than Ukraine 
(for around 168 years vs. 60 years). In his Presidential address to the Federal 
Assembly on December 4, 2014, Vladimir Putin stressed the strategic im-
portance of the peninsula also as “the spiritual source” of the Russian nation 
and state. He added a religions argument erroneously claiming that Grand 
Prince Vladimir of Kyiv was baptized on Crimea. According to V. Putin, 
Crimea has had “invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for 
                                                          
5 N.B. Art. 5 of the Russian Constitution contains a provision for the right of the peoples to 
self-determination but, likewise, does not confer to them the right to secede from the Rus-
sian Federation. 
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Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and 
Judaism”.6 Moreover, the reunification in 2014 was said to undo the uncon-
stitutional and unjust separation of Crimea from Russia sixty years earlier 
and was achieved without known victims. 
In the framework of Ukrainian constitutional and legal order the holding 
of the referendum on March 16, 2014 and the declaration of independence 
were clearly illegal and unconstitutional. Article 73 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine namely effectively bars secessions by prescribing: “Alterations to 
the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by the all-Ukrainian 
referendum”. However, most declarations of independence have been uncon-
stitutional, including the declaration of USA in 1776 and, more recently, Ko-
sovo’s declaration in 2008. The International Court of Justice, in its opinion 
issued in July 2013, concluded that the Kosovo declaration did not violate the 
norms of international public law.  
President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Russian separatists in Crimea 
used the Kosovo example to justify their actions. There have been indeed 
several similarities between the Kosovo and Crimea cases. A forceful separa-
tion from Serbia and Ukraine were achieved through military interventions 
unauthorized by the UN Security Council and thus violated international law. 
Russian officials and propaganda have however consistently omitted very 
important differences. The Russian-speaking population of Crimea has not 
experienced anything similar to the protracted repression by central authori-
ties, massive and grave violations of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, the de facto abolition of Crimea’s autonomous status, massive discrim-
ination and firing of Russians from the public sector, mass displacement and 
expulsion of several hundred thousand Russians and several thousand deaths. 
Prior to its separation from Ukraine, Crimea and the ethnic Russians, as no 
other Russian minority in ex-Soviet republics, had enjoyed in Ukraine very 
considerable autonomy and protection of human rights and fundamental free-
doms. Although there was no need, unlike in Kosovo, to apply on humanitar-
ian grounds the “responsibility to protect”, the majority among the population 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea nevertheless claimed and, with deci-
sive outside military assistance realized its right to self-determination. 
Whether it was entitled to exercise this right is a debatable legal proposition.7 
This right was flatly denied to it by the Soviet Communist authorities in 1954 
and ignored by the Russian and Ukrainian leaders in 1991. Moreover, the 
Russian-speaking majority in Crimea has relatively peacefully expressed and 
exercised this right, in conformity with principle 8 of the Helsinki Final Act. 
The two sizeable minority communities (Ukrainians and Tatars) apparently 
                                                          
6 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23341 (12-
12-14). 
7 Burke-White, William. Crimea and the International Legal Order. In Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, 
August-September 2014, pp. 65-80. 
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acquiesced to the desire of the Russian-speaking majority. These facts confer 
a measure of legitimacy to Crimea’s secession and to its reunification with 
the Russian Federation.  
Crimea, the war in mainland Ukraine and the international 
community 
The annexation of Crimea encouraged the Russian-speaking separatists in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine who apparently hoped that Moscow will repeat 
the same scenario. The mass unrest, anti-Kyiv demonstrations, tearing down 
Ukrainian state symbols and hoisting up Russian national flags, breaking-in 
and occupying numerous official buildings took place in April 2014 in a 
number of Ukrainian cities. In Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk and Odessa “Peo-
ple’s Republics” were proclaimed. Numerous Crimean Russians have pre-
sumably also participated in these events.  
There have been however considerable differences between Crimea and 
“Novorossia” as the South Eastern part of the Republic of Ukraine used to be 
called by the Russian imperial authorities in the past and recently again in the 
Russian mass media and occasionally also by Russian politicians. “No-
vorossia” and particularly the area of Donbass have been much more closely 
economically and energy-wise connected with and more important to the 
Russian Federation than Crimea. “Novorossia” contains a somewhat lower 
percentage of ethnic Russians but together with numerous other Russian-
speakers (including many ethnic Ukrainians) they constitute a strong regional 
majority. Unlike Crimea “Novorossia” has been legally part of Ukraine since 
1921, with only one exception during the Second World War. The flare-up of 
unrest and subsequently of violence in the Donbass area had however a 
somewhat different origin. It expressed regional grievances against Kyiv cen-
tralism, the defense of Russian language rights which were attacked by 
Ukrainian nationalists and the strong opposition to the “fascists” who “staged 
a coup” in the capital. The unrest in “Novorossia” has quickly deteriorated 
from peaceful demonstrations to seizures of state institutions and clashes with 
the Ukrainian security forces. In a stark contrast with the development in 
Crimea the unrest finally degenerated into a full-fledged civil war in which 
the insurgents had enjoyed the critically needed assistance from across the 
long and unmarked border with the Russian Federation. In the war heavy 
conventional weapons (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and rock-
ets) had been used by both sides, while helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft by 
the Ukrainian Army only. Undiscriminate massive shelling and rocket attacks 
of Donetsk, other towns and settlements caused numerous deaths also among 
the civilian population. These attacks constituted grave violations of Interna-
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tional humanitarian law, initially only and later more often by the Ukrainian 
side than by the insurgents. 
The conflict over Crimea and the war in mainland Ukraine have developed 
in an international environment which, apart from the two directly involved 
states, included other important actors. These have been the European Union, 
NATO, OSCE, UN, USA, Germany, France, Poland et.al. The Russian lead-
ership has for many years openly opposed Ukraine’s integration into the eco-
nomic, and hence also political, “West” and in particular the possibility of its 
NATO membership. This Russian position has been well known but consist-
ently ignored by Western leaders who insisted on every European state’s le-
gal right to freely decide on its association with other states, including on 
membership either in EU or NATO. The high representatives of the Soviet 
Union and of its legal successor – the Russian Federation – officially recog-
nized this right of all European states in several documents, including the 
“Charter of Paris for a new Europe” (1990). However, in practice the imple-
mentation of this abstract legal right depends on and is conditioned by a 
number of internal political and wider geopolitical, also constraining, consid-
erations. 
In his keynote speech at a joint session of the two chambers of the Russian 
parliament on March 18, 2014, President Vladimir Putin clearly stated the 
geopolitical rationale for the annexation of Crimea. NATO’s presence in 
close proximity to Russia’s Southern borders, “directly in front of the Rus-
sian home”, “on Russia’s historic territories” remains utterly unacceptable to 
President Putin and to the Russian elite. The sheer possibility of Ukraine’s 
membership in NATO and of Crimea’s and Sevastopol’s inclusion into the 
North Atlantic Treaty area have been viewed by Putin as an acute threat to 
the security of Southern Russia. The NATO plans to place US antiballistic 
missiles in Romania and Bulgaria have accentuated the threat perception. In 
order to not be “lost in the near future”, Crimea needed to be under “a strong 
and steady sovereignty…” which “could be only Russian”.8 President Vladi-
mir Putin’s statement expressed the primary motivation of the Russian lead-
ership – the annexation prevented Crimea’s conceivable inclusion into the 
North Atlantic Treaty area and Sevastopol’s becoming a NATO naval base.  
The Russian actions in 2014 related to Ukraine and Crimea were thus 
largely – if not primarily – provoked by the EU and NATO encroachment 
into the ex-Soviet space. To a considerable but critical extent, Crimea’s 
straightforward annexation was Moscow’s forceful reaction to the intention 
of the US administration under George W. Bush to bring Ukraine (and Geor-
gia) into NATO. The key European members of NATO did not support the 
US proposal to issue a straightforward invitation to Ukraine but as a com-
promise agreed to include the promise of membership in the conclusions of 
                                                          
8 Kremlin. Address by President of the Russian Federation, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 
(18-3-14). 
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the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008. This promise was not preceded by a 
careful examination of its medium and long-term security and political con-
sequences and of the Alliance’s ability to bear their burden. This unwise de-
cision, despite having neither a date of admission nor the inclusion into the 
Membership Action Plan, was repeated in NATO’s later documents. Alt-
hough the promise did not entail an Art. 5 guarantee, it morally implied that 
the states promised membership would not be left “cold in the rain” if their 
territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be grossly violated. Yet, Ukraine 
in 2014 (and earlier Georgia in 2008) were in fact effectively punished by the 
Russian Federation while NATO basically stood by. These facts certainly has 
not increased the Alliance’s credibility. The “misguided strategy” by the 
USA and NATO has been to a large extent responsible for the crisis in and 
partial disintegration of Ukraine.9 In September 2014 NATO indirectly ad-
mitted the mistake when the Wales Summit Declaration did not repeat the 
promise to Ukraine. 
Moscow’s action on Crimea expressed its defiance of NATO’s further en-
largement into Russia’s backyard. It could be more generally understood as 
its renunciation of the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic area formed 
after the end of the “Cold War” and as a demand for a redefinition of legiti-
mate “zones of interest” in Europe. It could be also taken as a stern warning 
to other ex-Soviet republics to behave, for instance, to Kazakhstan and Azer-
baijan. 
The occupation and annexation of Crimea has generated a vivid reaction in 
the international community, in the form of diplomatic protests, declarations 
and resolutions passed by international organizations among other things. On 
March 15, 2014 the UN Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution, 
sponsored by the United States, which urged the UN members not to recog-
nize the results of the Crimean referendum. Thirteen of the Council’s 15 
members voted in favour, Russia voted against the draft while China ab-
stained. On March 27, 2014 the UN General Assembly however adopted a 
resolution on Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The resolution condemned the 
annexation of Crimea, declared the referendum “non-valid” and appealed to 
the international community not to recognize changes in the status of Crimea. 
A majority of one hundred UN members supported the resolution while 11 
voted against it. The vote showed the Russian Federation’s considerable dip-
lomatic isolation. Understanding and support for its action were expressed by 
states such as North Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, North Korea and by four Latin 
American countries. Among the ex-Soviet republics, only states highly de-
pendent on Russia, namely Armenia and Belarus, voted with in Russia’s fa-
vour, while Ukraine and Georgia understandably condemned the Russian 
                                                          
9 Mearsheimer, John J. Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault. In Foreign Affairs, Sep-
tember-October, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/
why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault (12-9-14). 
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action. The annexation put a large group of 58 states (including the BRICS 
members China, India, Brazil and South Africa) into a delicate situation. 
While supporting the principle of territorial integrity of member states they 
for various reasons did not want to condemn the Russian Federation and de-
cided to abstain.  
Active condemnation of Russia’s action was expressed in the strongest 
terms by a number of EU and NATO members, including those from Eastern 
Europe. It was shared also by many non-aligned states who, as a matter of 
principle, oppose any infringement on the territorial integrity of member 
states. On April 1, 2014, the foreign ministers of NATO member states con-
demned the annexation of Crimea and qualified it as illegal and illegitimate. 
They also approved a number of measures negatively affecting NATO’s rela-
tions with the Russian Federation. On September 5, 2014, leaders at the 
NATO Summit in Wales called on the Russian Federation to “reverse” the 
annexation of Crimea and declared the suspension of all practical, civilian 
and military cooperation and the freezing of the activities of the bilateral fo-
rum, the NATO-Russian Council. The ministers also decided to assist 
Ukraine with advisory teams, to support Ukraine’s defence reforms and to 
boost NATO’s collective defence posture by demonstrative deployments of 
its assets in land, air and sea configurations within the North Atlantic treaty 
area geographically close to Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The United 
States and later the European Union added to these measures economic and 
political sanctions targeting among others, a group of prominent Russian and 
Crimean personalities. 
The conflict over Crimea and the related conflict in South Eastern Ukraine 
raised the fears of escalation to a hot war between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation. The shooting down, of the Malaysia Airlines flight 017 on July 
17, 2014, which killed three hundred innocent civilians, further sharpened the 
political confrontation between EU, USA and NATO, on the one hand, and 
the Russian Federation, on the other. The confrontation has worsened the 
general political climate in the Euro-Atlantic area. Some aspects of the con-
frontation and of the Western sanctions bore resemblance with the “Cold 
War” period. The conflict over Crimea and its further ramifications have had 
a number of other negative international effects. The substantive breach by 
the Russian Federation of its obligations to Ukraine under the Budapest 
Memorandum (1994) certainly weakened the nuclear non-proliferation re-
gime. The conflict also brought the US-Russia talks on anti-ballistic defence 
and on other strategic issues to an end, although they were already in deep 
troubles. Russian non-compliance with its obligations of notification and the 
international observation of large movements of troops in border areas 
harmed the system of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) 
under the OSCE Vienna Documents (1990, 1994). The Crimean conflict 
heightened the sense of insecurity in states bordering on the Russian Federa-
204 Anton Bebler  
tion, particularly those having within their borders Russian minorities. These 
states are most concerned with the possible resurrection of Russian neoimpe-
rialism, while the former Soviet republics with a new, narrower version of 
L. Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty”. All this resulted in increased 
defense appropriations and the reintroduction of military draft in Lithuania. 
The Crimean affair has also reduced the possibility of de-escalation in several 
“frozen” conflicts on the ex-Soviet periphery, e.g., over Transnistria. 
The application of EU and US sanctions raised the question of their objec-
tives, effectiveness and consequences. The true objectives of the sanctions 
have been never clearly staled. These could be: a) a restitution of Crimea to 
Ukraine, b) the termination of Moscow’s support to the separatists in Eastern 
Ukraine and exerting pressure on them to desist and return to Kyiv’s rule, c) 
to force Moscow to agree to further EU’s and NATO’s enlargement into the 
post-Soviet space, d) to effect a regime change in the Kremlin and “shackle” 
the disobedient Russian “bear”.  
President Vladimir Putin apparently firmly believes in the latter.10 Wash-
ington’s hostility to Russia has been evident, according to him, already earli-
er and Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis were used only as a pretext to mobi-
lize its European allies for an anti-Russian action. It is an irony that US initi-
ated and has pressed for sanctions against Russia while having openly admit-
ted the failure of its own sanctions applied for 50 years against an incompa-
rably smaller, weaker and much more vulnerable state – Cuba. The war of 
sanctions with the Russian Federation economically harm also Europe, but 
not US. Most importantly they are not likely to achieve any of the above-
stated objectives. This is certainly true of the prohibition of military exports 
due to the near self-sufficiency in arms of the second largest exporter of 
weapons world-wide. In addition this ban is to be applied to new contracts 
only. It is clear, that no kind and no intensity of international sanctions will 
ever return Crimea to Ukraine. In this particular sense, the application of 
economic sanctions by the European Union is pointless. They have had no 
educational or deterrent effect. Moscow politically cannot and will not allow 
a military defeat of the separatists – turned – autonomists in Eastern Ukraine. 
Generally, sanctions often provide results contrary to those intended. The war 
of sanctions already strengthened the autocratic elements of Vladimir Putin’s 
regime and slowed down or stopped altogether internal political and econom-
ic reforms in Russia favoured by the West. The absence, so far, of a direct 
and massive military intervention by the Russian Army could be not attribut-
ed to the Western sanctions. The Crimean scenario has not been repeated for 
a number of other reasons. An open and massive Russian invasion would 
have caused an all-out war between Russia and Ukraine, with catastrophic 
consequences. Although quickly victorious on the battlefield, the Russian 
                                                          
10 News conference of Vladimir Putin, December 18, 2014. 
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forces would face the prospect of waging for many years a bloody anti- guer-
rilla warfare, similar to that in Western Ukraine in 1945-1949. The human, 
political and economic costs of a massive invasion and of the protracted oc-
cupation of Eastern Ukraine would far outweigh any possible gains for Rus-
sia.  
By February 15, 2015 the civil war in Ukraine affected more than five mil-
lion of its inhabitants, caused about 6.700 dead (recorded by the UN and 
OSCE plus probably at least eight thousand unrecorded deaths), more than 
eleven thousand wounded, over a million and a half internally displaced per-
sons and refugees and a huge economic damage. An agreement reached in 
Minsk by the highest representatives of the Russian Federation, Germany, 
France and Ukraine allowed for a ceasefire starting on February 18, 2015, the 
removal of heavily weapons from a wide tampon zone, exchange of prisoners 
and other measures of normalization. An associated protocol signed separate-
ly by the former President L. Kuchma, Russian Ambassador in Ukraine, two 
leaders of the insurgents and an OSCE mediator obliged Ukraine to imple-
ment by the end of 2015 a constitutional reform allowing for autonomy with-
in Ukraine of parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. New local elec-
tion are to be held according to Ukrainian law. If these and other measures 
are implemented. Ukraine would eventually reinstate its control over the en-
tire interstate border with the Russian Federation etc. The very different 
course of events in territorially undefined “Novorossia” has led thus, so far, 
to an outcome of the conflict quite different than that in Crimea.  
There have been many commentaries and a number of proposals on how to 
deal with the conflict related to Crimea and Ukraine. Some commentaries 
openly try to revive the spirit of the “Cold War” depicting President Putin as 
a new Hitler and presenting Russia’s behaviour as a threat to the very founda-
tions of international security, international law and even to the liberal West. 
More realistic commentaries, on the other hand, admit the mistake made by 
NATO and propose that the Alliance assures Moscow that it will not draw 
Ukraine into its membership (H. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski). Some proposals 
demand that Russia, in exchange for normalisation of relations, recognizes 
Ukraine’s sovereignty over autonomous Crimea (i.a. H. Kissinger). Another 
suggestion was made by M. O’Hanlon and J. Shapiro requesting a repeated 
and binding referendum on Crimea, this time under international supervi-
sion.11 The same authors propose as other conditions for gradual lifting of 
sanctions: a verifiable removal of Russian “volunteers” from Eastern 
Ukraine, Russia’s guarantees of mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the 
                                                          
11 N.B. A representative public opinion poll conducted by OSCE could be more palatable to 
Moscow. O’Hanlon, Michael, Shapiro, Jeremy. Crafting a win-win-win for Russia, Ukraine 
and the West. Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/crafting-a-win-
win-win-for-russia-ukraine-and-the-west/2014/12/05/727d6c92-7be1-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bf
f8_story.html (7-1-15). 
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termination of NATO’s enlargement and making Ukraine’s relations with EU 
compatible with its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.  
Crimea covers 26,200 square kilometres and had in 2007 about 2,3 million 
inhabitants. In terms of its territory and/or population, Crimea is thus larger 
than each of the five small members of the European Union (Luxemburg, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta), not to mention the five internationally 
recognized mini-states (Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Holy See-
Vatican, Andorra) and the five unrecognized or less than universally recog-
nized but de facto existing states or state-like entities in Europe. According to 
the last Ukrainian census held in 2001, 58 percent of Crimea’s population 
were ethnic Russians, 24 percent ethnic Ukrainians and about 12 percent 
Crimean Tatars. The actual number and percentage of Russians were proba-
bly higher than was stated in the official Ukrainian count. There is no current 
data on the additional influx of Russian military, security and civilian per-
sonnel since March 2014 and on a considerable number of inhabitants (most-
ly Ukrainians and Tatars) who have reportedly left Crimea.  
The Republic of Crimea and the federal city Sevastopol are today de facto 
parts of the Russian Federation constituting the Crimean Federal District and 
part of Russia’s Southern Military District. On April 11, 2014 a new constitu-
tion was adopted by the Republic of Crimea. A public opinion poll conducted 
in Crimea in January 2015 by a Canadian Berta Communication Company 
showed that a vast majority of respondents supported the reunification with 
the Russian Federation. The violence and destruction in the Donbass area 
have strongly confirmed this decision of Crimea Russians. Most of the inter-
national community, however, does not recognize the annexation by the Rus-
sian Federation and considers the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as still 
belonging to Ukraine. On April 15, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament declared 
Crimea and Sevastopol “occupied territories”. Dmitri Medvedev, Russian 
Prime Minister, on the other hand, declared that the present status of Crimea 
is a non-negotiable “closed chapter”.12 The political and legal stand-off be-
tween Ukraine and the Russian Federation will undoubtedly continue indefi-
nitely having created a new and long lasting “frozen” conflict in Europe. 
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